TO GET a sense of what Donald Trump’s first week did to the federal government, talk to people who work in it. “I’ve been with the government for over 10 years, I lived through the first Trump administration, and nothing compares to this,” says one Treasury employee. Some workers are busy scrubbing their personal social media for items that could be interpreted as disloyal. Others are scrubbing up their resumes, anticipating that they will soon be looking for new work. Those who plan to stay expect their jobs to get worse, as colleagues flee or are not replaced. Everyone is “in absolute panic mode”, says another senior civil servant.
As a candidate, Mr Trump promised that he would “shatter the deep state”. Since taking office, it has become more clear what he meant. In a barrage of executive orders, Mr Trump has asserted that he can do just about whatever he likes to the federal government. He has, he claims, “sole and exclusive authority” over the executive branch, to include hiring, firing and all spending decisions. In effect, Mr Trump is claiming he is not merely a president, putting into action laws enacted by the legislature. He is claiming to be something closer to a king, able to withhold or redirect expenditure as he sees fit.
On January 27th Mr Trump revealed quite how far he intends to push. He decreed that all grants and loans that the federal government makes—excepting disbursements for Social Security, Medicare, and some other vaguely defined categories—would be suspended the following day, even though Congress had approved them. This apparent usurpation of Congress’s role under Article I of the constitution was “sweeping and vast” and “really, really illegal”, says Eloise Pasachoff of Georgetown University law school. The memo laid out no legal justification for the freeze and on the evening of January 28th, a federal judge stopped it temporarily. The next day, the administration rescinded its memo; what happens next is unclear. A parallel freeze of all foreign aid created similar chaos.
In the meantime Mr Trump has launched an extralegal power grab almost as ambitious against the federal bureaucracy—the over 2m civil servants who actually implement federal policy. He has directly fired dozens of senior staff, including senior immigration officials, Department of Justice prosecutors and others he and his appointees have identified as being hostile to his goals. These included more than a dozen inspectors general (watchdogs who investigate departmental efficiency and wrongdoing). In the case of the inspectors general, the president is required by law to give 30 days notice and an explicit reason to justify firing. He did neither.
These decisions came on top of a complete hiring freeze across most departments (the military, immigration authorities, as well as jobs related to social security and veterans healthcare are exempt). He also reinstated an unimplemented order from his last term allowing his administration to redesignate any career civil service job as a political job, and thereby remove the usual job protections and sack whomever he wants. He has also pledged to shut down all “diversity, equity and inclusion” jobs, known as “deiA”, in government. To top it off, he banned all work from home.
The aim is transparently to get federal workers who do not like Mr Trump to leave. On January 28th, an email went out from the Office of Personnel Management (opm) offering every single federal employee “deferred resignation”. Essentially, the terms were: agree to leave this financial year and you can work from home until then. The touches—including instructions to reply with the word “RESIGN” by February 6th—implied the influence of Elon Musk, the billionaire head of Mr Trump’s “Department of Government Efficiency”, or “doge”. Since the opm is not actually a corporate hr department, the offer is unlikely to withstand scrutiny. Federal tech employees report that outsiders, many seemingly junior employees of Mr Musk’s companies, have come into offices to take over government it systems and do “code reviews”.
Were Mr Trump to make these changes stick—a questionable prospect—it would amount to “probably the most fundamental alteration of the civil service system since 1883” says Don Moynihan, of the Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan (a verdict many in the White House would love). The president appears to have little interest in the idea that most government officials should be non-partisan specialists whose expertise is deployed to keep the public safe, among other benefits. Under Mr Trump’s plan, decisions about hiring and firing would be made by his political appointees.
According to Max Stier, of the Partnership for Public Service, a charity which works to improve government, Mr Trump is “tearing apart the civil service” so as to recreate “the spoils system” of government that persisted until the end of the 19th century. That was a model whereby new presidents came in and immediately distributed jobs to their pals as a reward for supporting their election campaigns.
Will he succeed? This seems unlikely, says Larry Jacobs, of the University of Minnesota. “Mr Trump’s orders, he says, are “impressively sweeping and breathtaking in their institutional arrogance” but he argues that much of what Mr Trump is trying to do will probably be undone by the courts or Congress. He points out that even after Mr Trump appointed sympathetic new members in his last term, the Supreme Court often overruled him. Congress has ceded much power to the presidency, but controlling the federal purse is a prerogative it is unlikely to yield readily.
Yet it could take years for challenges to work their way through the courts. The damage done in the meantime could be considerable. Employees who find other jobs after being pushed out will not necessarily return just because a court says their dismissal was wrong. Talented new hires will not join. And with government lawyers cowed by fears of firing, all manner of illegality could reign. Mr Stier worries about things like the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice being used to punish Mr Trump’s enemies, without civil service lawyers able to say no.
Even the best-case outcome is not good. In the last Trump administration, hiring freezes caused parts of government to shrink and jam up (see chart). Some of this may have been intended: the issuing of green cards and citizenship applications ground to a halt thanks in part to cuts at the State Department. But queues also lengthened for basic government services like getting passports, or tax refunds.
Chart: The Economist
The “swamp”, as Mr Trump might call it, may feel like a lot of busybodies in Washington dc pushing around bits of paper. It is certainly true that it can often be slow, rule-bound and unaccountable. But a system based more on political loyalty than on merit is one primed for failure. Bureaucrats make sure that foods are not poisonous; that cars do not explode when they crash; and that toxic waste is not dumped into the wilderness. “The federal government is very vulnerable,” says Paul Light, a political scientist at New York University. Mr Trump, he says, risks becoming “the president of ‘I didn’t give a shit and a lot of people got killed.’” Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown. ■
NORMALLY, GAVIN NEWSOM is loose. The Democratic governor of California talks with a staccato cadence, often flitting from one incomplete thought to the next. When he talks to journalists or asks a guest on his podcast a meandering question, he tends to use a lot of meaningless filler words: “in the context of” is a frequent Newsomism. But on June 10th he was clear and direct. “This brazen abuse of power by a sitting president inflamed a combustible situation,” he said during a televised address after President Donald Trump deployed nearly 5,000 troops to Los Angeles to quell protests over immigration raids. “We do not want our streets militarised by our own armed forces. Not in LA. Not in California. Not anywhere.”
A woman shops at a supermarket on April 30, 2025 in Arlington, Virginia.
Sha Hanting | China News Service | Getty Images
Consumers in the early part of June took a considerably less pessimistic about the economy and potential surges in inflation as progress appeared possible in the global trade war, according to a University of Michigan survey Friday.
The university’s closely watched Surveys of Consumers showed across-the-board rebounds from previously dour readings, while respondents also sharply cut back their outlook for near-term inflation.
For the headline index of consumer sentiment, the gauge was at 60.5, well ahead of the Dow Jones estimate for 54 and a 15.9% increase from a month ago. The current conditions index jumped 8.1%, while the future expectations measure soared 21.9%.
The moves coincided with a softening in the heated rhetoric that has surrounded President Donald Trump’s tariffs. After releasing his April 2 “liberation day” announcement, Trump has eased off the threats and instituted a 90-day negotiation period that appears to be showing progress, particularly with top trade rival China.
“Consumers appear to have settled somewhat from the shock of the extremely high tariffs announced in April and the policy volatility seen in the weeks that followed,” survey director Joanne Hsu said in a statement. “However, consumers still perceive wide-ranging downside risks to the economy.”
To be sure, all of the sentiment indexes were still considerably below their year-ago readings as consumers worry about what impact the tariffs will have on prices, along with a host of other geopolitical concerns.
On inflation, the one-year outlook tumbled from levels not seen since 1981.
The one-year estimate slid to 5.1%, a 1.5 percentage point drop, while the five-year view edged lower to 4.1%, a 0.1 percentage point decrease.
“Consumers’ fears about the potential impact of tariffs on future inflation have softened somewhat in June,” Hsu said. “Still, inflation expectations remain above readings seen throughout the second half of 2024, reflecting widespread beliefs that trade policy may still contribute to an increase in inflation in the year ahead.”
The Michigan survey, which will be updated at the end of the month, had been an outlier on inflation fears, with other sentiment and market indicators showing the outlook was fairly contained despite the tariff tensions. Earlier this week, the Federal Reserve of New York reported that the one-year view had fallen to 3.2% in May, a 0.4 percentage point drop from the prior month.
At the same time, the Bureau of Labor Statistics this week reported that both producer and consumer prices increase just 0.1% on a monthly basis, pointing toward little upward pressure from the duties. Economists still largely expect the tariffs to show impact in the coming months.
The soft inflation numbers have led Trump and other White House officials to demand the Fed start lowering interest rates again. The central bank is slated to meet next week, with market expectations strongly pointing to no cuts until September.
LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM – MARCH 26, 2025: Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves leaves 11 Downing Street ahead of the announcement of the Spring Statement in the House of Commons in London, United Kingdom on March 26, 2025. (Photo credit should read Wiktor Szymanowicz/Future Publishing via Getty Images)
Britain’s government is planning to ramp up public spending — but market watchers warn the proposals risk sending jitters through the bond market further inflating the country’s $143 billion-a-year interest payments.
U.K. Finance Minister Rachel Reeves on Wednesday announced the government would inject billions of pounds into defense, healthcare, infrastructure, and other areas of the economy, in the coming years. A day later, however, official data showed the U.K. economy shrank by a greater-than-expected 0.3% in April.
Funding public spending in the absence of a growing economy, leaves the government with two options: raise money through taxation, or take on more debt.
One way it can borrow is to issue bonds, known as gilts in the U.K., into the public market. By purchasing gilts, investors are essentially lending money to the government, with the yield on the bond representing the return the investor can expect to receive.
Gilt yields and prices move in opposite directions — so rising prices move yields lower, and vice versa. This year, gilt yields have seen volatile moves, with investors sensitive to geopolitical and macroeconomic instability.
Official estimates show the government is expected to spend more than £105 billion ($142.9 billion) paying interest on its national debt in the 2025 fiscal year — £9.4 billion higher than at the the time of the Autumn budget last year — and £111 billion in annual interest in 2026.
The government did not say on Wednesday how its newly unveiled spending hikes will be funded, and did not respond to CNBC’s request for comment about where the money will come from. However, in her Autumn Budget last year, Reeves outlined plans to hike both taxes and borrowing. Following the budget, the finance minister pledged not to raise taxes again during the current Labour government’s term in office, saying that the government “won’t have to do a budget like this ever again.”
Andrew Goodwin, chief U.K. economist at Oxford Economics, said Britain’s government may be forced to go even further with its spending plans, with NATO poised to hike its defense spending target for member states to 5% of GDP, and once a U-turn on winter fuel payments for the elderly and other possible welfare reforms are factored in.
Additionally, Goodwin said, the U.K.’s Office for Budget Responsibility is likely to make “unfavorable revisions” to its economic forecasts in July, which would lead to lower tax receipts and higher borrowing.
“If recent movements in financial market pricing hold, debt servicing costs will be around £2.5bn ($3.4 billion) higher than they were at the time of the Spring Statement,” Goodwin warned in a note on Wednesday.
‘Very fragile situation’
Mel Stride, who serves as the shadow Chancellor in the U.K.’s opposition government, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Europe” on Thursday that the Spending Review raised questions about whether “a huge amount of borrowing” will be involved in funding the government’s fiscal strategies.
“[Government] borrowing is having consequences in terms of higher inflation in the U.K. … and therefore interest rates [are] higher for longer,” he said. “It’s adding to the debt mountain, the servicing costs upon which are running at 100 billion [pounds] a year, that’s twice what we spend on defense.”
“I’m afraid the overall economy is in a very weak position to withstand the kind of spending and borrowing that this government is announcing,” Stride added.
Stride argued that Reeves will “almost certainly” have to raise taxes again in her next budget announcement due in the autumn.
“We’ve ended up in a very fragile situation, particularly when you’ve got the tariffs around the world,” he said.
Rufaro Chiriseri, head of fixed income for the British Isles at RBC Wealth Management, told CNBC that rising borrowing costs were putting Reeves’ “already small fiscal headroom at risk.”
“This reduced headroom could create a snowball effect, as investors could potentially become nervous to hold UK debt, which could lead to a further selloff until fiscal stability is restored,” he said.
Iain Barnes, Chief Investment Officer at Netwealth, also told CNBC on Thursday that the U.K. was in “a state of fiscal fragility, so room for manoeuvre is limited.”
“The market knows that if growth disappoints, then this year’s Budget may have to deliver higher taxes and increased borrowing to fund spending plans,” Barnes said.
However, April LaRusse, head of investment specialists at Insight Investment, argued there were ways for debt servicing burdens to be kept under control.
The U.K.’s Debt Management Office, which issues gilts, has scope to reshape issuance patters — the maturity and type of gilts issued — to help the government get its borrowing costs under control, she said.
“With the average yield on the 1-10 year gilts at c4% and the yield on the 15 year + gilts at 5.2% yield, there is scope to make the debt financing costs more affordable,” she explained.
However, LaRusse noted that debt interest payments for the U.K. government were estimated to reach the equivalent of around 3.5% of GDP this fiscal year, and that overspending could worsen the burden.
“This increase is driven not only by higher interest rates, which gradually translate into higher coupon payments, but also by elevated levels of government spending, compounding the fiscal burden,” she said.