HOME TO MANY of America’s most progressive policies, from criminal justice to vehicle emissions, California serves a unique role as a punchbag for right-wing politicians. Every few years it becomes fashionable to declare that it is a failed state, or that the California dream is turning into a nightmare. This rhetoric is often overblown: in terms of pure economic heft California remains the most powerful American state. But for all its continuing prowess in innovation (not least in artificial intelligence), California again appears to be entering one of its periodic rough patches.
The state faces three overlapping challenges: rising unemployment, growing fiscal strains and population outflows. All of these should abate over time, but for now they mark out California as a pocket of relative weakness in an otherwise robust American economy.
Chart: The Economist
When the Federal Reserve jacked up interest rates in 2022 in order to tame inflation, many analysts and investors fretted that this monetary tightening would lead to a recession. Instead, the broader economy has been surprisingly resilient. The national unemployment rate remains less than 4%, within spitting distance of a six-decade low. In California, by contrast, the unemployment rate has shot up to 5.3%, the highest of any state (see chart 1).
On its surface the reason for the rise in joblessness in California is no bad thing: as the aftershocks of the covid pandemic fade away, more people are actively seeking jobs. Until they find work, they show up in official data as unemployed. The deeper problem is that the state does not have enough work for them. In California there are roughly 0.8 job openings per unemployed person—the lowest in the country—whereas in America’s other 49 states the overall ratio is 1.6. On Indeed, a recruitment website, California is one of only a handful of states to have suffered a decline in job postings since the eve of the pandemic. Tech firms, which had hired aggressively during the long period of low interest rates, are now retrenching. Silicon Valley’s downsizing has seeped into other parts of the Californian economy, with transport, financial and manufacturing companies all shedding workers.
The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), a nonpartisan fiscal adviser for California’s legislature, last autumn pointed to the rise in unemployment as a potential signal of a recession in the state. The LAO’s judgment matters because it focuses on the state’s fiscal picture, which appears to be badly frayed. Last year California’s income-tax collection tumbled by 25%, similar to falls during the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the dotcom bust of the early 2000s.
Weakness has persisted. In his budget for the new fiscal year, which begins on July 1st, Gavin Newsom, California’s governor, projected that the state’s deficit would hit $38bn. But the LAO estimates that it is instead on track to hit $73bn. A slightly different methodology accounts for roughly half of that discrepancy, but however the numbers are sliced, California’s constitution requires a balanced budget and it must find a way to close its fiscal hole.
The state has built up a rainy-day fund over the past decade, but Mr Newsom’s proposed budget will draw down roughly half of it. Other solutions have involved deferring promised funding—for universities, the homeless and the disabled. That, however, will only add to shortfalls in the near future, when the LAO projects continued deficits. “It might be easier to tell various stakeholders that the money has just been delayed, but the reality is much of it needs to be eliminated,” says Gabriel Petek, head of the LAO.
As for the outflow of Californians—the third worry—it is not new. Since the early 1990s Californians moving out have usually outnumbered other Americans moving in. But the impact of this out-migration has become more serious. In the past immigrants from abroad more than made up for the domestic outflows, such that California’s population continued to grow. The slowdown in international arrivals during the covid pandemic changed that dynamic. California has recorded an outright decline in its population for three straight years, the first sustained drop since 1850, the year it became a state.
Chart: The Economist
From a fiscal standpoint, the damage has been compounded by the wealth of those leaving. California has lost a steadily growing number of high-earning residents, with the trend accelerating at the height of covid. In 2021 California lost nearly $30bn in net taxpayer income to other states, amounting to about 2% of its tax base. And given its reliance on capital-gains taxes as a big, if volatile, source of revenue, departures of the wealthy may hurt its future fiscal position. Taken together these outflows limit the state’s flexibility in fixing its budget mess. Raising taxes would be one possible solution but doing so may just drive more rich Californians to leave.
As it stands, the overall tax burden on Californians is the fifth-highest in the country, according to the Tax Foundation, a think-tank. The one area where the state’s tax revenues are low—absurdly so—is on property because of a law, passed by popular vote in 1978, which has led to homes being assessed well below their market value. That in turn contributes to inflated housing prices in California, pushing yet more people away from the state.
Golden handcuffs It is salutary to remember that California has experienced worse. In the early 1990s, reeling from a deep recession, more than 1m Californians left for other states. In 2000-01 a grossly mismanaged electricity market (plus Enron’s corruption) led to blackouts. In 2009 California began paying IOUs to businesses, students and taxpayers to whom it owed money. California’s unemployment rate tends to run a little higher than the rest of America’s. This partly reflects the churn of its tech sector, with firms expanding rapidly but also, when times are tough, pulling back sharply. Throughout California’s many brushes with economic trouble, its innovation-led growth model has been remarkably resilient. The state accounted for about 14% of America’s total output last year, up from 12.5% in the late 1990s (see chart 2).
“People are always judging us on past metrics. So they’re looking at what’s receding, and not enough at what is emerging,” says Dee Dee Myers, a senior adviser to the governor. She points to rising stars across different parts of the state: AI, quantum computing, space tech, immunotherapy, electric vehicles and more. California’s entrenched strengths include the largest higher-education system in the country, more national laboratories than any other state, a location that makes it the gateway for a third of America’s foreign trade and—rumour has it—some pretty nice beaches and mountains. “I also think it’s the culture of California, which often gets maligned. It’s not an accident that all these new ideas are happening here,” says Ms Myers.
Another transition is under way, with more of California’s population and, by extension, economy shifting inland. Among people who left the two biggest Bay Area cities (San Jose and San Francisco) between 2016 and 2020, five of their six most popular destinations were within California, not to other states, according to Oxford Economics, a research firm. Two of the winners were Sacramento and Stockton in the Central Valley, both less than three hours by car from San Francisco. That is spreading tech expertise more widely. “If you’ve got the talent elsewhere and you don’t need to be in San Francisco, why would you build a factory there? You can build in the greater San Francisco area, where land is much cheaper,” says Jerry Nickelsburg of UCLA.
Yet the inland migration by itself is not enough to solve California’s problems. A recent research paper by the Hoover Institution, a conservative think-tank, counted 352 firms that had moved their headquarters to other states in the four years to the end of 2021. A bevy of cost factors were, it argued, pushing them out: high taxes, high energy prices and high wages. Lee Ohanian, one of the report’s authors, thinks more of the same—a steady decay, not a crash—is in store for California’s economy. “The more you have this insidious drop, the tougher it becomes for the state government,” he says. “We have hit the wall where we really can’t get any more tax revenue without significantly damaging the economy.”
One fulcrum that could dramatically alter California’s fortunes is the property market. Housing has become more unaffordable throughout America over the past decade but California continues to claim the dubious crown as the least affordable big state. The price-to-income ratio for buying homes is 12 in San Jose and 11.3 in San Francisco, double the national median, according to researchers at Harvard University. The root cause is a lack of new housing. Mr Newsom is well aware of this and has sought to kick-start construction. Since 2017 lawmakers have passed more than 100 separate pieces of legislation to make it easier to build homes. But the results have been dismal so far. Construction permits have plateaued at about 110,000 housing units per year, far short of what California needs.
Instead, the property sector stands as an example of how California often ties itself in regulatory knots. The state has sped up its notoriously cumbersome environmental reviews for housing, especially for affordable projects. Yet to benefit from this provision, companies must demonstrate that they are using highly skilled workers at prevailing wages—a requirement that in practice compels them to hire union contractors. Alexis Gevorgian, a developer, calculates that this can increase costs by as much as 40%, turning affordable housing into a guaranteed loss-making venture. “The expedited reviews themselves are useless unless you get a subsidy from the government,” Mr Gevorgian says. One of the things on the chopping block as California looks to close its budget deficit? About $1bn of funding for affordable housing, including subsidies for developers. California is no failed state. But it certainly is a struggling one. ■
On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.