The last time Larry Jost, a sixth-generation Wisconsinite, even considered supporting a Republican was in primary school. “I had an ‘I like Ike’ pin just because I liked the rhyme,” he says. His town of Alma, with two main streets, is tucked along the Mississippi River between a dam and limestone bluffs. Every Wednesday morning he gathers in his wife’s art gallery with members of his book club, including a retired local judge, a carpenter and a farmer. Recently they discussed an anthology of short stories edited by Langston Hughes. “We’re the last Democrats in Buffalo County and that’s why we meet back here in Kevlar vests,” jokes one member.
Their species became endangered abruptly. In every presidential election between 1988 and 2012, Buffalo County voted for the Democratic candidate. But in 2016 Donald Trump won the county by 22 points and wrested Wisconsin from the Democrats while forging his electoral-college victory over Hillary Clinton. Mr Trump carried Buffalo easily again in 2020 as he lost Wisconsin to Joe Biden by a mere 20,000 votes out of more than 3m cast.
As Mr Trump opens formidable polling leads in Nevada, Arizona and Georgia—other swing states Mr Biden won in 2020—Wisconsin’s significance has grown. Mr Biden may need to win all of the demographically similar states formerly mislabelled as the Blue Wall: Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. Barring surprises elsewhere, if Mr Biden swept those three and won one of Nebraska’s split electoral votes, a likely prospect, he would be re-elected, barely.
The contest emerging in Wisconsin is striking in part because it complicates the story of Mr Trump’s success with rural white voters. They comprise a far greater share of Wisconsin’s electorate than of any other state rated by non-partisan analysts as a toss-up in 2024 (see chart). Yet Wisconsin’s rural white voters have remained decidedly less Republican than those in other swing states.
Rural white voters†, 2020
Share of total
votes cast, %
Republican margin,
percentage-points
Rural white voters†, 2020
Share of total votes cast, %
Republican margin, percentage-points
Rural white voters†, 2020
Share of total votes cast, %
Republican margin, percentage-points
In 2020 Mr Biden lost the segment in Wisconsin by 24 points, compared with 43 points nationally. In Pennsylvania and Michigan Mr Trump won the rural-white vote by 44 points and 31 points, respectively. A recent survey by Marquette Law School showed Mr Biden improving slightly with Wisconsin’s rural voters over 2020, although this was more than offset by a decline among suburbanites.
Mr Jost and his book-club members, then, are perhaps not so anomalous: the state’s Democratic coalition relies significantly on rural white voters. Why is Wisconsin’s liberal vote in the countryside relatively resilient? The most obvious reason is the state’s long history as a bastion of agrarian progressive politics, exemplified by the career of Robert La Follette, a three-term governor and three-term senator early in the 20th century who championed progressive taxation and government investment in rural areas. He and his successors in Wisconsin politics, who eventually migrated to the Democratic Party, won backing from “agrarian progressives who actually thought government was a good thing because it brought them things like rural electrification and utilities and highways”, says Barry Burden, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. That outlook has not vanished.
A step to the right
Presidential vote margin by county, percentage points, sized by population
The recent turn to anti-government populism dates to 2010, as the Tea Party wave crested. That year, Republicans flipped all three branches of the state’s government and Scott Walker became governor on a message demonising public employees and their pensions. Dozens of rural counties that had voted consistently for Democrats backed him. What Mr Walker planted, Mr Trump has reaped.
In addition to Wisconsin’s progressive traditions, other factors may limit Mr Trump’s vote, however. Wisconsin has small- to medium-sized state university campuses spread throughout its territory. (Mr Biden does best among younger and college-educated rural voters.) And because the state has a relatively balanced mix of suburban and rural populations, and of university graduates and non-college-educated voters, polarisation in recent years has been symmetrical. In four of the past six presidential elections, the winning candidate’s margin of victory has been less than one percentage point.
Top: Gary Herritz, of Hill Point, WI, is an ardent Donald Trump supporter whose main concern in the election is to see Mr Trump returned to the White House. Bottom: Jennifer Paul, of Hill Point, WI, cited the rise in the cost of living as her top political concern. She said she intended to vote for Mr Trump. Image: Matthew Ludak
Infamously to Democrats, Mrs Clinton did not visit Wisconsin once during her 2016 general-election campaign. Mr Biden and Kamala Harris have already visited it a combined eight times this year. They don’t often rally in rural areas but of the 46 offices the Biden campaign has opened in Wisconsin—more than in any other swing state—nearly half are in rural counties.
Republicans are betting that this outreach, a strong Democratic state party and emotive issues such as abortion rights and the insurrection of January 6th cannot compete with Mr Trump’s personal appeal to rural voters. His win in Wisconsin in 2016 was the first by a Republican in 32 years, and he achieved it with little campaign infrastructure. The Wisconsin Republican Party remains well-organised and “has gotten very good at turning out votes”, notes Mark Graul, a Republican strategist who ran George W. Bush’s 2004 re-election campaign in the state.
“Which candidate is better on these issues?”
Wisconsin, percentage-point margin*
*Poll of registered voters
Source: Marquette Law School Poll
“Which candidate is better on these issues?”
Wisconsin, percentage-point margin*
*Poll of registered voters
Source: Marquette Law School Poll
“Which candidate is better on these issues?”
Wisconsin, percentage-point margin*
*Poll of registered voters
Source: Marquette Law School Poll
Mr Biden’s biggest problem is that he is seen as performing abysmally on the economy and immigration, the issues rural voters—and others—cite as most important. In the Wisconsin countryside, as in much of rural America, the problems are entrenched: declining populations, blighted main streets, dwindling access to health care and shuttered family farms. Charlene, a farmer in western Wisconsin who works a second job as a cleaner to supplement her family’s income, says she’ll be voting for Mr Trump because of his strength on the economy and health care. Her son struggled to afford care when he fell ill recently. Because of Republican resistance, Wisconsin remains one of ten states yet to expand Medicaid to cover those whose incomes fall just above the poverty line.
Top: Mark Weihing, photographed in Sauk County, WI, is a lifelong Republican but has become disillusioned with his party. He said he would not vote for Mr Trump in November but declined to say who he favoured. Bottom: Greg Snell, of Sauk City, WI, is a small-business owner who views Donald Trump as a “loud mouth bully.” He said he will vote for Joe Biden in November. Image: Matthew Ludak
Democrats tout their commitment to rural investment. For example, the bipartisan infrastructure bill that Mr Biden signed pledges to invest some $1.4bn in Wisconsin to deliver high-speed internet service to underserved areas, partly to tackle rural isolation from the information economy. But the process will be slow. Mr Biden can complain that he does not get credit for his economic achievements, but his technocratic policies and messages about preserving democratic norms do not resonate with rural voters who have “a tangible feeling that the political system is broken”, says Bill Hogseth, a community organiser in western Wisconsin.
The familiar meme of rural white rage can be overdrawn. Still, when rural voters hear Mr Trump say that Washington is a mess and they have a right to be angry, his words strike a chord, Mr Hogseth reports. “There’s a lot of anger here, and so when you have a candidate who’s willing to name that, it’s going to get some traction.” ■
On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.
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