Pedestrians walk along Wall Street near the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in New York, US, on Thursday, May 16, 2024.
Alex Kent | Bloomberg | Getty Images
Wall Street’s favorite recession signal started flashing red in 2022 and hasn’t stopped — and thus far has been wrong every step of the way.
The yield on the 10-year Treasury note has been lower than most of its shorter-dated counterparts since that time — a phenomenon known as an inverted yield curve which has preceded nearly every recession going back to the 1950s.
However, while conventional thinking holds that a downturn is supposed to occur within a year, or at most two years, of an inverted curve, not only did one not occur but there’s also nary a red number in sight for U.S. economic growth.
The situation has many on Wall Street scratching their heads about why the inverted curve — both a signal and, in some respects, a cause of recessions — has been so wrong this time, and whether it’s a continuing sign of economic danger.
“So far, yeah, it’s been a bald-faced liar,” Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, said half-jokingly. “It’s the first time it’s inverted and a recession didn’t follow. But having said that, I don’t think we can feel very comfortable with the continued inversion. It’s been wrong so far, but that doesn’t mean it’s going to be wrong forever.”
Depending on which duration point you think is most relevant, the curve has been inverted either since July 2022, as gauged against the 2-year yield, or October of the same year, as measured against the 3-month note. Some even prefer to use the federal funds rate, which banks charge each other for overnight lending. That would take the inversion to November 2022.
Whichever point you pick, a recession should have arrived by now. The inversion had been wrong only once, in the mid-1960s, and has foretold every retrenchment since.
According to the New York Federal Reserve, which uses the 10-year/3-month curve, a recession should happen about 12 months later. In fact, the central bank still assigns about a 56% probability of a recession by June 2025 as indicated by the current gap.
“It’s been such a long time, you have to start to wonder about its usefulness,” said Joseph LaVorgna, chief economist SMBC Nikko Securities. “I just don’t see how a curve can be this wrong for this long. I’m leaning toward it being broken, but I haven’t fully capitulated yet.”
The inversion is not alone
Making the situation even more complicated is that the yield curve isn’t the only indicator showing reason for caution about how long the post-Covid recovery can last.
Gross domestic product, a tally of all the goods and services produced across the sprawling U.S. economy, has averaged about 2.7% annualized real quarterly growth since the third quarter of 2022, a fairly robust pace well above what is considered trend gains of around 2%.
Prior to that, GDP was negative for two straight quarters, meeting a technical definition though few expect the National Bureau of Economic Research to declare an official recession.
The Commerce Department on Thursday is expected to report that GDP accelerated 2.1% in the second quarter of 2024.
However, economists have been watching several negative trends.
The so-called Sahm Rule, a fail-safe gauge that posits that recessions happen when the unemployment rate averaged across three months is half a percentage point higher than its 12-month low, is close to being triggered. On top of that, money supply has been on a steady downward trajectory since peaking in April 2022, and the Conference Board’s index of leading economic indicators has long been negative, suggesting substantial headwinds to growth.
“So many of these measures are being questioned,” said Quincy Krosby, chief global strategist at LPL Financial. “At some point, we’re going to be in recession.”
Yet no recession has appeared on the horizon.
What’s different this time
“We’ve got a number of different indicators that just haven’t panned out,” said Jim Paulsen, a veteran economist and strategist who has worked at Wells Fargo among other firms. “We’ve had a number of things that were recession-like.”
Paulsen, who now writes a Substack blog called Paulsen Perspectives, points out some anomalous occurrences over the past few years that could account for the disparities.
For one, he and others note that the economy actually experienced that technical recession prior to the inversion. For another, he cites the unusual behavior by the Federal Reserve during the current cycle.
Faced with runaway inflation at its highest rate in more than 40 years, the Fed started raising rates gradually in March 2022, then much more aggressively by the middle part of that year — after the inflation peak of June 2022. That’s counter to the way central banks have operated in the past. Historically, the Fed has raised rates early in the inflation cycle then started cutting later.
“They waited until inflation peaked, and then they tightened all the way down. So the Fed’s been completely out of synch,” Paulsen said.
But the rate dynamics have helped companies escape what usually happens in an inverted curve.
One reason why inverted curves can contribute to a recession as well as signal that one is occurring is that they make shorter-term money more expensive. That’s hard on banks, for instance, that borrow short and lend long. With an inverted curve hitting their net interest margins, banks may opt to lend less, causing a pullback in consumer spending that can lead to recession.
But companies this time around were able to lock in at low long-term rates before the central bank starting hiking, providing a buffer against the higher short-term rates.
However, the trend raises the stakes for the Fed, as much of that financing is about to come due.
Companies needing to roll over their debt could face a much harder time if the prevailing high rates stay in effect. This could provide something of a self-fulfilling prophecy for the yield curve. The Fed has been on hold for a year, with its benchmark rate at a 23-year high.
“So it could very well be the case that the curve’s been lying to us up until now. But it could decide to start telling the truth here pretty soon,” said Zandi, the Moody’s economist. “It makes me really uncomfortable that the curve is inverted. This is one more reason why the Fed should be lowering interest rates. They’re taking a chance here.”
On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.