TO GET a sense of what Donald Trump’s first week did to the federal government, talk to people who work in it. “I’ve been with the government for over 10 years, I lived through the first Trump administration, and nothing compares to this,” says one Treasury employee. Some workers are busy scrubbing their personal social media for items that could be interpreted as disloyal. Others are scrubbing up their resumes, anticipating that they will soon be looking for new work. Those who plan to stay expect their jobs to get worse, as colleagues flee or are not replaced. Everyone is “in absolute panic mode”, says another senior civil servant.
As a candidate, Mr Trump promised that he would “shatter the deep state”. Since taking office, it has become more clear what he meant. In a barrage of executive orders, Mr Trump has asserted that he can do just about whatever he likes to the federal government. He has, he claims, “sole and exclusive authority” over the executive branch, to include hiring, firing and all spending decisions. In effect, Mr Trump is claiming he is not merely a president, putting into action laws enacted by the legislature. He is claiming to be something closer to a king, able to withhold or redirect expenditure as he sees fit.
On January 27th Mr Trump revealed quite how far he intends to push. He decreed that all grants and loans that the federal government makes—excepting disbursements for Social Security, Medicare, and some other vaguely defined categories—would be suspended the following day, even though Congress had approved them. This apparent usurpation of Congress’s role under Article I of the constitution was “sweeping and vast” and “really, really illegal”, says Eloise Pasachoff of Georgetown University law school. The memo laid out no legal justification for the freeze and on the evening of January 28th, a federal judge stopped it temporarily. The next day, the administration rescinded its memo; what happens next is unclear. A parallel freeze of all foreign aid created similar chaos.
In the meantime Mr Trump has launched an extralegal power grab almost as ambitious against the federal bureaucracy—the over 2m civil servants who actually implement federal policy. He has directly fired dozens of senior staff, including senior immigration officials, Department of Justice prosecutors and others he and his appointees have identified as being hostile to his goals. These included more than a dozen inspectors general (watchdogs who investigate departmental efficiency and wrongdoing). In the case of the inspectors general, the president is required by law to give 30 days notice and an explicit reason to justify firing. He did neither.
These decisions came on top of a complete hiring freeze across most departments (the military, immigration authorities, as well as jobs related to social security and veterans healthcare are exempt). He also reinstated an unimplemented order from his last term allowing his administration to redesignate any career civil service job as a political job, and thereby remove the usual job protections and sack whomever he wants. He has also pledged to shut down all “diversity, equity and inclusion” jobs, known as “deiA”, in government. To top it off, he banned all work from home.
The aim is transparently to get federal workers who do not like Mr Trump to leave. On January 28th, an email went out from the Office of Personnel Management (opm) offering every single federal employee “deferred resignation”. Essentially, the terms were: agree to leave this financial year and you can work from home until then. The touches—including instructions to reply with the word “RESIGN” by February 6th—implied the influence of Elon Musk, the billionaire head of Mr Trump’s “Department of Government Efficiency”, or “doge”. Since the opm is not actually a corporate hr department, the offer is unlikely to withstand scrutiny. Federal tech employees report that outsiders, many seemingly junior employees of Mr Musk’s companies, have come into offices to take over government it systems and do “code reviews”.
Were Mr Trump to make these changes stick—a questionable prospect—it would amount to “probably the most fundamental alteration of the civil service system since 1883” says Don Moynihan, of the Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan (a verdict many in the White House would love). The president appears to have little interest in the idea that most government officials should be non-partisan specialists whose expertise is deployed to keep the public safe, among other benefits. Under Mr Trump’s plan, decisions about hiring and firing would be made by his political appointees.
According to Max Stier, of the Partnership for Public Service, a charity which works to improve government, Mr Trump is “tearing apart the civil service” so as to recreate “the spoils system” of government that persisted until the end of the 19th century. That was a model whereby new presidents came in and immediately distributed jobs to their pals as a reward for supporting their election campaigns.
Will he succeed? This seems unlikely, says Larry Jacobs, of the University of Minnesota. “Mr Trump’s orders, he says, are “impressively sweeping and breathtaking in their institutional arrogance” but he argues that much of what Mr Trump is trying to do will probably be undone by the courts or Congress. He points out that even after Mr Trump appointed sympathetic new members in his last term, the Supreme Court often overruled him. Congress has ceded much power to the presidency, but controlling the federal purse is a prerogative it is unlikely to yield readily.
Yet it could take years for challenges to work their way through the courts. The damage done in the meantime could be considerable. Employees who find other jobs after being pushed out will not necessarily return just because a court says their dismissal was wrong. Talented new hires will not join. And with government lawyers cowed by fears of firing, all manner of illegality could reign. Mr Stier worries about things like the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice being used to punish Mr Trump’s enemies, without civil service lawyers able to say no.
Even the best-case outcome is not good. In the last Trump administration, hiring freezes caused parts of government to shrink and jam up (see chart). Some of this may have been intended: the issuing of green cards and citizenship applications ground to a halt thanks in part to cuts at the State Department. But queues also lengthened for basic government services like getting passports, or tax refunds.
Chart: The Economist
The “swamp”, as Mr Trump might call it, may feel like a lot of busybodies in Washington dc pushing around bits of paper. It is certainly true that it can often be slow, rule-bound and unaccountable. But a system based more on political loyalty than on merit is one primed for failure. Bureaucrats make sure that foods are not poisonous; that cars do not explode when they crash; and that toxic waste is not dumped into the wilderness. “The federal government is very vulnerable,” says Paul Light, a political scientist at New York University. Mr Trump, he says, risks becoming “the president of ‘I didn’t give a shit and a lot of people got killed.’” Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown. ■
On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.