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Economics

How wrong could America’s pollsters be?

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DESPITE POLLS being in essence tied, gamblers betting on the outcome of America’s presidential election are increasingly confident that Donald Trump, the Republican nominee, will win. Polymarket, a prediction market that has seen over $2.6bn traded on the election, gives him a two-in-three chance. Bettors are in effect gambling that polls are underestimating him for the third time in a row.

Chart: The Economist

Such an error is certainly possible. Polling averages show Kamala Harris or Mr Trump leading in each of the seven swing states by a smaller margin than a normal polling error (see chart). Democrats fear there will be a repeat of the substantial polling misses of  2016 and 2020, when Mr Trump did better than expected. But there is no guarantee that the error will be in the same direction this year: pollsters have gone to great lengths to account for previous mistakes. As The Economist’s presidential forecast quantifies, based on historical polling errors, a broad range of results are possible on election day—but polls remain the best indication of how people intend to vote.

Opinion polling works by surveying a representative sample of voters. Errors can arise in a number of ways. There is normal statistical variation, which affects all polls, especially those with a small sample size. There is the risk of last-minute swings or unexpected turnout patterns. And there is the biggest headache for pollsters—ensuring their sample is representative. Researchers work hard to do this: finding new ways of reaching voters, incentivising respondents from certain demographic groups and using “weights” to increase the relative importance of underrepresented groups.

FiveThirtyEight, a data-journalism outfit, has calculated polling averages for presidential elections going back to 1976. On average, the size of the gap between the polls’ findings and the actual margin of victory is 2.7 percentage points nationwide and 4.2 points in individual states. FiveThirtyEight currently estimates that the largest lead for either candidate in the seven swing states is just 2.0 points, for Mr Trump in Arizona.

Infamously, polls in 2016 and 2020 systematically underestimated Mr Trump’s vote, especially in battleground states. After the 2016 election, the post mortem conducted by AAPOR, a professional organisation of pollsters, pointed to a late swing towards the Republican nominee and overrepresentation of graduates in poll samples. Most firms began to weight their samples to do a better job of reflecting the education profile of voters.

In 2020 the underestimation of Mr Trump was repeated for different reasons. This time AAPOR identified non-response bias—Republican voters were less likely to respond to pollsters. One theory is that they were less likely to be at home during the covid-19 pandemic (twiddling their thumbs and responding to surveys). Another is that Republican voters distrust pollsters, which discourages them from answering surveys.

Since 2020 pollsters have been at pains to reach a representative sample. They have experimented with recruitment that appeals to certain sections of society (postcards plastered with patriotic imagery, for example) and new modes, such as text messages. It is anyone’s guess whether this will be enough to account for the Democratic bias in response rates or whether supporters of Mr Trump are still reluctant to answer polls. If the errors seen in 2020 or 2016 are repeated even to a small degree that would be disastrous for Ms Harris—she could lose all seven swing states.

Democrats aiming to soothe their anxieties may refer to a wider historical lens. It is true that there is a slight correlation between the polling error in a state at one election and the error in the next. That suggests that Mr Trump is more likely to outperform the polls than Ms Harris is. But the relationship is weak and not very useful for predicting election results. There are also plenty of plausible scenarios in which polls underestimate support for Ms Harris. For example, the errors in 2020 could have been pandemic-specific. Pollsters may have since overcorrected for them. Polls, with all their uncertainties, remain the most useful indicator of public opinion. Without them we would not be able to say with such confidence that the outcome of the election is a toss-up.

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Economics

Democrats need to understand: Americans think they’re worse

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If you think Donald Trump is too crass or cruel or incompetent to be president—if you are disappointed or even astonished that, having tried and failed to subvert the will of the people in the last election, he has come back to win fair and square—you should be asking yourself this question: why, to so many Americans, does the Democratic Party seem worse?

This victory is a tremendous achievement for Mr Trump, who after his loss in 2020 and the attack on the Capitol on January 6th 2021 was counted out even by leaders of his own party. At the time Mitch McConnell, the Senate Republican leader, who privately regarded Mr Trump as “a sleazeball” and “stupid”, called the insurrection “further evidence of Donald Trump’s complete unfitness for office”, according to reporting he has not disputed in a new biography by Michael Tackett, a journalist.

Yet what might seem a psychological frailty—an inability to brook criticism or concede mistakes, much less defeat—has for Mr Trump been a mighty source of political strength, one that intensifies his connection to the voters he has made the base of the Republican Party. As in 2016, Mr Trump wielded his command of that bloc of voters this year to clear a path through crowded Republican primaries, and then relied upon “negative polarisation”, or fear of the other guys, to unite the party. “Can you believe he endorsed me?” Mr Trump chortled at a rally in North Carolina on November 3rd, gloating over how Mr McConnell eventually fell into line. Mr Trump felt no obligation to reciprocate. “Hopefully we get rid of Mitch McConnell pretty soon,” he said.

Mr Trump has shown courage, not only in weathering assassins’ attacks but in insisting on views on trade, entitlements and other matters that a few years ago were heresy within his party. With his sophisticated grasp of new and legacy media and his instinct for the basic needs and fears of many Americans, he has revolutionised how American politics is conducted and shifted the policy terrain over which it is waged. In terms of disrupting what came before, he has had more effect than even Ronald Reagan.

Unlike Reagan—or the other two-term presidents since, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama—Mr Trump has never been very popular, though he managed, in this third run as the Republican nominee, at last to win the popular vote. Unlike those predecessors, Mr Trump has relied upon division, not addition, for his electoral maths. In his first term his average approval rating of 41% was the lowest ever measured by the Gallup Poll, which began tracking the statistic under Harry Truman. Democrats have good reason to think Mr Trump repels many voters when he calls adversaries “vermin” or “the enemy from within” or says illegal immigrants are “poisoning the blood of our country”.

Yet, after this victory, whatever disdain Democrats have for Mr Trump should be cause only for humility and self-scrutiny. As in 2016, Mr Trump’s broad support will present his adversaries with a Rorschach test in which they can see their preferred image of America, and it will be ugly. For some, white supremacy and misogyny will explain Mr Trump’s success, while others may attribute it to tax cuts and greed. Some will conclude that poor, non-white or female Americans have been ensorcelled into voting against their self-interest. Rather than retreat into some grand theory, they would so better ro think through how, in a divided country, President Joe Biden might have nudged the balance a few points away from Mr Trump, rather than to him. Kamala Harris was no bystander, but pime responsibility lies with the president she served.

Mr Biden did not heed his own warnings about Mr Trump. He tried to eat into Mr Trump’s support with blue-collar workers through giant investments in manufacturing and infrastructure that offered something to everyone. But, unlike Mr Clinton or Mr Obama, he ducked choices that would have respected the concerns of most Americans but disappointed left-wing Democrats. A political strategy of addition still requires some division.

Most egregious, Mr Biden resharpened Mr Trump’s most effective political wedge by doing away with obstacles he had created to illegal immigration, with no alternative. By the time he restored some of Mr Trump’s restrictions this spring, more than 4m migrants had crossed the southern border, compared with fewer than 1m under Mr Trump. That was terrible for the Democrats as a party, and worse for people they want to help and the cause they believe in: under Mr Biden, Americans who say they want a decrease in legal immigration rose from a minority to a majority, as did the number who favour mass deportation.

How to defend democracy

Even where Mr Biden had accomplishments that undermined Mr Trump’s arguments, he let himself be constrained by his party’s loudest activists. Oil production rose to record levels, but Mr Biden did not boast about that. He was also no longer up to the demands of presidential communication that Mr Trump understands so well. He was not constantly, energetically promoting his success in sustaining economic growth and raising wages. His approval rating sagged as low as 36% just asother Democrats were forcing him to face the obvious: he should not be running again. In the short time Ms Harris had, she waged a good campaign. But any politician would have struggled under such burdens. She could not separate herself enough from Mr Biden, or from the video Mr Trump’s ads used, to devastating effect, of her recently declaring positions that were alienating to most Americans.

“We have learned again that democracy is precious,” Mr Biden proudly declared during his inaugural address almost four years ago. “Democracy is fragile. And at this hour, my friends, democracy has prevailed.” Now it has prevailed again. Will Democrats get the message this time? 

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Economics

The Fed is likely cutting rates again Thursday. Everything you need to know

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Federal Reserve Board Chairman Jerome Powell holds a press conference following a two-day meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on interest rate policy in Washington, U.S., September 18, 2024. REUTERS/Tom Brenner

Tom Brenner | Reuters

The Federal Reserve likely will stick to the business at hand when it wraps up its meeting Thursday with another interest rate cut, but will have its eye on the future against a backdrop that suddenly has gotten a lot more complicated.

Financial markets are pricing in a near-certainty that the central bank’s Federal Open Market Committee will lower its benchmark borrowing cost by a quarter percentage point as it seeks to “recalibrate” policy for an economy that is seeing the inflation rate moderate and the labor market soften.

The focus, though, will turn to what’s ahead for Chair Jerome Powell and his Fed colleagues as they navigate a shifting economy — and the political earthquake of Donald Trump’s stunning victory in the presidential race.

“We think Powell will refuse to give any early judgment on the implications of the election for the economy and rates, and will seek to be a source of stability and calm,” Krishna Guha, head of global policy and central bank strategy at Evercore ISI, said in a a note issued before the election’s outcome was known.

In keeping with policymakers’ historical desire to stay above the political fray, Powell “will say the Fed will take the time it needs to study the new administration’s plans” then will “refine this assessment as actual policies are developed and enacted,” Guha added.

So while the immediate action will be to stay the course and enact the cut, which equals 25 basis points, the market’s attention likely will turn to what the committee and Powell have to say about the future. The fed funds rate, which sets what banks charge each other for overnight lending but often influences consumer debt as well, is currently targeted in a range between 4.75%-5.0%.

Market pricing currently favors another quarter-point cut in December, followed by a January pause then multiple reductions through 2025.

Preparing for Trump

But if Trump’s agenda — tax cuts, higher spending and aggressive tariffs — comes to fruition, it could have a meaningful impact on a Fed trying to right-size policy after the mammoth rate hikes aimed at controlling inflation. Many economists believe another round of isolationist economic moves from the president-elect could reignite inflation, which held below 3% during Trump’s entire first-term despite a similar recipe.

Trump was a frequent critic of Powell and the Fed during his term, which ran from 2017-21, and is in favor of low interest rates.

“Everyone is on the lookout for future rate cuts and whether anything is telegraphed,” said Quincy Krosby, chief global strategist at LPL Financial. “Also, however, there’s the question of whether or not they can declare victory on inflation.”

Any answers to those questions would be largely left to Powell’s post-meeting news conference.

Though the committee will release its joint decision on rates, it will not provide an update on its Summary of Economic Projections, a document issued quarterly that includes consensus updates on inflation, GDP growth and unemployment, as well as the anonymous “dot plot” of individual officials’ interest rate expectations.

Beyond the January pause, there’s considerable market uncertainty about where the Fed is heading. The SEP will be updated next in December.

“What we’re going to hear more and more of is the terminal rate,” Krosby said. “That’s going to come back into the lexicon if yields continue to climb higher, and it’s not completely associated with growth.”

So where’s the end?

Traders in the fed funds futures market are betting on an aggressive pace of cuts that by the close of 2025 would take the benchmark rate to a target range of 3.75%-4.0%, or a full percentage point below the current level following September’s half percentage point cut. The Secured Overnight Financing Rate for banks is a bit more cautious, indicating a short-term rate around 4.2% at the end of next year.

“A key question here is, what’s the end point of this rate cut cycle?” said Bill English, the Fed’s former head of monetary affairs and now a finance professor at the Yale School of Management. “Fairly soon, they’ve got to think about, where do we think this rate cut period changes with the economy looking pretty strong. They may want to take a pause fairly soon and see how things develop.”

Powell also may be called on to address the Fed’s current moves to reduce the bond holdings on its balance sheet.

Since commencing the effort in June 2022, the Fed has shaved nearly $2 trillion off its holdings in Treasurys and mortgage-backed securities. Fed officials have said that the balance sheet reduction can continue even while they cut rates, though Wall Street expectations are for the run-off to end as soon as early 2025.

“They’ve been happy to just kind of leave that percolating in the background and they probably continue to do that,” English said. “But there’s going to be a lot of interest over the next few meetings. At what point do they make a further adjustment to the pace of runoffs?”

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Economics

Donald Trump wins big and fast

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IT IS AN extraordinary comeback—or, as Donald Trump triumphantly put it in West Palm Beach, Florida, in the early hours of November 6th, “a political victory that our country has never seen before”. After losing four years ago he has survived impeachment, conviction as a felon, numerous other indictments and two assassination attempts, and will become America’s 47th president, to add to his stint as the 45th. He becomes the oldest man ever to win the White House.

Many had expected a long wait for the result of an extremely close election to become clear. In the event, the outcome was evident within hours. Mr Trump looked set to win all seven of the critical swing states: he triumphed in North Carolina, Georgia, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, and had strong leads in Michigan, Arizona and Nevada. That translates into a decisive advantage in the electoral college.

It appears that Mr Trump was able to draw support from both urban and rural voters at levels notably higher than in his contest against Joe Biden in 2020. In state after state, Mr Trump performed better than he had in 2020. In Florida, for example, where he won by three percentage points last time, his margin is on track to surge to 12 points. And although opinion-poll aggregates had consistently shown Kamala Harris to be ahead in the national popular vote, it seems that Mr Trump may have won that too. Just as in 2016 and 2020, in other words, the polls underestimated Mr Trump’s support.

What went wrong for Ms Harris? For one thing, her advantage among women voters, on whom Democrats were pinning their hopes, turned out to be smaller than expected. The gender gap, between the votes of men and women, actually narrowed, from 23 points in 2020 to 20, according to exit polls. Among Hispanic voters, Mr Trump made striking inroads, improving his margin by ten percentage points compared with 2020, according to CNN’s exit poll. The trend was particularly strong among Hispanic men: Joe Biden won their vote by a margin of 23 points; this time Mr Trump was on track to prevail among them by a margin of ten points. More broadly, dissatisfaction with high inflation and immigration contributed to a sense among voters that the country was on the wrong track, for which they naturally blame the incumbent. Much as Ms Harris sought to present herself as the candidate of change, she was stuck with her association with the current administration.

As well as the White House, the Republicans also wrested back control of the Senate. It was always going to be hard for Democrats to hold on to their slender majority in that chamber, given that they were defending a disproportionate number of seats (a third of which are up for election in each election cycle). Not only did Republicans take the vacant seat in West Virginia, as expected; they also flipped Ohio and Montana and prevailed in a close contest in Nebraska. The upsets Democrats hoped for in Florida and Texas failed to materialise. Republican control of the Senate smooths the way for Mr Trump to make important appointments—from cabinet secretaries to generals to Supreme Court justices—that require Senate confirmation.

Whether the Republicans complete their sweep by retaining control of the House of Representatives is still not clear. Results in California, to arrive later, will determine that. But Mr Trump, in his victory speech, was confident that the House would be his, too.

“This will truly be the golden age of America,” he declared. Few will question that the country is indeed entering a new age. Whether Mr Trump will truly “heal” America, as he promised, is more debatable. Beyond America’s borders, too, the consequences are momentous. From tariffs to climate change to Ukraine, the world must brace itself for Trump II.

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