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Joe Biden’s weakness among Latinos threatens his re-election

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In Arizona, a growing Hispanic electorate should help Democrats. Yet Donald Trump is gaining ground

Image: Caitlin O’Hara

Ruben Gallego, a Democrat, first won elected office in Arizona in 2010, a time of fierce battles over immigration. That year, Republicans passed SB1070, known as the “show me your papers” law, which required state police to ask individuals they suspected of being undocumented to provide proof of their status. Joe Arpaio, the publicity-minded sheriff in Arizona’s most populous county, recruited right-leaning Hollywood actors to a “posse” he formed to track down illegal migrants. Although the Supreme Court struck down most of SB1070’s provisions and voters ousted Mr Arpaio in 2016, “those scars aren’t going away,” says Mr Gallego, now a congressman running for an open Senate seat. He says the legacy of Latino activism from the Arpaio era may explain why, in 2020, Arizona Latinos voted for Joe Biden in higher numbers than Latinos nationally did, helping to deliver Mr Biden a narrow 10,000-vote victory in the state.

Yet Donald Trump is once again testing Democrats’ assumptions. He gained some 90,000 Latino voters in Arizona between 2016 and 2020 despite having pardoned Mr Arpaio for a criminal-contempt conviction, calling him an “American patriot” who “kept Arizona safe”. And if current polling is anything to go by, Mr Trump looks set to cut further into Mr Biden’s margins with Latino voters come November.

The Latino electorate is growing unusually fast and a majority still prefers Democrats. Of the six swing states likely to decide the presidential election in November (the other five being Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin), Arizona has the largest share of Latino voters. Mr Trump is clearly gaining popularity among Hispanics. However, current polling suggests that Latino voters still prefer Democrats overall, just by a smaller margin than in the past—meaning that it is Mr Biden who will benefit from the growth in Latino voters. The outcome in Arizona will depend largely on the race between these two trends.

Hispanic population in Arizona, % of total

Sources: Pew Research Centre; US Census

The Arizona contest reflects fluidity in the national Latino vote. The group has never constituted a political monolith. It includes both Florida’s right-leaning refugees from Cuba’s socialist dictatorship and California’s proud leftist heirs to Chicano activism. Yet because, on average, Latino voters came to America more recently than non-Hispanic white and black Americans, they are less likely to have inherited a strong party affiliation from their parents or grandparents. They also “are more likely to hold what political scientists call cross-cutting identities”, or traits more commonly found among people outside one’s political tribe, says Samara Klar, a political scientist at the University of Arizona in Tucson. An evangelical Democrat might sound like an oxymoron but half of evangelical Latinos say the Democratic Party represents their interests. Because of cross-cutting identities, “Latino voters know a lot more people from the other party and they’re less hostile” towards them, notes Dr Klar.

Latinos also tend to have less extreme views. Compared with white Americans, they are less likely to identify as very conservative or very liberal. In a recent YouGov/The Economist poll one in seven said they do not know where they fall on the political spectrum, three times the number of white Americans who said the same.

Given these attributes, it should be little surprise that although Latinos as a whole lean Democratic, millions have voted for Republican candidates. Exit polls suggest that as far back as 1984 Ronald Reagan won some 37% of the Latino vote. By 2004 George W. Bush’s approximate 40% share was a high-water mark that even Mr Trump has yet to achieve.

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast by Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast

by Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Democrats have assumed at their peril that Latinos are a natural constituency and share many of the party’s (increasingly) progressive preferences. “Latinos are not the black vote and Democrats just don’t understand that,” says Mike Madrid, a veteran Republican strategist. Yet Republicans have at times fallen into the same trap, assuming that Latinos leaned so Democratic that courting them was futile. “There were no Latino organisers in the Republican Party for 30 years,” adds Mr Madrid.

That has changed. In 2020 Republicans made gains with Latinos across the board. Voter profiles from Catalist, a political-data firm that helps Democrats, show that although Democrats won Latinos outright, Republicans increased their vote share among all subgroups of Latino voters. Their strides were especially large with non-college-educated Latinos. They swung 11 percentage points to the right between 2016 and 2020. Republicans also gained six points among college-educated Latinos. And while Mr Trump did not generally make notable gains among young voters between 2016 and 2020, young Latinos lurched to the right. Mr Trump’s share of votes from 18- to 29-year-old Latinos increased from 21% to 31%.

Some of this Republican momentum might be a reversion to the mean. Latino support for Barack Obama, the first minority nominee, and Hillary Clinton, the first female one, may have been unusually strong. Without Mrs Clinton to inspire them, Latinas swung towards Mr Trump by 12 percentage points in 2020. But why else did Republican gains materialise in such a pronounced way in 2020?

Top: A Phoenix food vendor who declined to be named said he intends to vote for Donald Trump in 2024.
Bottom: Arizona State University student Jazlyn Gonzalez, 19, said that while the US presidential vote in November “is really important”, she is as yet undecided about her choice. Image: Caitlin O’Hara

Covid may have been a factor. The disease disproportionately killed Latinos and strained their incomes. Some 24% of Latinos were employed as low-income front-line workers, more than any other race or ethnicity. About one in four new businesses are Hispanic-owned. So although Democrats’ focus on lockdowns and containing the disease may have saved many Latinos’ lives, it was perceived as threatening their livelihoods. Meanwhile, Mr Trump and Republican governors across the country advocated for fewer restrictions and a swift return to normal. According to a report by Equis Research, an outfit that studies Latino political behaviour, “Latino voters saw the 2020 election as a referendum on the economy…in a way they hadn’t in 2016.”

About 85% of Arizona’s Latino voters trace their origins to Mexico, a cohort whose views typically track Latino national averages. Yet whereas Democrats’ lead over Republicans among Latinos shrank by 16 points nationally in 2020, in Arizona their lead narrowed by only 9.6 points. Had Mr Trump performed among Arizona Latinos as he did nationally he would have won the state. His prospects have improved since then. Even after accounting for Democrats’ strength in Arizona, current polling suggests Mr Biden’s chances of winning the state in November are on a knife’s edge.

Holding constant the advantage Democrats had among Latinos in Arizona in 2020, Mr Biden is currently up by 17 percentage points among Latinos in the state, an 8.4-point shift to the right. An equivalent erosion in support would have cost Mr Biden 50,000 votes in 2020, enough for him to lose the state. Yet Republicans appear poorly positioned to seize upon their gains as the 2024 general-election campaign gets under way. Four years ago the Republican National Committee (RNC) invested early and heavily to win over Latino voters. This year the RNC is starved for cash. It has just $8m on hand compared with $77m at this point in 2020. And the Arizona Republican Party has been hobbled by dysfunction and factional disputes. All this bodes ill because campaign pros say the formula for winning an election that requires a surge in turnout is simple: spend money and reach out to voters early and often.

Mr Biden could still win the White House while losing Arizona. Assuming that the forecasts of a tight race prove accurate, and that Mr Biden holds on to Pennsylvania and Michigan, which are his strongest prospects among the half-dozen swing states, he would need to win at least one more of them. But Mr Biden’s loosening grip on the Latino vote— which is a significant factor in other closely contested states, particularly Nevada—is hardly encouraging.

Democrats are betting that the electoral maths will continue to favour them in Arizona because the Latino electorate will continue to grow. (They also expect Mr Biden’s standing with voters to improve by November.) The number of Latinos voting in Arizona has in fact increased steadily over the past two decades. This year alone there will be 150,000 newly eligible Latino voters in the state. And Arizona Latinos seem particularly motivated. In 2020 a striking 67% of eligible Latino voters in Arizona went to the polls, compared with 54% nationally (which was the lowest of all major racial and ethnic groups). If Latino turnout again reaches 67% in November, that would mean that Democrats could lose nearly four points from their Arizona margins over Republicans in 2020 and still net just as many votes.

“Who do you think would do a better job

handling the following issues as president?”

Source: YouGov/The Economist

“Who do you think would do a better job handling the

following issues as president?”, United States, %

“Who do you think would do a better job handling the

following issues as president?”, United States, %

Yet it is not a sure bet that Latinos will comprise a larger share of the electorate in 2024. Mr Biden and Mr Trump are both deeply unpopular candidates. Latinos are especially lukewarm on both. In national-level polling from YouGov/The Economist Hispanic respondents are roughly twice as likely as white ones to say that neither candidate would do a good job handling the issues they prioritise: the economy, inflation, health care and immigration. Among those who select a candidate, Mr Biden is viewed as stronger on health care while Mr Trump is seen as stronger on immigration.
Latino attitudes about immigration do not align neatly with the policies of either major party. Polling from Unidos, a lobbying group, found that roughly 83% of the Latinos they surveyed in Arizona in November 2023 supported a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, long a Democratic goal. Yet in that same survey 63% favoured securing the border, the signature cause of Republicans. “Republicans only want border security. They don’t want a pathway to citizenship…they just want moats and crocodiles and hot oil on the border,” argues Mr Madrid. And Democrats are often seen as having prioritised everything but a secure border. Between July and October of 2023 Arizona had more migrant encounters on its southern border than any other state and the crisis has persisted this year. Republicans will be hoping that Democrats bear the brunt of the political fallout.

Top: Samual Lopez, 31, who said he is voting for Donald Trump in November, added that he is frustrated at the US sending aid to Ukraine when there is a large population of homeless people in Phoenix.
Bottom: Ayling Dominguez, 26, who works as an advocate for immigrant rights, said Latino voters should “evolve the way we see our power and choices in electoral politics.” Image: Caitlin O’Hara

Economic issues may also hurt Mr Biden. Until 2019 housing in the Phoenix metropolitan area, where two-thirds of the state’s population lives, was cheaper than the nationwide average. Residents there now shell out 12% more than average. Inflation also spiked higher in Phoenix during 2022 than in any other city, although it has since fallen below the national average. In November 2023 some 59% of Latinos in the state said inflation was one of their most pressing concerns. That cannot be helping Mr Biden’s standing.

These perceptions may yet change as inflation softens. But views on access to abortion tend to be more fixed, and here Democrats retain an advantage. Some 65% of Arizona Latinos think that, no matter their personal views, it is wrong to make abortion illegal. In the aftermath of the Dobbs decision in 2022, which overturned the constitutional right to abortion, a surge of women registered to vote in Arizona. In November Arizonans may vote on a referendum that would protect a woman’s right to an abortion through viability, or about 24 weeks of pregnancy. That could increase Democrat-leaning turnout.

Political campaigns come and go, but Democrats’ outreach to Latinos is maintained during off-cycle years with a vast network of grassroots Latino organisations that hew progressive. “This does not exist on the Republican side of the equation,” laments Helder Toste, a former field director at the Republican National Senatorial Committee.

These dynamics will affect more than just the presidential ticket. They may well help decide which party controls the House and the Senate. Mr Gallego, who currently represents parts of Phoenix in the House of Representatives, will probably do battle with Kari Lake, a Trump acolyte and election-denier, for Kyrsten Sinema’s open Senate seat. The state also has two competitive House races. One features an incumbent and rising star, Juan Ciscomani, a Mexican-born Republican who gave the party’s Spanish-language response to Joe Biden’s state-of-the-union speech in 2023.

The election is still more than seven months away and many Latino voters have not tuned in yet. According to polling from YouGov/The Economist, 38% of Hispanic respondents, compared with 23% of white respondents, say they are paying little or no attention to the 2024 presidential campaigns. In the autumn, when more Latino voters take note, they are likely to be bombarded with messages that the fate of the nation lies in their hands. In Arizona at least, the adverts will not be all exaggeration.

Sources: YouGov; Catalist; Redistricting Data Hub; US Census Bureau; OpenStreetMap; Pew Research Centre; Federal Election Commission; All About Redistricting; ArcGIS; The Economist

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Economics

UK Has a New Prime Minister Without a General Election

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UK Has a New Prime Minister Without a General Election

On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.

How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister

Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.

If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.

Why No Election Was Required

A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.

This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.

The King’s Constitutional Role

After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.

Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.

Could an Election Still Happen?

Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.

In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.

What This Means for the UK

The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.

Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.

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Economics

Global Grid Upgrades Reshape Macro Economics

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Global grid upgrades reshape macro economics

On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.

According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.

The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.

For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.

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Economics

Global Trade Realignment and Supply Chains in 2026

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Global Trade Realignment and Supply Chains in 2026

The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.

The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.

Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.

For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.

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