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In August 1988 an inquisitive young Chinese political scientist named Wang Huning came to America for a six-month visit. He admired the Gateway Arch in St Louis, Missouri, and analysed the town government of Belmont, Massachusetts, watched a football game at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, and toured a detergent factory in Iowa City, Iowa. He was shocked by the many people begging in the streets and amazed by the softness of the waterbeds in the furniture stores. One question preoccupied him: how had such a young country raced so far ahead of his homeland, with its history of more than 2,000 years? He found a lot to respect in the dynamism of America, but he also identified contradictions that could tear it apart.
China-watchers debate the extent to which Mr Wang’s American sojourn influenced the course of China’s modernisation. What is known is that he left academia just a few years later, cutting off his torrent of published work, to help define the Communist Party’s message and maybe its policies for three successive presidents. Now Xi Jinping’s chief of ideology and propaganda, he is one of seven members of the Communist Party’s ruling body.
Americans should have learned from him, too. They still can. His book about his inquiry, “America against America”, is a time capsule from back before the cold war ended and the internet smashed a virtual world into the real one, back when a Chinese visitor might marvel that Americans could sharpen pencils with electric gizmos and order pizza over the phone. Mr Wang’s book reminds the American reader that in those days, too, Americans were anxious about big problems, from racism to homelessness.
America was an alien land to Mr Wang, and he saw important, enduring patterns in what the natives might overlook as the wallpaper of their lives. He spotted subtle controls everywhere. The police did not have to mandate identity cards because the government persuaded each citizen to volunteer to have one by calling it a driver’s licence and issuing it through a motor-vehicle agency. Big corporations such as Coca-Cola relieved the government of management over the lives of millions.
Because just about everything could be denominated in dollars, the voluntary pursuit of financial wherewithal, rather than any ideology or political system of coercion, was the ultimate source of stability. “People manage money, and at the same time they use money to manage people,” he wrote. Technological superiority had become the source of Americans’ sense of national superiority: “If you want to overwhelm the Americans, you must do one thing: surpass them in science and technology.”
Mr Wang was astonished by the public libraries. Ancient Chinese thought was unique, he argued, but failed to influence the world because of a lack of means to share it. By contrast American libraries gave everyone access to the knowledge of generations. “The purpose of building a reservoir is not to store water, but to irrigate,” he wrote. Knowledge was the source of social progress, but also social conflict. How to get the former without the latter?
Visiting Plymouth plantation and the Liberty Bell, Mr Wang admired how Americans put their thin history to work inculcating a shared political tradition. In light of recent events, his book’s most poignant passage describes the inauguration of President George H.W. Bush. Mr Wang was impressed by the pageantry, by the creation of a tradition strong enough to guarantee the transfer of authority. The important result, he wrote, “is not that the new president has power, but that the old president thus loses power”.
But Mr Wang did not think America’s unifying forces and traditions could withstand its centrifugal forces. He has been called the Chinese Tocqueville, but he disdained one of Tocqueville’s key conclusions. Mr Wang wrote that only someone such as Tocqueville, from an even more unequal society, could look at America and perceive a country achieving equality of conditions. Americans might claim to value both liberty and equality, but these values inevitably conflicted, and Americans prioritised freedom. They resented paying taxes that might yield greater equality, and the result was a destabilising divide between rich and poor.
Americans also claimed to treat the family as the basic unit of society, “but in spirit, the family is being hollowed out” because Americans actually emphasised the individual. Mr Wang was unsettled that parents put children younger than one to bed in separate rooms and encouraged their children to leave home starting at 18, to enter society “like entering a battlefield”. These children would have no time to take care of their parents as they aged, and yet because of the resistance to taxes the government would not be able to care for them, either, or for others left behind.
Who lost America?
Mr Wang was taken with Allan Bloom’s “The Closing of the American Mind”, published in 1987, which lamented a shift to cultural relativism in higher education. Mr Wang believed an abandonment of shared values was precipitating an American “spiritual crisis”. He thought the American system—“based on individualism, hedonism and democracy”—was losing out to the Japanese system “of collectivism, self-forgetfulness and authoritarianism”.
Mr Wang got that one wrong. And the Chinese model does not look so hot these days, either. But many Americans have come to share a version of his conclusion, that America’s contradictions are creating “an unstoppable undercurrent of crisis”. A record low of 28% say they are satisfied with “the way democracy is working in this country”, according to a recent Gallup poll. Sensible Americans still think that if only supporters of Donald Trump would wake up to the threat he represents to American institutions, they would reject him. The chilling reality is that that is what they like about him. Mr Wang may not have anticipated Mr Trump, but he did identify the corrosion of civic virtue that is letting the once and possibly future president tear so much to pieces. ■
On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.
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