Economics
Three reasons why Donald Trump might outperform the polls
Published
2 years agoon
THIS IS AMERICA’S closest presidential contest since at least 2000. With hours to go before the polls close, forecasting models, including The Economist’s, are showing a nearly 50/50 race, because swing-state polls are roughly tied. Thanks to one last batch on the campaign’s final day, our model favours Kamala Harris over Donald Trump by a very narrow margin, giving her a 56% chance of victory. Others show an even tighter race: Split Ticket puts Ms Harris on 53%, and both FiveThirtyEight and Silver Bulletin have her at 50%.
In states where our model gives the leader at least a 90% chance to win, Ms Harris has 226 electoral votes to Mr Trump’s 219. In the remaining seven states, the two are within three percentage points of each other in all state polling averages. Ms Harris is clinging to one-point leads in Michigan and Wisconsin; Mr Trump has similarly small edges in North Carolina and Georgia, and a slightly larger one in Arizona. Nevada and Pennsylvania are a dead heat.
The vice-president’s easiest path to victory is winning the Rust Belt states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin—just as the former president’s task is to break through this northern “blue wall”, as he did in 2016. If Ms Harris loses even one of these states, she would have to pick off a Sun Belt state where Mr Trump is currently in the lead.
And yet the race will probably not wind up as close as polls suggest. Since 1976, state polling averages have missed the final margin between the two nominees by an average of four percentage points. Moreover, when surveys underestimate a candidate in one part of the country, they generally err in the same way in other parts, too. At least a modest nationwide error is likely. Such an error, given how close the polls are, would probably deliver most or all of the swing states, and a decisive electoral-college victory, to whichever candidate benefits.
The chances of a big error may be even larger than usual this year because of evidence that at least some pollsters have been “herding”. This means that, when they get an outlier result, they decline to publish it or adjust their weighting to bring it closer to consensus. To be sure, America’s two most revered pollsters have released some stunning results this year. The New York Times and Siena College put Mr Trump up 13 points in Florida. On November 2nd, Ann Selzer gave Ms Harris a three-point lead in Iowa, which Mr Trump won by eight points in 2020. But the share of polls that put the candidates within a point of each other in the swing states is greater than random chance alone can explain.
Betting markets suggest that Mr Trump is likelier to outperform than is Ms Harris. On real-money exchanges with unlimited stakes, he is currently a 56-62% favourite. Some Democratic pundits dismiss this as “manipulation” by Trump supporters. Such charges are hard to stand up. Mr Trump is favoured on all major markets. Unless Elon Musk himself is propping him up on most of these sites, the prices simply reflect the (dollar-weighted) wisdom of crowds.
Three Trump cards
More convincing reasons can explain the divergence between models and markets. The first is that forecasts that rely mainly on state polling averages, rather than national ones, may be underestimating the “stickiness” of Mr Trump’s advantage in the electoral college. In 2016 and 2020, Democrats fared far better in the national popular vote than in Wisconsin, the state that delivered the decisive 270th vote in both elections. Currently Ms Harris clings to a tiny one-point edge in national polls.
Most of Mr Trump’s gains since 2020 have come from non-white and Hispanic voters, who are concentrated in big, uncompetitive states. State-level surveys support the idea that Republicans will “waste” many more votes this year: Mr Trump has inefficiently narrowed his deficit in New York and expanded his leads in Florida and Texas. None of that will decide the election. But if Ms Harris really does prevail by a single point in the popular vote, Mr Trump would need to retain only a fraction of his four-point electoral-college advantage of 2020 to return to the White House.
The second argument in Mr Trump’s favour lies in early-voting data. In 2020 Mr Trump denounced early and postal voting, allowing Democrats to bank huge leads before election day. This year he has sent mixed messages. As a result, the big gap in early voting that Democrats enjoyed four years ago has shrunk and, in some states, even become a deficit. Only when early-voting numbers started to come in did market prices begin to diverge from polling averages in 2024.
The third and final pro-Trump theory is that he is more likely than Ms Harris to outperform the polls because he did so in each of his past two campaigns. There are good reasons to expect this trend to continue. His supporters tend to distrust the media and universities, which account for most non-partisan public polling. This may make them less likely to participate in surveys. Pollsters use weighting methods to try to overcome this bias. But such efforts fail if Trump voters are less willing to share their views than are others with the same demographic profile.
Three Kam-terarguments
Or is it Ms Harris whom models are underestimating? Democrats offer three strong arguments for this. The first is an alternative explanation for previous polling errors that favoured Mr Trump. In 2016 many pollsters failed to weight their surveys by educational attainment. Because voters who graduated from college are very likely to talk to pollsters, this caused surveys to under-sample Mr Trump’s working-class supporters. By 2020 education weighting was de rigueur, but the incumbent beat his polls again, by an even greater margin.
Trump fans may believe that their man’s backers simply cannot be polled. But the 2020 election took place amid a once-in-a-century pandemic, in which Democrats were far more likely to stay at home, and so had time to participate in surveys, than Republicans were. Polls of the Trump-Biden race taken before covid began came much closer to the final result than subsequent ones did. No such imbalance in free time exists this year.
Most pollsters have also adopted “recall-vote weighting”, adjusting their samples so that the share of people who say that they supported Mr Biden and Mr Trump in 2020 matches the actual result. More respondents generally claim they voted for the winner of the past election than the number who actually did. As a result, recall weighting tends to increase vote shares for the party whose candidate lost last time: in this case, the Republicans. This method makes polls less accurate, but many firms lowballed Mr Trump for two straight cycles. Abundant recall weighting this time may have overshot the mark, which would raise the probability of a polling error in Ms Harris’s favour.
The second argument is that Ms Harris may have an advantage in the turnout battle. During Barack Obama’s two terms, Democrats depended on less reliable voters, and got walloped in midterm elections. But the Trump-era realignment, which has pushed college-educated voters towards Democrats and working-class ones towards Republicans, has reversed this dynamic. Since 2017 Democrats have consistently outperformed in lower-turnout contests. The “top-two” primary in Washington state, a reliable predictor of general elections, suggests a more Democratic national environment than current polls do, for instance.
The third argument is that Mr Trump’s tactics and strategy seem misaligned. He has given himself a tough task by focusing his campaign on appealing to groups with a low propensity to vote, such as young men and non-whites without college degrees. A candidate who is counting on such supporters should, as Mr Obama did, invest in a robust “ground game” to maximise turnout among expected backers.
Yet Mr Trump has outsourced most of this to an untested outfit funded by Mr Musk, called the America PAC. It is true that Hillary Clinton also enjoyed an advantage in field offices and among canvassers in 2016. But Mr Trump benefited from far more support from college-educated white voters that year than he is expected to in 2024.
The arguments are persuasive on both sides. So models are probably right to land around 50/50. But that is assuming the candidate who wins enough states to secure 270 electoral votes will also become president. And, if history is any guide, Mr Trump is unlikely to accept defeat. With six of the nine Supreme Court justices appointed by Republicans, a repeat of 2000—when the court handed the presidency to George W. Bush in an election decided by 537 votes—gives Mr Trump one more potential path back to the White House.
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Economics
U.S.- Canada Trade Talks Collapse; Carney Says Retaliatory Tariffs Begin September 8
Published
2 days agoon
September 1, 2026
Trade negotiations between the United States and Canada collapsed this week, with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announcing that retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods will take effect September 8, 2026. The breakdown follows the Trump administration’s imposition of 50% tariffs on certain Canadian goods, according to reporting from CNBC and the Washington Post.
What Happened
CNBC reported the collapse of talks as part of its ongoing business news coverage on August 22, 2026, noting the story as one of the week’s most significant developments for cross-border trade. The Washington Post’s business desk, in coverage also published August 22-23, quoted Carney characterizing President Trump’s 50% tariffs as “a miscalculation,” and confirmed the September 8 date for Canada’s retaliatory measures.
As of this writing, specific details on which categories of U.S. goods will be subject to Canadian retaliatory tariffs have not been fully reported. This article will be updated with additional specifics as they become available from primary government sources.
Why This Matters for Markets and Consumers
Trade disputes between the U.S. and its largest trading partners tend to have ripple effects across supply chains, consumer prices, and specific industry sectors with cross-border exposure. A Washington Post analysis accompanying the coverage noted that other countries unhappy with existing U.S. trade arrangements are likely watching the U.S.-Canada breakdown closely, suggesting the dispute could have implications beyond the immediate bilateral relationship.
Broader Context: A Volatile Week for Cross-Border and Fiscal News
The trade breakdown arrived during an already turbulent week for U.S. economic news. The same week saw the national debt cross $40 trillion for the first time, a sharp rise in Treasury bond market volatility, and the Treasury Department doubling the size of its debt buyback program. Whether the trade dispute has any direct connection to these fiscal and monetary developments has not been established in current reporting, but the concentration of major economic stories in the same week has drawn attention from market commentators tracking overall macroeconomic risk.
How This Fits the Broader Trade Policy Pattern
The U.S.-Canada breakdown is not occurring in isolation. Trade policy has been an active area of U.S. economic policymaking throughout 2026, with tariff actions and negotiations affecting multiple trading partners over the course of the year. Canada has historically been among the United States’ largest trading partners by total trade volume, meaning a prolonged dispute carries more direct economic exposure for both economies than a similar breakdown with a smaller trading partner would.
Industries with integrated North American supply chains — including automotive manufacturing, agriculture, and energy — have historically been among the most exposed to U.S.-Canada trade friction, given the degree to which components and raw materials cross the border multiple times during production. Businesses in these sectors should treat the September 8 deadline as a planning point regardless of whether it ultimately takes effect as announced.
What We Don’t Yet Know
Several material details remain unconfirmed or unreported as of this writing:
– The specific list of U.S. product categories subject to Canadian retaliatory tariffs
– Whether any further negotiations are scheduled between the September 8 deadline and the present
– Potential exemptions for critical supply chains, such as energy or auto parts, which have historically received special treatment in prior U.S.-Canada trade disputes
What to Watch Next
Businesses with cross-border exposure to Canadian suppliers or customers should monitor official statements from the U.S. Trade Representative’s office and Canada’s Department of Global Affairs for detailed tariff schedules ahead of the September 8 implementation date. Given the fluid nature of trade negotiations, a resumption of talks or a modified agreement before that date remains possible and would supersede current retaliatory tariff plans.
Economics
U.S. National Debt Surpasses $40 Trillion for the First Time: What It Means for the Economy
Published
2 weeks agoon
August 23, 2026
The U.S. gross national debt crossed $40 trillion for the first time this week, according to Treasury Department data reported by NPR on August 20, 2026. The milestone caps a period of rapid fiscal expansion: the debt has doubled since 2017, and the federal government now spends more than $1 trillion a year just servicing interest on what it owes.
Why the Debt Load Is Accelerating
The debt has not grown at a steady pace. Instead, a combination of pandemic-era spending, tax policy changes, and elevated interest rates has compounded the federal government’s borrowing costs. As older Treasury bonds issued at lower rates mature, they are being refinanced at today’s higher prevailing rates, which pushes up the government’s annual interest bill even without any new borrowing.
That interest bill is no longer a minor line item. At more than $1 trillion annually, debt servicing now competes directly with discretionary spending on defense, infrastructure, and social programs. Economists watching the trend note that this dynamic can become self-reinforcing: higher interest costs widen the deficit, which requires more borrowing, which in turn raises future interest costs.
Bond Market Reaction
The debt milestone arrived during a volatile week for Treasury bonds. Bond prices fell even as equity markets touched record highs, a divergence that market analysts describe as bond investors signaling concern about the sustainability of federal borrowing, even as stock investors remain focused on corporate earnings and AI-driven growth.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent responded to the bond market pressure by expanding the Treasury’s debt buyback program, telling CNBC the size of buyback operations had been doubled to at least $4 billion per operation, with room to increase further. Buybacks are intended to support demand for existing Treasury securities and help stabilize yields during periods of market stress.
What Rising Debt Means for Ordinary Households
For everyday consumers, the national debt level itself is abstract, but its downstream effects are not. Elevated Treasury yields tend to push up borrowing costs across the economy, including mortgage rates, auto loans, and business credit. The same week the $40 trillion milestone was confirmed, average 30-year mortgage rates moved sharply, illustrating how bond market volatility connects directly to household borrowing costs.
Rising federal interest costs also narrow the government’s fiscal flexibility. As a larger share of the federal budget goes toward servicing debt rather than funding programs, policymakers face growing pressure to either cut spending, raise revenue, or both — choices that carry direct economic consequences for households and businesses alike.
What to Watch Next
The debt trajectory is expected to remain a central topic at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, scheduled for August 27–29, 2026 — the first such gathering under new Fed Chair Kevin Warsh, who was confirmed by the Senate in a 54-45 vote in May 2026. While the symposium’s stated theme is financial innovation and payments policy, fiscal sustainability and its interaction with monetary policy are likely to feature in sideline discussions given the scale of the debt milestone.
Investors and households should watch upcoming Treasury auction results and any further changes to the buyback program as early indicators of how markets are digesting the government’s borrowing needs. A weak auction — one that requires higher yields to attract sufficient buyers — would be a signal that investor appetite for U.S. debt is softening further.
The $40 trillion figure is a threshold, not a crisis in itself. But combined with a bond market already showing signs of strain, it adds urgency to a fiscal conversation that has largely been deferred by successive Congresses and administrations.
Economics
Economic Profile of the United States of America (2026–2030 Horizon)
Published
2 weeks agoon
August 22, 2026
Executive Summary & Core Macro Outlook
The United States enters the 2026–2030 macroeconomic window as the unquestioned heavyweight of nominal economic output, retaining its status as the primary engine of global financial liquidity, private enterprise innovation, and high-margin technological deployment. According to multi-year projections from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook and complementary datasets from the World Bank, the US nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to reach $32.38 trillion by 2026, accounting for approximately 25% of global nominal output and roughly 14.5% of world GDP measured at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).
Unlike many of its advanced-economy peers across Western Europe and East Asia—which are grappling with acute demographic contraction and structural energy shocks—the United States demonstrates remarkable macroeconomic resilience. The IMF projects a real GDP Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 2.1% to 2.3% through 2030. This expansion is sustained by three structural anchors: unmatched capital depth driving massive private-sector investment in Artificial Intelligence (AI) infrastructure, complete energy independence as a net exporter of hydrocarbons and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and high labor productivity gains that cushion the economy against rising debt-servicing costs.
Macroeconomic Data Matrix (2026–2030 Projections)
| Economic Metric | IMF / World Bank Baseline (2026–2030) | Global Benchmark & Context |
| Nominal GDP (2026 Projection) | ~$32.38 Trillion | Rank #1 Globally |
| GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) | ~$32.40 Trillion | Rank #2 Globally (Behind China’s ~$38.5T PPP) |
| Projected Real GDP CAGR (2026–2030) | 2.1% – 2.3% | Top decile among G7 advanced economies |
| Gross Public Debt (% of GDP) | ~122.5% – 128.0% | Structural fiscal deficit trajectory |
| Core Inflation Rate (PCE Target) | Stabilizing at 2.0% – 2.2% | Federal Reserve inflation target alignment |
| Current Account Balance (% of GDP) | -2.8% to -3.2% | Persistent capital import & reserve currency demand |
Deep Structural Growth Drivers
1. The AI Infrastructure Hyper-Cycle & TFP Expansion
The defining growth catalyst for the US economy over the 2026–2030 horizon is the unprecedented scale of private capital expenditure (Capex) poured into artificial intelligence infrastructure, enterprise software integration, and advanced computing hardware.
Major technology mega-caps and private equity funds are directing hundreds of billions of dollars annually into hyper-scale data centers, domestic semiconductor fabrication, high-voltage electrical grid upgrades, and AI-driven workflow platforms. According to World Bank economic research, technological adoption across American service and manufacturing sectors is driving a notable uptick in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This productivity surge allows US companies to expand profit margins and output even in an environment characterized by higher structural real interest rates and tight skilled-labor markets.
2. Deep Capital Markets and Private Sector Liquidity
The structural backbone of US economic outperformance remains its financial system. US capital markets represent over 40% of global equity market capitalization and a vast majority of global venture capital and private credit assets.
This liquidity creates an efficient mechanism for capital allocation: high-potential emerging industries (such as quantum computing, synthetic biology, and advanced defense technology) receive early-stage funding at a scale that no other national market can match. When global monetary conditions tighten, global capital flees toward safety and yield, reinforcing US capital depth and lowering the relative cost of equity capital for American corporations.
3. Net Energy Independence & Industrial Cost Advantages
Unlike industrial hubs in Germany, Japan, or South Korea—which remain highly vulnerable to volatile sea-lane logistics and imported fuel price spikes—the United States operates as a major net exporter of petroleum, natural gas, and refined chemical products.
Access to abundant, cheap domestic natural gas provides US heavy industry, advanced manufacturing, and electricity-hungry data centers with a persistent structural cost advantage. Furthermore, federal policy frameworks (including the CHIPS and Science Act and clean energy tax provisions) continue to catalyze domestic private manufacturing investment, re-shoring high-value supply chains from East Asia back to the American Sunbelt and Midwest.
Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities & Downside Risks
1. Structural Sovereign Debt Trajectory
The most significant medium-term threat to US macroeconomic stability is the path of federal public debt. With gross national debt exceeding 120% of GDP and annual federal deficits running between 5% and 7% of GDP, the US fiscal baseline faces increasing structural pressure.
As older legacy low-yield Treasury bonds mature, they are refinanced at higher prevailing interest rates. According to IMF fiscal monitor assessments, federal net interest payments are absorbing an expanding share of total fiscal revenue, crowding out discretionary spending and narrowing the government’s capacity to deploy counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus during future downturns.
2. Commercial Real Estate (CRE) & Banking Sector Realignment
The structural transformation toward hybrid work models has permanently altered office space utilization across major US metropolitan areas. Regional and community banks, which hold a disproportionate share of commercial real estate debt, face ongoing balance-sheet pressure as legacy office loans mature and require refinancing at lower property valuations and higher interest rates. While systemic money-center banks remain well-capitalized, localized credit tightening from regional lenders presents a headwind for small-and-medium enterprise (SME) borrowing.
High-Outperformance Sector Matrix (2026–2030)

- Enterprise AI, Cloud Compute, & Cybersecurity: Companies building enterprise-grade software, AI agents, cloud architectures, and specialized hardware protection layers.
- Next-Generation Energy & Grid Modernization: Power generation utilities, high-voltage electrical equipment makers, small modular nuclear reactor (SMR) developers, and energy storage systems catering to exponential data center energy demands.
- Advanced Defense Technology & Aerospace: Autonomous systems, satellite networks, hypersonic defense, and advanced materials supplying both domestic security needs and global allied demand.
Strategic Summary for Global Investors & Executives
The United States through 2030 remains the ultimate high-volume, high-yield destination for institutional capital. While fiscal debt risks require long-term monitoring, the immediate 5-year outlook is defined by strong technology-driven productivity, resilient private consumption, and unmatched market liquidity. For global corporations and institutional allocators, exposure to the US economy remains an indispensable pillar of long-term growth strategy.
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