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Joe Biden’s weakness among Latinos threatens his re-election

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2 years ago

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In Arizona, a growing Hispanic electorate should help Democrats. Yet Donald Trump is gaining ground

Image: Caitlin O’Hara

| Phoenix and Tucson

Ruben Gallego, a Democrat, first won elected office in Arizona in 2010, a time of fierce battles over immigration. That year, Republicans passed SB1070, known as the “show me your papers” law, which required state police to ask individuals they suspected of being undocumented to provide proof of their status. Joe Arpaio, the publicity-minded sheriff in Arizona’s most populous county, recruited right-leaning Hollywood actors to a “posse” he formed to track down illegal migrants. Although the Supreme Court struck down most of SB1070’s provisions and voters ousted Mr Arpaio in 2016, “those scars aren’t going away,” says Mr Gallego, now a congressman running for an open Senate seat. He says the legacy of Latino activism from the Arpaio era may explain why, in 2020, Arizona Latinos voted for Joe Biden in higher numbers than Latinos nationally did, helping to deliver Mr Biden a narrow 10,000-vote victory in the state.

Yet Donald Trump is once again testing Democrats’ assumptions. He gained some 90,000 Latino voters in Arizona between 2016 and 2020 despite having pardoned Mr Arpaio for a criminal-contempt conviction, calling him an “American patriot” who “kept Arizona safe”. And if current polling is anything to go by, Mr Trump looks set to cut further into Mr Biden’s margins with Latino voters come November.

The Latino electorate is growing unusually fast and a majority still prefers Democrats. Of the six swing states likely to decide the presidential election in November (the other five being Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin), Arizona has the largest share of Latino voters. Mr Trump is clearly gaining popularity among Hispanics. However, current polling suggests that Latino voters still prefer Democrats overall, just by a smaller margin than in the past—meaning that it is Mr Biden who will benefit from the growth in Latino voters. The outcome in Arizona will depend largely on the race between these two trends.

Hispanic population in Arizona, % of total

Sources: Pew Research Centre; US Census

The Arizona contest reflects fluidity in the national Latino vote. The group has never constituted a political monolith. It includes both Florida’s right-leaning refugees from Cuba’s socialist dictatorship and California’s proud leftist heirs to Chicano activism. Yet because, on average, Latino voters came to America more recently than non-Hispanic white and black Americans, they are less likely to have inherited a strong party affiliation from their parents or grandparents. They also “are more likely to hold what political scientists call cross-cutting identities”, or traits more commonly found among people outside one’s political tribe, says Samara Klar, a political scientist at the University of Arizona in Tucson. An evangelical Democrat might sound like an oxymoron but half of evangelical Latinos say the Democratic Party represents their interests. Because of cross-cutting identities, “Latino voters know a lot more people from the other party and they’re less hostile” towards them, notes Dr Klar.

Latinos also tend to have less extreme views. Compared with white Americans, they are less likely to identify as very conservative or very liberal. In a recent YouGov/The Economist poll one in seven said they do not know where they fall on the political spectrum, three times the number of white Americans who said the same.

Given these attributes, it should be little surprise that although Latinos as a whole lean Democratic, millions have voted for Republican candidates. Exit polls suggest that as far back as 1984 Ronald Reagan won some 37% of the Latino vote. By 2004 George W. Bush’s approximate 40% share was a high-water mark that even Mr Trump has yet to achieve.

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast by Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast

by Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Democrats have assumed at their peril that Latinos are a natural constituency and share many of the party’s (increasingly) progressive preferences. “Latinos are not the black vote and Democrats just don’t understand that,” says Mike Madrid, a veteran Republican strategist. Yet Republicans have at times fallen into the same trap, assuming that Latinos leaned so Democratic that courting them was futile. “There were no Latino organisers in the Republican Party for 30 years,” adds Mr Madrid.

That has changed. In 2020 Republicans made gains with Latinos across the board. Voter profiles from Catalist, a political-data firm that helps Democrats, show that although Democrats won Latinos outright, Republicans increased their vote share among all subgroups of Latino voters. Their strides were especially large with non-college-educated Latinos. They swung 11 percentage points to the right between 2016 and 2020. Republicans also gained six points among college-educated Latinos. And while Mr Trump did not generally make notable gains among young voters between 2016 and 2020, young Latinos lurched to the right. Mr Trump’s share of votes from 18- to 29-year-old Latinos increased from 21% to 31%.

Some of this Republican momentum might be a reversion to the mean. Latino support for Barack Obama, the first minority nominee, and Hillary Clinton, the first female one, may have been unusually strong. Without Mrs Clinton to inspire them, Latinas swung towards Mr Trump by 12 percentage points in 2020. But why else did Republican gains materialise in such a pronounced way in 2020?

Top: A Phoenix food vendor who declined to be named said he intends to vote for Donald Trump in 2024.
Bottom: Arizona State University student Jazlyn Gonzalez, 19, said that while the US presidential vote in November “is really important”, she is as yet undecided about her choice. Image: Caitlin O’Hara

Covid may have been a factor. The disease disproportionately killed Latinos and strained their incomes. Some 24% of Latinos were employed as low-income front-line workers, more than any other race or ethnicity. About one in four new businesses are Hispanic-owned. So although Democrats’ focus on lockdowns and containing the disease may have saved many Latinos’ lives, it was perceived as threatening their livelihoods. Meanwhile, Mr Trump and Republican governors across the country advocated for fewer restrictions and a swift return to normal. According to a report by Equis Research, an outfit that studies Latino political behaviour, “Latino voters saw the 2020 election as a referendum on the economy…in a way they hadn’t in 2016.”

About 85% of Arizona’s Latino voters trace their origins to Mexico, a cohort whose views typically track Latino national averages. Yet whereas Democrats’ lead over Republicans among Latinos shrank by 16 points nationally in 2020, in Arizona their lead narrowed by only 9.6 points. Had Mr Trump performed among Arizona Latinos as he did nationally he would have won the state. His prospects have improved since then. Even after accounting for Democrats’ strength in Arizona, current polling suggests Mr Biden’s chances of winning the state in November are on a knife’s edge.

Holding constant the advantage Democrats had among Latinos in Arizona in 2020, Mr Biden is currently up by 17 percentage points among Latinos in the state, an 8.4-point shift to the right. An equivalent erosion in support would have cost Mr Biden 50,000 votes in 2020, enough for him to lose the state. Yet Republicans appear poorly positioned to seize upon their gains as the 2024 general-election campaign gets under way. Four years ago the Republican National Committee (RNC) invested early and heavily to win over Latino voters. This year the RNC is starved for cash. It has just $8m on hand compared with $77m at this point in 2020. And the Arizona Republican Party has been hobbled by dysfunction and factional disputes. All this bodes ill because campaign pros say the formula for winning an election that requires a surge in turnout is simple: spend money and reach out to voters early and often.

Mr Biden could still win the White House while losing Arizona. Assuming that the forecasts of a tight race prove accurate, and that Mr Biden holds on to Pennsylvania and Michigan, which are his strongest prospects among the half-dozen swing states, he would need to win at least one more of them. But Mr Biden’s loosening grip on the Latino vote— which is a significant factor in other closely contested states, particularly Nevada—is hardly encouraging.

Democrats are betting that the electoral maths will continue to favour them in Arizona because the Latino electorate will continue to grow. (They also expect Mr Biden’s standing with voters to improve by November.) The number of Latinos voting in Arizona has in fact increased steadily over the past two decades. This year alone there will be 150,000 newly eligible Latino voters in the state. And Arizona Latinos seem particularly motivated. In 2020 a striking 67% of eligible Latino voters in Arizona went to the polls, compared with 54% nationally (which was the lowest of all major racial and ethnic groups). If Latino turnout again reaches 67% in November, that would mean that Democrats could lose nearly four points from their Arizona margins over Republicans in 2020 and still net just as many votes.

“Who do you think would do a better job

handling the following issues as president?”

Source: YouGov/The Economist

“Who do you think would do a better job handling the

following issues as president?”, United States, %

“Who do you think would do a better job handling the

following issues as president?”, United States, %

Yet it is not a sure bet that Latinos will comprise a larger share of the electorate in 2024. Mr Biden and Mr Trump are both deeply unpopular candidates. Latinos are especially lukewarm on both. In national-level polling from YouGov/The Economist Hispanic respondents are roughly twice as likely as white ones to say that neither candidate would do a good job handling the issues they prioritise: the economy, inflation, health care and immigration. Among those who select a candidate, Mr Biden is viewed as stronger on health care while Mr Trump is seen as stronger on immigration.
Latino attitudes about immigration do not align neatly with the policies of either major party. Polling from Unidos, a lobbying group, found that roughly 83% of the Latinos they surveyed in Arizona in November 2023 supported a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, long a Democratic goal. Yet in that same survey 63% favoured securing the border, the signature cause of Republicans. “Republicans only want border security. They don’t want a pathway to citizenship…they just want moats and crocodiles and hot oil on the border,” argues Mr Madrid. And Democrats are often seen as having prioritised everything but a secure border. Between July and October of 2023 Arizona had more migrant encounters on its southern border than any other state and the crisis has persisted this year. Republicans will be hoping that Democrats bear the brunt of the political fallout.

Top: Samual Lopez, 31, who said he is voting for Donald Trump in November, added that he is frustrated at the US sending aid to Ukraine when there is a large population of homeless people in Phoenix.
Bottom: Ayling Dominguez, 26, who works as an advocate for immigrant rights, said Latino voters should “evolve the way we see our power and choices in electoral politics.” Image: Caitlin O’Hara

Economic issues may also hurt Mr Biden. Until 2019 housing in the Phoenix metropolitan area, where two-thirds of the state’s population lives, was cheaper than the nationwide average. Residents there now shell out 12% more than average. Inflation also spiked higher in Phoenix during 2022 than in any other city, although it has since fallen below the national average. In November 2023 some 59% of Latinos in the state said inflation was one of their most pressing concerns. That cannot be helping Mr Biden’s standing.

These perceptions may yet change as inflation softens. But views on access to abortion tend to be more fixed, and here Democrats retain an advantage. Some 65% of Arizona Latinos think that, no matter their personal views, it is wrong to make abortion illegal. In the aftermath of the Dobbs decision in 2022, which overturned the constitutional right to abortion, a surge of women registered to vote in Arizona. In November Arizonans may vote on a referendum that would protect a woman’s right to an abortion through viability, or about 24 weeks of pregnancy. That could increase Democrat-leaning turnout.

Political campaigns come and go, but Democrats’ outreach to Latinos is maintained during off-cycle years with a vast network of grassroots Latino organisations that hew progressive. “This does not exist on the Republican side of the equation,” laments Helder Toste, a former field director at the Republican National Senatorial Committee.

These dynamics will affect more than just the presidential ticket. They may well help decide which party controls the House and the Senate. Mr Gallego, who currently represents parts of Phoenix in the House of Representatives, will probably do battle with Kari Lake, a Trump acolyte and election-denier, for Kyrsten Sinema’s open Senate seat. The state also has two competitive House races. One features an incumbent and rising star, Juan Ciscomani, a Mexican-born Republican who gave the party’s Spanish-language response to Joe Biden’s state-of-the-union speech in 2023.

The election is still more than seven months away and many Latino voters have not tuned in yet. According to polling from YouGov/The Economist, 38% of Hispanic respondents, compared with 23% of white respondents, say they are paying little or no attention to the 2024 presidential campaigns. In the autumn, when more Latino voters take note, they are likely to be bombarded with messages that the fate of the nation lies in their hands. In Arizona at least, the adverts will not be all exaggeration. ■

Sources: YouGov; Catalist; Redistricting Data Hub; US Census Bureau; OpenStreetMap; Pew Research Centre; Federal Election Commission; All About Redistricting; ArcGIS; The Economist

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U.S.- Canada Trade Talks Collapse; Carney Says Retaliatory Tariffs Begin September 8

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September 1, 2026

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U.S.- Canada Trade Talks Collapse; Carney Says Retaliatory Tariffs Begin September 8

Trade negotiations between the United States and Canada collapsed this week, with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announcing that retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods will take effect September 8, 2026. The breakdown follows the Trump administration’s imposition of 50% tariffs on certain Canadian goods, according to reporting from CNBC and the Washington Post.

What Happened

CNBC reported the collapse of talks as part of its ongoing business news coverage on August 22, 2026, noting the story as one of the week’s most significant developments for cross-border trade. The Washington Post’s business desk, in coverage also published August 22-23, quoted Carney characterizing President Trump’s 50% tariffs as “a miscalculation,” and confirmed the September 8 date for Canada’s retaliatory measures.

As of this writing, specific details on which categories of U.S. goods will be subject to Canadian retaliatory tariffs have not been fully reported. This article will be updated with additional specifics as they become available from primary government sources.

Why This Matters for Markets and Consumers

Trade disputes between the U.S. and its largest trading partners tend to have ripple effects across supply chains, consumer prices, and specific industry sectors with cross-border exposure. A Washington Post analysis accompanying the coverage noted that other countries unhappy with existing U.S. trade arrangements are likely watching the U.S.-Canada breakdown closely, suggesting the dispute could have implications beyond the immediate bilateral relationship.

Broader Context: A Volatile Week for Cross-Border and Fiscal News

The trade breakdown arrived during an already turbulent week for U.S. economic news. The same week saw the national debt cross $40 trillion for the first time, a sharp rise in Treasury bond market volatility, and the Treasury Department doubling the size of its debt buyback program. Whether the trade dispute has any direct connection to these fiscal and monetary developments has not been established in current reporting, but the concentration of major economic stories in the same week has drawn attention from market commentators tracking overall macroeconomic risk.

How This Fits the Broader Trade Policy Pattern

The U.S.-Canada breakdown is not occurring in isolation. Trade policy has been an active area of U.S. economic policymaking throughout 2026, with tariff actions and negotiations affecting multiple trading partners over the course of the year. Canada has historically been among the United States’ largest trading partners by total trade volume, meaning a prolonged dispute carries more direct economic exposure for both economies than a similar breakdown with a smaller trading partner would.

Industries with integrated North American supply chains — including automotive manufacturing, agriculture, and energy — have historically been among the most exposed to U.S.-Canada trade friction, given the degree to which components and raw materials cross the border multiple times during production. Businesses in these sectors should treat the September 8 deadline as a planning point regardless of whether it ultimately takes effect as announced.

What We Don’t Yet Know

Several material details remain unconfirmed or unreported as of this writing:

– The specific list of U.S. product categories subject to Canadian retaliatory tariffs
– Whether any further negotiations are scheduled between the September 8 deadline and the present
– Potential exemptions for critical supply chains, such as energy or auto parts, which have historically received special treatment in prior U.S.-Canada trade disputes

What to Watch Next

Businesses with cross-border exposure to Canadian suppliers or customers should monitor official statements from the U.S. Trade Representative’s office and Canada’s Department of Global Affairs for detailed tariff schedules ahead of the September 8 implementation date. Given the fluid nature of trade negotiations, a resumption of talks or a modified agreement before that date remains possible and would supersede current retaliatory tariff plans.

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U.S. National Debt Surpasses $40 Trillion for the First Time: What It Means for the Economy

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2 weeks ago

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August 23, 2026

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US Debt is now 40 trillions

The U.S. gross national debt crossed $40 trillion for the first time this week, according to Treasury Department data reported by NPR on August 20, 2026. The milestone caps a period of rapid fiscal expansion: the debt has doubled since 2017, and the federal government now spends more than $1 trillion a year just servicing interest on what it owes.

Why the Debt Load Is Accelerating

The debt has not grown at a steady pace. Instead, a combination of pandemic-era spending, tax policy changes, and elevated interest rates has compounded the federal government’s borrowing costs. As older Treasury bonds issued at lower rates mature, they are being refinanced at today’s higher prevailing rates, which pushes up the government’s annual interest bill even without any new borrowing.

That interest bill is no longer a minor line item. At more than $1 trillion annually, debt servicing now competes directly with discretionary spending on defense, infrastructure, and social programs. Economists watching the trend note that this dynamic can become self-reinforcing: higher interest costs widen the deficit, which requires more borrowing, which in turn raises future interest costs.

Bond Market Reaction

The debt milestone arrived during a volatile week for Treasury bonds. Bond prices fell even as equity markets touched record highs, a divergence that market analysts describe as bond investors signaling concern about the sustainability of federal borrowing, even as stock investors remain focused on corporate earnings and AI-driven growth.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent responded to the bond market pressure by expanding the Treasury’s debt buyback program, telling CNBC the size of buyback operations had been doubled to at least $4 billion per operation, with room to increase further. Buybacks are intended to support demand for existing Treasury securities and help stabilize yields during periods of market stress.

What Rising Debt Means for Ordinary Households

For everyday consumers, the national debt level itself is abstract, but its downstream effects are not. Elevated Treasury yields tend to push up borrowing costs across the economy, including mortgage rates, auto loans, and business credit. The same week the $40 trillion milestone was confirmed, average 30-year mortgage rates moved sharply, illustrating how bond market volatility connects directly to household borrowing costs.

Rising federal interest costs also narrow the government’s fiscal flexibility. As a larger share of the federal budget goes toward servicing debt rather than funding programs, policymakers face growing pressure to either cut spending, raise revenue, or both — choices that carry direct economic consequences for households and businesses alike.

What to Watch Next

The debt trajectory is expected to remain a central topic at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, scheduled for August 27–29, 2026 — the first such gathering under new Fed Chair Kevin Warsh, who was confirmed by the Senate in a 54-45 vote in May 2026. While the symposium’s stated theme is financial innovation and payments policy, fiscal sustainability and its interaction with monetary policy are likely to feature in sideline discussions given the scale of the debt milestone.

Investors and households should watch upcoming Treasury auction results and any further changes to the buyback program as early indicators of how markets are digesting the government’s borrowing needs. A weak auction — one that requires higher yields to attract sufficient buyers — would be a signal that investor appetite for U.S. debt is softening further.

The $40 trillion figure is a threshold, not a crisis in itself. But combined with a bond market already showing signs of strain, it adds urgency to a fiscal conversation that has largely been deferred by successive Congresses and administrations.

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Economic Profile of the United States of America (2026–2030 Horizon)

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August 22, 2026

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Economic Profile of the United States of America (2026–2030 Horizon)

Executive Summary & Core Macro Outlook

The United States enters the 2026–2030 macroeconomic window as the unquestioned heavyweight of nominal economic output, retaining its status as the primary engine of global financial liquidity, private enterprise innovation, and high-margin technological deployment. According to multi-year projections from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook and complementary datasets from the World Bank, the US nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to reach $32.38 trillion by 2026, accounting for approximately 25% of global nominal output and roughly 14.5% of world GDP measured at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

Unlike many of its advanced-economy peers across Western Europe and East Asia—which are grappling with acute demographic contraction and structural energy shocks—the United States demonstrates remarkable macroeconomic resilience. The IMF projects a real GDP Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 2.1% to 2.3% through 2030. This expansion is sustained by three structural anchors: unmatched capital depth driving massive private-sector investment in Artificial Intelligence (AI) infrastructure, complete energy independence as a net exporter of hydrocarbons and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and high labor productivity gains that cushion the economy against rising debt-servicing costs.

Macroeconomic Data Matrix (2026–2030 Projections)

Economic MetricIMF / World Bank Baseline (2026–2030)Global Benchmark & Context
Nominal GDP (2026 Projection)~$32.38 TrillionRank #1 Globally
GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)~$32.40 TrillionRank #2 Globally (Behind China’s ~$38.5T PPP)
Projected Real GDP CAGR (2026–2030)2.1% – 2.3%Top decile among G7 advanced economies
Gross Public Debt (% of GDP)~122.5% – 128.0%Structural fiscal deficit trajectory
Core Inflation Rate (PCE Target)Stabilizing at 2.0% – 2.2%Federal Reserve inflation target alignment
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)-2.8% to -3.2%Persistent capital import & reserve currency demand

Deep Structural Growth Drivers

1. The AI Infrastructure Hyper-Cycle & TFP Expansion

The defining growth catalyst for the US economy over the 2026–2030 horizon is the unprecedented scale of private capital expenditure (Capex) poured into artificial intelligence infrastructure, enterprise software integration, and advanced computing hardware.

Major technology mega-caps and private equity funds are directing hundreds of billions of dollars annually into hyper-scale data centers, domestic semiconductor fabrication, high-voltage electrical grid upgrades, and AI-driven workflow platforms. According to World Bank economic research, technological adoption across American service and manufacturing sectors is driving a notable uptick in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This productivity surge allows US companies to expand profit margins and output even in an environment characterized by higher structural real interest rates and tight skilled-labor markets.

2. Deep Capital Markets and Private Sector Liquidity

The structural backbone of US economic outperformance remains its financial system. US capital markets represent over 40% of global equity market capitalization and a vast majority of global venture capital and private credit assets.

This liquidity creates an efficient mechanism for capital allocation: high-potential emerging industries (such as quantum computing, synthetic biology, and advanced defense technology) receive early-stage funding at a scale that no other national market can match. When global monetary conditions tighten, global capital flees toward safety and yield, reinforcing US capital depth and lowering the relative cost of equity capital for American corporations.

3. Net Energy Independence & Industrial Cost Advantages

Unlike industrial hubs in Germany, Japan, or South Korea—which remain highly vulnerable to volatile sea-lane logistics and imported fuel price spikes—the United States operates as a major net exporter of petroleum, natural gas, and refined chemical products.

Access to abundant, cheap domestic natural gas provides US heavy industry, advanced manufacturing, and electricity-hungry data centers with a persistent structural cost advantage. Furthermore, federal policy frameworks (including the CHIPS and Science Act and clean energy tax provisions) continue to catalyze domestic private manufacturing investment, re-shoring high-value supply chains from East Asia back to the American Sunbelt and Midwest.

Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities & Downside Risks

1. Structural Sovereign Debt Trajectory

The most significant medium-term threat to US macroeconomic stability is the path of federal public debt. With gross national debt exceeding 120% of GDP and annual federal deficits running between 5% and 7% of GDP, the US fiscal baseline faces increasing structural pressure.

As older legacy low-yield Treasury bonds mature, they are refinanced at higher prevailing interest rates. According to IMF fiscal monitor assessments, federal net interest payments are absorbing an expanding share of total fiscal revenue, crowding out discretionary spending and narrowing the government’s capacity to deploy counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus during future downturns.

2. Commercial Real Estate (CRE) & Banking Sector Realignment

The structural transformation toward hybrid work models has permanently altered office space utilization across major US metropolitan areas. Regional and community banks, which hold a disproportionate share of commercial real estate debt, face ongoing balance-sheet pressure as legacy office loans mature and require refinancing at lower property valuations and higher interest rates. While systemic money-center banks remain well-capitalized, localized credit tightening from regional lenders presents a headwind for small-and-medium enterprise (SME) borrowing.

High-Outperformance Sector Matrix (2026–2030)
  1. Enterprise AI, Cloud Compute, & Cybersecurity: Companies building enterprise-grade software, AI agents, cloud architectures, and specialized hardware protection layers.
  2. Next-Generation Energy & Grid Modernization: Power generation utilities, high-voltage electrical equipment makers, small modular nuclear reactor (SMR) developers, and energy storage systems catering to exponential data center energy demands.
  3. Advanced Defense Technology & Aerospace: Autonomous systems, satellite networks, hypersonic defense, and advanced materials supplying both domestic security needs and global allied demand.

Strategic Summary for Global Investors & Executives

The United States through 2030 remains the ultimate high-volume, high-yield destination for institutional capital. While fiscal debt risks require long-term monitoring, the immediate 5-year outlook is defined by strong technology-driven productivity, resilient private consumption, and unmatched market liquidity. For global corporations and institutional allocators, exposure to the US economy remains an indispensable pillar of long-term growth strategy.

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