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America’s immigration policies are failing

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SO YOU WANT to come to America. Venezuela, your home country, is suffering under Nicolás Maduro’s violent kleptocracy. What to do? Good luck getting a green card: employers won’t bother sponsoring a low-skilled worker like you, and you have no immediate family in America to vouch for you. Your WhatsApp is filled with news of friends who have crossed America’s southern border. You decide to follow them and, after a hellish trip, make it to the Rio Grande. You could try to slip across undetected—about 600,000 “gotaways” managed it last year. Or you can tell the border agents who intercept you that you want asylum. Odds are that they will release you with a court date scheduled in several months’ time, kickstarting a process that may take years. Welcome to America.

In November 2023 nearly 250,000 migrants crossed the southern border. The surge—and the perception that America’s borders are open—is a giant political liability for President Joe Biden. Just 27% of Americans tell pollsters that they approve of his handling of the border. More than twice as many trust Donald Trump on the issue. The fact that surging migration over the southern border could cost Mr Biden the election in November has made the problem trickier to solve. Wrangling over a deal to fund Ukraine in exchange for tighter border security and asylum limits has dragged on for months. Although Senate leaders say an agreement is close, some Republicans—reportedly including Mr Trump—seem to want the border chaos to fester, to better beat Mr Biden over the head with it during the election campaign.

Several factors explain the surge: violence and instability around the globe; plentiful job openings in America; the accurate perception that Mr Biden is more welcoming than his predecessor; and cumbersome, limited pathways to come legally. An overwhelmed border apparatus also invites more crossings, notes David Bier of the Cato Institute, a think-tank. When people hear that they are unlikely to be detained and deported, more try their luck.

Decades of neglect and partisan rancour have crippled America’s immigration system and created a situation where immigrants view asylum-seeking as the surest way to get into the country, rather than a long-shot attempt. Congress last made meaningful reform to immigration law in 1990. Comprehensive, bipartisan reform has seemed close several times since, only to fall apart in the end. In 2006, 2007 and 2013 bipartisan Senate bills included a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, more visas for workers and stricter enforcement at the border. In recent years Democrats have largely been animated by the desire to protect daca recipients, immigrants who were brought to America as children, from deportation.

Mr Trump’s candidacy upended the politics of immigration. When he launched his campaign in 2015, the number of migrants apprehended nationwide was at its lowest level since 1971. That fact did not, of course, stop Mr Trump from declaring that migrants threatened the American way of life. (“They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”) In 2019 irregular entries at the southern border jumped. Mr Trump saw detention as a means of deterrence and made some migrants with pending asylum claims wait in Mexico. At one time during his presidency nearly 57,000 people were detained. The surge was so great that even Mr Trump released a quarter of migrants into the country immediately with a notice to appear (NTA) in immigration court.

Borderline, personalities, disorder

Mr Biden reduced detentions—the number in custody today is around 38,000—and scrapped the requirement to remain in Mexico. He has tried less effective deterrents. His administration wants to steer migrants towards ports of entry where they arrive for appointments made via a smartphone app. Most are admitted with permission to stay for a year or two. By contrast people caught crossing illegally are presumed ineligible for asylum, with a few narrow exceptions, and quickly deported.

Chart: The Economist

At least that is how it is supposed to work. In reality most migrants who cross illegally are still being released into the country, and irregular arrivals far exceed those at official crossings. Once on American soil a migrant can request asylum, which involves a screening with an asylum officer. Because of Mr Biden’s reluctance to pursue detention and an insufficient number of asylum officers, in November seven in ten were handed an NTA and sent on their way.

Last year the Biden administration also began granting parole to up to 30,000 Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans each month, if applicants identified a financial sponsor in America. Again the goal was to make flows more orderly and decrease illegal arrivals. Permission to stay lasts two years but can be revoked at any time. Illegal crossings by Haitians, Nicaraguans and Cubans plummeted. But Venezuelans, who are less likely to have social ties to America, continue to enter illegally. “Most of the Venezuelans arriving now don’t have family, friends, relatives,” says Theresa Cardinal Brown, who served in the Department for Homeland Security in the Bush and Obama administrations.

Once across the border, migrants head to cities. Shelter systems in New York City, Chicago and Denver are overwhelmed and their mayors want Mr Biden’s help. This is partly the doing of Greg Abbott, the Republican governor of Texas, who is busing migrants to Democratic-run cities. But big cities are also natural magnets for migrants.

With an NTA in hand, new arrivals enter the court system, where the backlog is growing faster than judges can keep up. Cases in immigration court surpassed 3m in November. It takes more than four years on average just to get an initial asylum hearing. Doubling the number of judges would clear the backlog—but only by 2032, according to an estimate from the Congressional Research Service.

Half of asylum cases are denied, and decisions are inconsistent. One judge in Houston denied 95% of her asylum cases last year; another in San Francisco denied just 1% of hers. But the immense wait, low chance of detention and the prospect of work in America encourage migrants with a weak claim to cross the border. Prioritising the most recent arrivals’ cases would reduce this incentive, notes Stephen Yale-Loehr of Cornell Law School. A long journey seems less worth it if the reward is deportation rather than an NTA.

The looming election, Mr Trump’s perceived strength on border issues and Mr Biden’s desire to arm Ukraine mean that the president wants to make a deal. His openness to tougher border enforcement is also no doubt fuelled by Americans’ rightward turn on immigration. Polling from YouGov suggests that more Americans favour building a southern border wall than don’t. Even 32% of Democrats now say they support the idea, up from 20% in 2022.

Whether the House and the Senate can agree on reform is questionable. A deal may include funding for more Border Patrol agents, the ability to shut down migrant intake if encounters reach a certain level, a higher bar for migrants to pass their interview—so that they are not released into the country unless they are likely to actually receive asylum—and limits on parole. Any changes to asylum rules will almost certainly be challenged in the courts.

But House Republicans have waffled, often insisting that they would accept nothing other than HR2, a hardline immigration bill passed along party lines last year that would be dead on arrival in the Senate. On the left, progressives do not want to tighten access to asylum. Both groups should beware. A new poll from The Economist and YouGov suggests that a plurality of Americans want Congress to pass a bill that both funds Ukraine and restricts asylum. The politicians should not ignore their voters.

Stay on top of American politics with Checks and Balance, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter, which examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters.

Economics

UK Has a New Prime Minister Without a General Election

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UK Has a New Prime Minister Without a General Election

On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.

How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister

Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.

If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.

Why No Election Was Required

A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.

This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.

The King’s Constitutional Role

After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.

Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.

Could an Election Still Happen?

Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.

In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.

What This Means for the UK

The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.

Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.

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Economics

Global Grid Upgrades Reshape Macro Economics

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Global grid upgrades reshape macro economics

On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.

According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.

The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.

For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.

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Economics

Global Trade Realignment and Supply Chains in 2026

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Global Trade Realignment and Supply Chains in 2026

The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.

The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.

Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.

For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.

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