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AMERICANS WILL elect 471 federal officials in November: 435 members of the House of Representatives, 34 senators, a vice-president and a president. These contests are overshadowed by the impending rematch between President Joe Biden and Donald Trump, his predecessor, which will be pitched as a struggle between democracy and autocracy (and amplified by a projected $3bn in campaign spending). Seven months of this promises to be wearing.
Cast your eye down the ballot, however, and something exotic is in the offing. At the moment, Washington is divided by the thinnest of margins. Democrats control the Senate by just two seats out of 100. Republicans control the House of Representatives by five out of 435 (a margin that will shrink to four once Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin retires next month).
After the election, control of both chambers could flip. In the Senate, the seats contested this year are in extremely favourable states for Republicans. In the House, by contrast, Democrats campaigning against the chaos of Republican leadership may wrest back control. A double flip would be quite a feat of political gymnastics: it has never happened before.
Senate terms last six years, and only one-third are contested every two years. The mix this year is unkind to Democrats. Joe Manchin, the West Virginia senator who managed to remain the Democratic representative of his Trump-loving state, is retiring. His seat will almost certainly be filled by a Republican, leaving the starting-point for the race at, in essence, 50-50.
Of the seven competitive Senate races this cycle, all are now held by Democrats. Five are in presidential battleground states (Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin). They are winnable by Democrats, but none comfortably (see chart). In Montana and Ohio Mr Biden is likely to lose, but the incumbent Democratic senators, Jon Tester and Sherrod Brown, must prevail if the party is to retain control of the chamber. They are the last remaining Democrats holding statewide office in their respective states. Adding to the Democrats’ headaches, Larry Hogan, a popular Republican ex-governor of ordinarily deep-Democratic Maryland, plans to run for its Senate seat.
Chart: The Economist
Republican incumbents, meanwhile, look comfortable. The two that Democrats have the slightest chance of upsetting are Ted Cruz of Texas and Rick Scott of Florida—neither of whom represents states that Mr Biden will be seriously contesting. Overall, then, the maths look troubling for Democrats. They will need to play perfect defence to get to a 50-50 Senate (and hope that Kamala Harris remains vice-president to break ties in their favour).
True, the Democrats managed this feat in the midterms of 2022 (actually gaining one seat, in Pennsylvania). They expect to retain their fundraising advantages. And the candidate-quality issues that hurt Republicans in previous elections may recur. In Arizona, for example, Kari Lake, an election-denying demagogue who in 2022 lost her bid for governor against a weak Democratic challenger, will probably be the party’s Senate candidate. In Pennsylvania Dave McCormick, the presumptive Republican nominee who lost an expensive Senate primary in 2022 to a celebrity doctor, Mehmet Oz, is dogged by allegations of carpet-bagging over his private-jet travel to his mansion in Connecticut.
The House elections are not so tilted against the Republicans as the Senate elections are against the Democrats. But Democrats have a more credible case for taking the chamber than the Republicans do for keeping it, for a number of reasons.
First, Republican stewardship of the House has been chaotic, even by the low standards of Congress. Last year, for the first time in American history, Republican hardliners deposed their speaker. Last week one of their ranks, Marjorie Taylor Greene, introduced a motion to depose the current speaker. More ordinary forces also militate against Republicans. Democrats are expected to outspend them. And there are over a dozen Republicans in districts that voted for Mr Biden; there are only five Democrats in Trump-friendly districts.
Chart: The Economist
The possible flip-flopping of the chambers may seem odd when American politics are so nationalised and polarised. Split-ticket voting—in which people vote for presidential candidates of one party and congressional candidates of another—has gone from common to exceptional. In roughly one-third of the Senate races held in the presidential-election years of 1992, 1996 and 2000, voters opted for a presidential candidate of one party and a senator of the other. In 2016 there were no such cases. And in the 33 elections held in 2020 the sole exception was in Maine.
Split congressional districts have also declined precipitously. Before 2000 well over 100 districts typically had representatives belonging to a different party from the voters’ presidential preference. By 2020 this had declined to a record low of 16.
But as American politics have calcified into two mutually loathing teams of nearly equal size, legislative majorities that were once enduring have become narrow and unstable. Between 1932 and 1994, Democrats controlled the House for all but four years. Since then the chamber has flipped party control five times. Minor fluctuations—small shifts in turnout, the entry of a third-party candidate—can be decisive.
A double flip would matter for more than just novelty. Republican control of the Senate would mean that Mr Trump, if he regains the White House, would have a far easier time confirming his most outlandish potential nominees. Mr Biden, if re-elected, could find that his nominees to fill judicial vacancies were refused.
Republican senators are, for the moment, more internationalist than their House colleagues, so aid for Ukraine could pass through a differently divided government. But on the whole, divided government tends to be inimical to serious legislating—as experienced in the tug-of-war between President Barack Obama and the Republican-controlled Senate after 2015.
The competition for Capitol Hill has not yet attracted a great deal of public interest. Perhaps it should. For all the attention that Americans pay to the question of their next president, they devote surprisingly little to whether or not he will be able to do much from his perch. ■
On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.