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IT IS NEVER nice for a campaign when a steadfast constituency turns irate and threatens to withhold their votes; it is the stuff of nightmares when they happen to reside in a swing state that may decide the next presidential election. Incensed over the Israeli military campaign in Gaza—which is fast approaching 30,000 Palestinian deaths—Muslim-American and Arab-American voters staged a campaign to withhold their votes for President Joe Biden in Michigan’s Democratic primary. Rashida Tlaib, a prominent Palestinian-American congresswoman representing the heavily Muslim western suburbs of Detroit, encouraged her fellow Democrats to vote “uncommitted”, as did most prominent Muslim officials in the state. Over 100,000 Michiganders voted “uncommitted”, representing 13.3% of the total vote.
The threat to Mr Biden is not veiled. “There is not really a path that does not go through Michigan. And there is not really a path that goes through Michigan without the Muslim community,” says Hira Khan of Emgage, a Muslim-voter mobilisation group. Michigan has had a recent spate of tight elections. In 2016 Donald Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a margin of 10,704 votes (or 0.22% of those cast); in 2020 Mr Biden won by 154,188 (or 2.78%). The state also has one of the highest concentrations of voters with Middle Eastern and Muslim backgrounds. In 2020 there were an estimated 206,000 Muslims in the electorate—roughly 2.8% of the total—and most of them probably voted for Democrats. If the anti-Gaza backlash persisted through November (including among the three-quarters of young voters who disapprove of Mr Biden’s handling of it), the effect would be marginal. But in a state like Michigan, marginal effects can matter quite a lot.
That is why the Biden campaign seemed particularly concerned. Weeks ago, it sent Julie Chávez Rodríguez, the campaign manager, to the state to meet Muslim leaders. The meeting was cancelled when all of them refused to attend. Reportedly, a suggested meeting with Vice-President Kamala Harris in Washington was also nixed. The White House dispatched senior policymakers, including Jon Finer, the deputy national security adviser. A recording of the conversation, published by the New York Times, shows Mr Finer being unusually self-critical: “We have left a very damaging impression based on what has been a wholly inadequate public accounting for how much the president, the administration and the country values the lives of Palestinians. And that began, frankly, pretty early in the conflict,” he said.
The listening sessions are only going so far. “I think they’re hearing the concerns. The problem is that they’re not acting on them yet,” says Alabas Farhat, a Democratic state representative who has been campaigning for the uncommitted vote.
Despite the display of discontent in the primary, it remains unclear how seriously the grumbling will jeopardise the president’s prospects in the general election. In 2012, when Barack Obama was running for re-election, 10.7% of Democratic primary voters in Michigan voted “uncommitted”, even though there was no concerted campaign to do so. Graded against that baseline, the 13.3% showing mustered by this campaign looks less impressive.
Back in 2012 the discontent was diffuse. This year it was concentrated. In some precincts of Dearborn, a heavily Arab-American city near Detroit, three-quarters of voters were “uncommitted”. If 100,000 Democratic voters were really willing to spoil their ballots in November in order to nix Mr Biden’s chances of winning, he would be in serious trouble. Yet the president would also face an electoral backlash were he seen to abandon Israel. In The Economist’s YouGov poll 36% of those questioned say their sympathies in the conflict are more with Israelis, while just 15% are more sympathetic to Palestinians.
Some Muslims say they are ready to abandon Biden and that his inability to restrain Israel is cause enough to make him a one-term president. Given Mr Trump’s evident antipathy to Muslim-Americans, his favour towards Israel and his general lack of concern for most things that sound like human rights, this might seem paradoxical. Ahead of the primary vote Gretchen Whitmer, the popular governor of Michigan, argued that “any vote that is not cast for Joe Biden supports a second Trump term.” Many Muslims concede that outcomes under Mr Trump would not have been better, but that there would be no offensive pretence of caring about human rights. “I prefer to be stabbed from the front than from the back,” says one.
Others say that Mr Biden can win back their support if he were to call for a permanent ceasefire, if he stops sending weapons to the Israelis and resumes funding the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (which was cut off after the Israelis said that several of its employees had taken part in Hamas’s attack on October 7th that murdered 1,200). Asked what happens in the next nine months, Abdullah Hammoud, the mayor of Dearborn, says: “That’s a question for President Biden.” ■
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On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.
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