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Kaleigh Long believed there had to be an American fix. As an Oklahoman working on political campaigns in the Democratic Republic of Congo she saw all too closely the bloodiness of the critical-mineral trade. Militias killed her flatmate’s siblings, burnt homes on resource-rich land and forced children to dig in the mines—as Chinese companies tolerated the abuses.
Back home the 28-year-old single mother reckoned that getting into the mineral business was the best way to clean up the supply chain and ease China’s chokehold on cobalt and other minerals vital to a greener economy. America had no nickel-cobalt refineries of its own. In early 2022 Ms Long set out to build its first. She raised $50m for her startup, Westwin Elements, and recruited oil-and-gas tycoons, a former intelligence officer and the longtime boss of Boeing, an aerospace company, to sit on her board. In her Oklahoma City headquarters the self-described libertarian touched her necklace, the pendant a silhouette of Africa, as she spoke about the $185m grant Westwin next hopes to win from the Department of Energy.
Westwin’s ambitions show the promise of the largesse doled out by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), Joe Biden’s signature bill to catalyse America’s clean-energy transition. Subsidies for electric cars attracted $110bn in investments in green manufacturing and battery-making within a year of the IRA’s passage in 2022. But as firms boosted production it became clear that China’s grip on the world’s mineral mines and refineries could prove perilous for its political foes. If China decides not to export refined metals tomorrow, as it has threatened to do, dozens of brand-new American gigafactories could soon sit idle.
Even with subsidies, mining and refining in America are not for the faint of heart. Regulations can make both activities uncompetitive. But the maths flipped in refiners’ favour in December 2023 when the tax agencies charged with implementing the IRA made it more protectionist. Their new rules clarified that companies selling electric cars made with materials processed by firms with at least 25% Chinese ownership are ineligible for subsidies. For makers of batteries and cars this was bad news—their inputs got pricier overnight. But for Ms Long it meant that her higher-cost product would have a market.
Drive 90 miles south-west of Oklahoma City through fields of cotton and cattle and you will find yourself at the construction site of Westwin’s pilot plant in Lawton. A steel skeleton of the refinery sits on a 40-acre plot framing the Wichita mountain-range; on a February morning engineers buzzed around it in hard hats. By 2030 Westwin plans to produce 64,000 metric tonnes of processed nickel and—if it can find ethical suppliers and sell the refined product without crashing the price—20,000 tonnes of cobalt. According to calculations by Daniel Quiggin of Chatham House, a British think-tank, that would meet roughly half of America’s demand for electric-car batteries. For building the supply chain “projects like this are indispensable,” says Bentley Allan, a professor at Johns Hopkins University.
Blood, sweat and fears
But in leaving Congo for America’s prairies Ms Long finds herself still haunted by ethical problems. By building in Oklahoma she inserted her project in the middle of a bitter row over indigenous rights. Leaders of the Apache, Comanche and Kiowa nations say the plant comes too close to their sovereign land and that the firm’s failure to consult them before building shows the same disrespect as settlers past. They fear that contamination from the refinery will give their babies cancer and dirty their sacred land and air. Having lost countless kin to covid-19 they refuse to back it without a guarantee that it will not make their people sick. Westwin cannot make that promise.
The protests echo those mounted against the Keystone XL oil pipeline in the Dakotas. At a sweat ceremony on a recent winter evening, between prayers for locked-up loved ones and addicted brothers, native residents pleaded for Westwin to stop construction. As an elder poured water on embers the hut filled with steam and became so hot your correspondent struggled to breathe. In darkness they sang and passed a tobacco pipe between them, the smoke a vehicle to lift their anti-industrial supplications “to the spirits”.
The next day the tribal chairmen met with Westwin executives. Lawton locals who attended had no patience for Ms Long’s tearful tale of child-slaves in the Congolese cobalt mines—indigenous people, she noted, just on a different continent—and no interest in what her project means for American national security.
Because they lack the muscle of richer tribes to the east who lobby more, their objections are probably for naught. But the distress of it all may in the end convince Ms Long not to build the commercial plant in her home state, especially if Texas or Louisiana offer better tax breaks.
The permitting process could be long and litigious in any of those places and the delay may undermine climate goals. As long as domestic refineries are not yet up and running and China’s mineral stash is still on offer, the IRA’s protectionist rules could slow progress towards decarbonisation, says Tom Moerenhout of Columbia University who advises the State Department and White House on energy policy.
Since hawkishness towards China is trendy in both parties, and most of the investments have gone to Republican districts, it is a fair bet that any future president will keep the subsidies in place. That comforts Ms Long, who says she worries about the risks facing her business “almost every day, most of the day”. Though many are cheering her on, Westwin has already shown just how hard it is to bring critical-mineral refining to America, never mind an ethical model for the world. ■
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On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.
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