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Donald Trump’s Defining Decade

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Donald Trump invoked the 1890s in laying out the agenda for his second term. But from his demand for the Panama Canal to his declaration of a national energy emergency to his order releasing the records of the assassination of John F. Kennedy to the music he grooved to at his inaugural balls, Mr Trump, in his first days back in office, has instead evoked a different decade: the 1970s, formative years for him, and for America.

It was in 1971 that Mr Trump, then in his mid-20s, moved from Queens into Manhattan, taking a rent-stabilised studio apartment with a view of a water tank. He had ambitions to turn his father’s Brooklyn-based business building middle-class housing into something grander. By the decade’s end he would be a millionaire in his own right, married to a glamorous immigrant and a fixture at clubs like Studio 54, with growing celebrity for projects such as his eponymous tower rising on 5th Avenue.

As he exited the 1970s in his mid-30s, the apprentice years of adulthood behind him, Mr Trump, like many Americans, had reasons to be cynical about politics and business, to be fearful of inflation and oil scarcity and urban crime, to be drawn to conspiracy theories, to think America had lost the national self-assurance of his childhood in the 1950s. During what Tom Wolfe branded “The ‘Me’ Decade”, amid revelations of dirty deeds by sainted figures, as Americans more freely embraced and divorced each other, old ideas about duty and service came to seem like frauds. “Forget foundationless traditions, forget the ‘moral’ standards others may have tried to cram down your throat,” advised one bestseller in those years, “Looking out for Number One”.

“The 1970s were daunting and frightening because habits and institutions that had succeeded brilliantly for half a century suddenly sputtered,” David Frum writes in his history of the decade, “How We Got Here: The 70s”. “Never—not even during the Depression—had American pride and self-confidence plunged deeper.” The disillusion, fear and reaction of those years hardened into the worldview that has carried Mr Trump twice to the Oval Office.

At the start of the 1970s Mr Trump met Roy Cohn, the man who probably influenced him more than anyone besides his father, sharpening his reflex to fight all comers for every advantage, as he is doing now as president. A ferocious New York lawyer, Mr Cohn became Mr Trump’s mentor, “introducing him to the netherworld of sordid quid pro quos that Cohn ruled”, wrote Mr Trump’s dogged biographer, Wayne Barrett, in “Trump”. Over the course of the 1970s Mr Trump became the largest individual donor in New York state and local elections. “I can buy a US senator for $200,000,” he once told an associate back then.

Revelations spilling out of the Watergate investigations were teaching all Americans similar lessons, and implicating more than just President Richard Nixon. America’s great corporations for years had evaded the law with donations to politicians of both parties. Not only Nixon had secretly recorded meetings in the Oval Office. So had Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy.

In 1976 Congress for the first time created a permanent committee to oversee the intelligence agencies, and it revealed shocking secrets about coups and assassinations by the CIA. Then came revelations about the FBI. Robert Kennedy himself had ordered wiretaps on Martin Luther King. As suspicions of skulduggery grew, Congress in 1976 ordered investigations into the assassinations of John Kennedy and King. Hollywood seized on the spectre of rot in America’s foundations for the plots of such movies as “Three Days of the Condor”, about CIA murders of Americans, “Chinatown” and the “Godfather” series. Mr Trump’s response in 2017 when an interviewer called Vladimir Putin a killer—“You think our country’s so innocent?”—was straight out of the 1970s.

Government was coming to seem not just corrupt but incompetent. New York City teetered at the edge of bankruptcy as officials struggled to stem rising theft and homicide. “Welcome to Fear City” read pamphlets bearing a death’s head that police officers in casual clothes handed out to tourists in 1975. During a citywide blackout in 1977, chaos swept the streets, resulting in hundreds of injuries to police officers and thousands of arrests for looting. One might well have called it American carnage.

Four years of the condor

Nationally, new laws in the 1960s led to a surge in immigration in the 1970s, and illegal immigration along with it. Backlash was building against new rights granted to non-citizens, as it was against policies meant to advance integration and equality such as affirmative action and busing. Mr Trump first hired Cohn to defend him against a Justice Department suit accusing the Trumps’ company of excluding black renters. Asked at a deposition in 1974 when the first black people moved into one of his projects, Mr Trump replied, “I don’t care and I don’t know.” He was insisting on the same sort of “colour-blindness” he declared in his inaugural address this month to now be government policy.

Mr Trump once lamented that during the 1970s America lost “the feeling of supremacy that this country had in the 1950s”. In the 1970s, ceding control of the Panama Canal divided conservatives. In a televised debate with Ronald Reagan, William Buckley, the founding editor of National Review, said turning the canal over would bring Americans “increased security and increased self-esteem”. Time has proved him correct as far as security goes. But to many on the right the treaty with Panama became an exhibit of the same weakness that led to failure in Vietnam and the Iranian hostage crisis. Mr Trump’s pledge to retake the canal is a direct assault on the 1970s, and it underscores a basic question about his second term: will he lead Americans to transcend that decade at last, or to wallow in it?

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Economics

UK Has a New Prime Minister Without a General Election

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UK Has a New Prime Minister Without a General Election

On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.

How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister

Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.

If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.

Why No Election Was Required

A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.

This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.

The King’s Constitutional Role

After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.

Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.

Could an Election Still Happen?

Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.

In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.

What This Means for the UK

The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.

Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.

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Economics

Global Grid Upgrades Reshape Macro Economics

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Global grid upgrades reshape macro economics

On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.

According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.

The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.

For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.

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Economics

Global Trade Realignment and Supply Chains in 2026

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Global Trade Realignment and Supply Chains in 2026

The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.

The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.

Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.

For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.

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