You might call it a new golden age. America’s economy is strong, overdose deaths are falling and crime rates are down. For the second consecutive year murders in America have plummeted. The surge in violence in 2020, which was the deadliest year in over two decades, may now seem like a distant memory to some. Yet for criminologists and policymakers the question of what caused that spike in the first place remains unanswered.
A popular theory, advanced prominently by Heather Mac Donald of the Manhattan Institute, a think-tank, is that it was caused by a “George Floyd effect”. The theory is as follows: after the murder of Floyd by police officers in Minneapolis in 2020, police lost trust in high-crime communities and among African-Americans, leading to lower clearance rates for murders. When people think they will not get caught, they commit more crime. Another version of the Floyd effect thesis holds that police officers, beset by rising public hostility, deliberately pulled back from high-crime neighbourhoods, for fear of being prosecuted for doing their jobs. Either way, protests against police brutality lead directly to more murders, a bitter unintended consequence for the protesters and, perhaps, evidence of the kind of soft liberalism from big-city Democrats that Donald Trump was elected to expunge.
A recent report from the Brookings Institution, a think-tank, advances an alternative theory. Rohit Acharya and Rhett Morris, the report’s authors, argue that the rise in murders began in April 2020, about six weeks before the murder of Mr Floyd. They contend that high unemployment and school closures in poor neighbourhoods, both brought about by covid-19 and the policy response to it, left teenage boys idle. This, not the Floyd effect, was responsible for the murder spike. This would suggest an awful trade-off: those early lockdowns saved many lives, but they also may have resulted in more murders.
Chart: The Economist
Using weekly national homicide data, Messrs Acharya and Morris show that throughout the summer of 2020 murders rose 30% compared with the summer of 2019. Crucially, they do not find an inflection point around the end of May, when Mr Floyd was killed. Across the six weeks preceding his death national weekly murders increased by around 17 murders per week, a rate 70% greater than the same period in 2019. And during the six weeks following his death, murders rose at a similar rate.
What, then, caused this increase? The authors theorise that the economic circumstances of the pandemic are to blame. Criminologists concur that, in general, poverty correlates with crime rates. In Atlanta, 65% of all homicides occur in neighbourhoods where at least 30% of the population lives below the poverty line. Nearly every big American city displays this trend. Poorer neighbourhoods were also disproportionately affected by the pandemic: job losses and high-school dropout rates were far higher. Cities with a greater share of young men living in these conditions saw larger increases in homicides in 2020.
Juveniles typically commit few murders. Though roughly half of murders go unsolved and not all jurisdictions report the age of the murderer, the available data suggest that fewer than 10% of homicides are committed by those under the age of 18. Yet between 2019 and 2020 juveniles accounted for an estimated 15-20% of the overall surge. That seems consistent with the idea that closed schools and idle teenage boys are a big part of the story.
Criminologists tend to be wary of single explanations. “It’s very difficult to come up with a definitive conclusion about what happened in 2020, because so many things changed at the same time”, says Aaron Chalfin, a criminologist at the University of Pennsylvania who was not involved with the Brookings report. He notes that, in the past, unemployment rates have not correlated with murder rates, although that does not necessarily mean no such relationship arose during the pandemic. And teasing out the interactions between variables is trickier still. Were school closures in poorer neighbourhoods responsible for juveniles committing more murders, or was it school closures plus fewer police officers patrolling the streets?
The research, says Neil Gross, a professor of criminology at Colby College (who was also not involved in the study), suggests that the nature of social ties in poor areas matters. Crime is often lower where “people know their neighbours and can look out on the street for errant teenagers and contact their parents”, says Mr Gross. That suggests yet another potential suspect: such neighbourhood watchers were locked down at home. ■
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On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.