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THE LIFE of the Senate’s bill to increase border security in exchange for sending aid to Ukraine was wretched and short. Its three main negotiators released the text on Sunday. On Monday it had the support of Mitch McConnell, the chamber’s top Republican. By Tuesday it was dead. “It looks to me, and to most of our members, as if we have no real chance here to make a law,” Mr McConnell conceded.
But that is only because of the petulant actions of those members. Republicans’ negative reactions in both chambers of Congress were overwhelming and swift—considering the bill is 370 pages long. Mike Johnson, the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives, posted on X (formerly Twitter) that the bill would be “dead on arrival” in the lower chamber. That is despite voters’ approval: a recent poll from YouGov suggests that a narrow plurality of Americans support the compromise.
Senators used to be more willing to do the hard work of governing than House members. They were supposed to be the grown-ups. Indeed, the willingness of the bill’s chief negotiators to try to craft a bipartisan compromise on an issue as toxic as immigration in an equally toxic political environment was something of a throwback to a more congenial time. But that distinction has faded as the Republican Party writ large has come under the thumb of Donald Trump, who has delighted in campaigning on border chaos, and who would not be denied the opportunity to keep doing so. “Only a fool, or a Radical Left Democrat, would vote for this horrendous Border Bill,” the former president wrote on his social-media platform, Truth Social.
Republican senators quickly fell into line. James Lankford, a senator for Oklahoma who had spent months as the lead Republican negotiating the bill, delivered a defiant message to his party on the Senate floor. “You can do press conferences without the other side,” he said, “but you can’t make law without the other side.”
The bill’s death is a blow to President Joe Biden, who supported it in large part because he needs to secure the border to help his electoral prospects. In a non-election year, the bill’s border provisions would be a Republican dream. It is far more conservative than any attempt at bipartisan immigration reform in this century. It would grant the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the power to shut down the asylum system to those crossing illegally if the number of people trying to cross exceeds a certain threshold. But there would be limits on how long the emergency power could be used, and the small number of migrants who show up at a port of entry with an appointment would still be processed. The bill would make it harder for migrants to pass their preliminary asylum interviews, limit parole at the border—a presidential authority that Republicans say the Biden administration has used too liberally—and expand detention.
The bill contains some carrots for the many Democrats squeamish about restricting asylum. It would create a path to residency for Afghans who had helped American forces prior to their disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. It would slightly expand legal immigration by offering 50,000 additional immigrant visas each year for five years, and protect the children of long-term visa holders from deportation. But it notably does not contain a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, nor relief for migrants brought to America as children.
More than border security is at stake. The $118bn bill included $60bn to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia, $20bn for border enforcement and the immigration system, $14bn for Israel and $10bn for humanitarian aid to be spread across Gaza, the West Bank and Ukraine, among other things. How the president can accomplish these objectives without funds appropriated by Congress is now unclear. Mr Biden can tweak the immigration system using executive action. But America needs a lot more asylum officers and Border Patrol agents, and that takes a lot of cash.
Also unclear is Congress’s ability to accomplish anything at all. Chuck Schumer, the Senate majority leader, is pushing for a foreign-aid package for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. It is in effect the border bill minus the border provisions. Such a bill might get 60 votes in the Senate, where support for Ukraine among Republicans is stronger than in the House.
But any one House member can call a vote for Mr Johnson’s removal as speaker. Marjorie Taylor Greene, a MAGA congresswoman from Georgia, has threatened to do so should he move to fund Ukraine. The mutiny against former speaker Kevin McCarthy last year proves that is not an empty threat. Even with a speaker, and that is a low bar, the House is flailing. On February 6th Mr Johnson failed to convince his slim majority to impeach Alejandro Mayorkas, the DHS secretary, and to pass aid for Israel.
The approaching election, Mr Trump’s long shadow and the intransigence of the House Republican caucus mean that little governing will happen on Capitol Hill this year. The only thing Americans can be sure to expect is more political theatre. ■
Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important electoral stories, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note from our Lexington columnist that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters.
On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.
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