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Every four years the American presidential primaries roll around to remind Americans how weak, clumsy and negative their major political parties have become. The news media’s red-and-blue maps, the repetitive partisan standoffs in Congress and the drama created by the polarisation of the parties create the impression that they hold tremendous sway, that Americans are devoted to either the Democrats or Republicans and obsessed with their prospects. The reality is more muddled and dispiriting.
The largest, and growing, share of Americans choose not to identify with either party. According to a Gallup poll released this month, 43% call themselves independent, tying a record set in 2014. In Gallup’s poll, the proportion of eligible voters identifying as Democrat has fallen to a record low, 27%, the same percentage that call themselves Republican. Another Gallup poll, also this month, found that only 28% of adults, also a new low, were satisfied with “the way democracy is working in this country”.
Yet the parties are not reacting by making themselves more appealing. Something is interfering with the signals the electorate sends to the organisations that supply candidates and ideas, never more so than this cycle, when most Americans have consistently turned their noses up at the products most likely to be on offer, President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump.
“The first party to retire its 80-year-old candidate is going to be the party that wins this election,” declared Nikki Haley, a former governor of South Carolina, as she conceded the New Hampshire primary to Mr Trump on January 23rd. She may be right in theory. But she is wrong in practice that there is some coherent entity called a “party” capable of such a rational calculation. As Mr Trump demonstrated in 2016, and Barack Obama did before him, political parties do not plot or strategise anymore to anoint a candidate, at least not with much effect; they have instead become vehicles idling by the curbs of American life until the primaries approach, waiting for successful candidates to commandeer them.
For most of American history, party leaders picked presidential nominees. That system collapsed after the fractious Democratic convention of 1968, in which party elders ignored the candidate of the anti-Vietnam-war left and instead bestowed the nomination on Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who had not competed in a single primary. Reformers successfully argued that nominating delegates should be picked by voters in primaries instead, and Republicans eventually followed the Democrats’ lead. This approach opened up the system to candidates, such as Jimmy Carter in 1976 and Ronald Reagan in 1980, who might never have been chosen in a smoke-filled room.
But in taking power from the party establishment, reformers unintentionally handed it to activists, who tend to be more extreme than other partisans, let alone the rest of the country. This is particularly true of the Republican Party. Now, relatively small numbers of impassioned voters can end up choosing nominees.
After Mr Trump won 51% of the vote in the Iowa caucuses this month, he was credited in the news media with a “landslide” win and a “blowout victory”. But it was a frigid night, and fewer than one in six registered Republicans turned out. They were probably among the most motivated of voters, quite unlike most Americans. Mr Trump won about 56,000 of these Republicans, or about 7% of the potential pool of 752,000 Iowa Republicans.
In New Hampshire on January 23rd Mr Trump won most Republicans who turned out, while Ms Haley won most “undeclared”, or independent voters who did so. Political analysts rightly saw this as a weakness of Ms Haley, because in many states independent voters cannot cast ballots in partisan primaries. And it might seem reasonable that the Republicans would want to nominate whoever wins the most Republicans. The flaw in this approach is that, definitionally, that candidate has demonstrated only that they can win if the electorate is Republican. A party capable of organising itself to win a general election with a big majority would place more value on reaching beyond the base.
A party’s nominee may not win the majority even of its primary voters, let alone of its eligible primary voters. The primaries tend to exaggerate the popularity of the eventual nominee because many states award all their delegates to the winner, rather than dividing them proportionately among the candidates. In 2016 Mr Trump won fewer than 45% of primary voters in all—that is, he won the Trumpy minority of the activist minority that turned out.
This is a fragile basis on which to stake a claim to nationwide electability. Nominees overcome that handicap by relying on what political scientists call “negative partisanship”. Though the plurality of Americans call themselves independent, they tend to lean to one party or another. Encouraging these voters, as well as less politically active party members, to see the opposing party as demonic is a reliable means of getting them to vote your way.
Third parties are hard
All this helps explain the longing of certain idealists and opportunists for a third party. That yen is particularly sharp in this cycle. History suggests it could be fulfilled quite suddenly, says Bernard Tamas, a political scientist at Valdosta State University and the author of “The Demise and Rebirth of American Third Parties”. “It’s often at times like this when the two major parties are polarised, because it opens a door for a third party to attack,” he says. “You don’t know if it’s going to happen until it happens.”
But the group No Labels, which is considering a third-party bid, appears to be off to a poor start. Successful third parties have tended to run candidates not just for president but down the ballot, too, and to have specific, galvanising issues. Had Donald Trump been capable of organising such an effort, he might have been a powerful third-party candidate. But why bother, when an existing party was just sitting there waiting to be commandeered? ■
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On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.
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