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“The vibes are off” is a phrase that does not usually appear in rigorous economic analysis but has cropped up again and again in serious discussions about America over the past year. From an array of hard data, there is reason to think that people ought to be quite satisfied about the state of the economy: inflation has slowed sharply, petrol prices are down, jobs are plentiful, incomes are rising and the stockmarket is strong. But survey after survey suggests that Americans are in fact quite unhappy. They think that the economy is in bad shape and that President Joe Biden is mismanaging it. What gives?
Start with the evidence of gloom. The figure watched most closely by economists for an idea of what people are feeling is a consumer-sentiment index from the University of Michigan. For the past two years it has bounced around at levels last seen during the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Even with an improvement in December, it is still 30% below its recent peak on the eve of the covid-19 crisis in early 2020.
Image: The Economist
Many other surveys are equally downcast. Every week since 2009 The Economist/YouGov poll has asked some 1,500 Americans to assess the economy: nearly half now think it is getting worse, up from about one-third in the decade before covid. Questions focused on Mr Biden’s record yield even less enthusiasm: two-thirds of respondents to a Gallup poll in November disapproved of his handling of the economy. And all this despite America outgrowing its large, developed peers over the past few years.
The fact that so many Americans are so dejected about such a strong economy has spawned a cottage industry of theories. A first batch argues that they have every right to feel glum: some of the figures which matter most to their pocketbooks are just not that rosy. Inflation has eroded their wages. Controlling for consumer prices (one common measure of inflation), average earnings for private-sector workers are basically stuck at the same level as in February 2020, right before covid struck.
More recent baselines are even less flattering. Although few Americans would want to go back to a world of covid shutdowns, many did receive big benefits from the government’s spending spree at the time. After-tax personal income is about 15% lower now than in March 2021, when it was propped up by the massive stimulus package passed by Democrats soon after Mr Biden took office. Another unflattering comparison with the recent past: the aggressive interest-rate rises needed to tame inflation have made loans for houses and cars much more expensive. Housing affordability hit its lowest in decades last year, serving as an easy target for critics of Mr Biden. The Republican National Committee says Bidenomics is “pricing out millions of people from the American Dream”.
However, as the Biden administration is only too keen to point out, there are many things to like about the current economy. The supposed stagnation in private-sector wages is in fact a statistical illusion caused by upward bias in the consumer-price index. Use a better alternative—the personal-consumption expenditures index targeted by the Federal Reserve—and real wages are roughly on their pre-pandemic trend. At 3.7% the unemployment rate is just a touch above a five-decade low. Wage growth has been especially strong for low-income Americans. The S&P 500, an index of America’s leading stocks, has been flirting with record highs.
To judge from the range of indicators—good and bad—Americans do appear to be unduly pessimistic. Ryan Cummings and Neale Mahoney, two economists who previously served in the Biden White House, created a simple model to predict the level of the consumer-sentiment index, drawing on inflation, unemployment and consumption data as well as stockmarket performance. Their conclusion was that the index has been about 20% lower than where the data suggest it ought to be. Other models have found a similar discrepancy.
This suggests a second category of explanation: that opinion polling and sentiment surveys may have a negative bias. Profound partisan hostility is undoubtedly one factor. In their study Messrs Cummings and Mahoney calculated that Republican antipathy towards a Democrat-controlled White House may account for about 30% of the sentiment gap today.
Another element may be the tone of news coverage. Ben Harris and Aaron Sojourner of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank, studied the relationship between economic data and an index of economic news sentiment. Since 2021 the news-sentiment index has, like the consumer-sentiment index, been notably worse than what would be expected from the data. And that may be only scratching the surface. The news-sentiment index, created by the Federal Reserve’s branch in San Francisco, is based on economic articles in major American newspapers. Throw in the vitriol that tends to go viral on social-media platforms, and the negative bias might be even more pronounced.
A final explanation is that there may simply be a long lag between the post-pandemic recovery and feelings about the economy. It has been a topsy-turvy period. The extreme uncertainty of the covid years—job losses, school closures, bankruptcies and illness—took a toll on people. Many are still upset by the bruising battle with inflation. Although inflation has moderated, prices are nearly 20% higher than when Mr Biden took office. The sticker-shock takes some getting used to. Messrs Cummings and Mahoney estimate that a 10% inflation surge reduces consumer sentiment by 35 index points in the year it occurs, 16 points in the next year and eight points the year after that.
If a similar timeline is now in play, Americans have probably gone about halfway towards accepting their new higher-priced reality. It also helps that real-income growth has accelerated over the past year, letting them recover some of their lost purchasing power. The consumer-sentiment index has been volatile, but it did clearly bottom out in mid-2022—right around the peak in inflation—and it did also post a solid rise in December, even if it remains low by historical standards.
“Our theory of the case is that if we can continue to maintain a tight labour market while easing inflation and delivering real wage gains, that recipe should show up in improved sentiment. And we think we’re starting to see that,” says Jared Bernstein, chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. The vibes, in other words, may be picking up. ■
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On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.