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Why Nikki Haley, crushed in her home state, vows to fight on

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WHEN DOES the act of hoping against hope go from admirable to absurd? Not yet apparently for Nikki Haley, the last woman left standing against Donald Trump and his seizure of the Republican Party’s presidential nomination. You can forgive Ms Haley for persisting through losses in the early primary states of Iowa and New Hampshire. But the indignity suffered on February 24th—a 20-point walloping in the primary election in South Carolina, the state she was governor of for six years—should have proven fatal.

And yet even out of those grim statistics, Ms Haley managed to extract something hopeful: “Today in South Carolina, we’re getting 40% of the vote. That’s about what we got in New Hampshire. I’m an accountant. I know 40% is not 50%. But I also know that 40% is not some tiny group.” She vowed to carry on her campaign until at least March 5th, also known as Super Tuesday, at which point another 21 states and territories will have conducted their elections. The embers of optimism present today will, in all likelihood, be extinguished by then.

Why continue? The first reason is that Ms Haley simply can. In America, moribund presidential campaigns are not usually dealt the coup de grâce by voters but by donors. The cash-burning machines simply run out of fuel. The central problem of Ms Haley’s campaign is that she is extraordinarily popular with the Trump-despising donors of her party—who showered her with $16.5m in contributions in January alone—but unacceptable to the Trump-adoring base of her party.

You could see this dilemma on vivid display at her election-night party held in a grand hotel in Charleston, South Carolina: fewer than 40 supporters had managed to tear themselves from the spectacular array of catered dips before them—crab, pimento cheese, spinach and artichoke—and enter the ballroom by the time the race was called, just seconds after the polls closed. (Later the room would fill up with supporters, who managed a surprisingly spirited cheer when the television screens showed that Ms Haley’s margin of loss had narrowed to only 16 points.) Like her catering budget, Ms Haley’s advertising budget was significantly higher than Mr Trump’s, too. Ms Haley and her allied political groups spent $8.4m on advertising in the state; Mr Trump spent almost none by comparison. The former governor embarked on a two-week bus tour; the former president flew in for a few rallies and quickly departed. All the extra expenditure of time and money simply did not matter.

Ms Haley and her advisers are fuzzy about how exactly this starting sequence of consecutive losses will ultimately spell victory. “We know that this is an uphill battle. We know that the road is difficult. We know that the math is challenging,” says Betsy Ankney, Ms Haley’s campaign manager. But Ms Ankney argues that because Mr Trump is unelectable in the general election, Ms Haley has an obligation to remain in the race for as long as she can. Indeed, in head-to-head polls against President Joe Biden, Ms Haley runs, on average, several points ahead of Mr Trump. Some polls even show her leading the hypothetical national popular vote by lopsided margins of 16 points or so.

Such margins are unheard of in modern-day, hyperpolarised politics; they probably do not reflect an actual possible result in November as much as they do the wide discontent felt with the two elderly candidates the major parties are preparing to nominate. In her stump speech, Ms Haley is fond of citing these polls as proof of her viability (though she scrupulously ignores any primary polling, which by our tally, has her down 57 points to Mr Trump). But winning the general election requires winning the primary election. That requires winning multiple state contests; but Ms Haley is struggling to win even one.

Her refusal to quit plainly enrages Mr Trump, who has declared that she and her enablers are personae non gratae in MAGA-land. “I feel no need to kiss the ring,” she said in a speech on February 20th teased to reporters as a major update on the state of the race (the kind of language used when a candidate is planning to drop out). Mr Trump’s needs may be more urgent than mere vanity. If he is declared the presumptive nominee his campaign lieutenants—including his daughter-in-law—could take over the leadership of the Republican Party. This could allow him to use the party to fund his considerable legal bills, now that Mr Trump is running low on the donor-provided funds that he has used for the last three years.

Bless her heart

The tortured, seemingly inevitable, demise of Ms Haley’s presidential campaign mirrors the fate of the increasingly endangered Reaganite wing of the party. Ms Haley is an internationalist who emphatically makes the case that America needs to continue providing military aid to Ukraine; followers of Mr Trump are withholding funds while their leader muses about encouraging Russian attacks on NATO allies. She frets about the national debt, while Mr Biden and Mr Trump studiously avoid the subject. She sees America as already great and good, while Mr Trump venomously attacks it, presenting himself as its only saviour. “Your victory will be our ultimate vindication, your liberty will be our ultimate reward and the unprecedented success of the United States of America will be my ultimate and absolute revenge,” he said at an apocalyptic speech delivered to CPAC, a conservative gathering, on the same day as the South Carolina primary. Trumpism is often an inversion of the spirit of John F. Kennedy’s famous inaugural address. “Ask not what your country can do for you,” Mr Trump asks of his fellow citizens: “Ask what your country can do for me.”

Understand these stakes and Ms Haley’s refusal to bend the knee makes more sense. In Congress, too, her faction is being broken. In the House of Representatives, sensible Republicans who might have helped reconstitute a post-Trump future like Mike Gallagher and Patrick McHenry are choosing to leave without seeking re-election. The House leadership, thoroughly aligned with Mr Trump, is utterly shambolic and unable to complete basic tasks of governance. In the Senate, this takeover has been slower due to lower attrition rates, but it is happening all the same. Mitch McConnell, the Republican Senate leader, thinks that Ukraine needs continued American aid and that Mr Trump disgraced himself on January 6th 2021. That places him in the minority of his own party. His command of his fellow senators, given his age and the increasing possibility of Mr Trump’s return, is slipping away.

Many ambitious Republicans have chosen to turn accommodationist with Mr Trump despite their consciences. Indeed, Ms Haley was guilty of this herself: going from opposing him in 2016, to joining his administration, to criticising him, before pledging not to challenge him in the presidential election—then challenging him while studiously avoiding any criticism of him, to finally emerging as a strong critic of Mr Trump’s character and record. Courage, even if it arrives late, is commendable. It is just that in this case, it may not make any difference.

Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important electoral stories, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note from our Lexington columnist that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters.

Economics

U.S.- Canada Trade Talks Collapse; Carney Says Retaliatory Tariffs Begin September 8

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U.S.- Canada Trade Talks Collapse; Carney Says Retaliatory Tariffs Begin September 8

Trade negotiations between the United States and Canada collapsed this week, with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announcing that retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods will take effect September 8, 2026. The breakdown follows the Trump administration’s imposition of 50% tariffs on certain Canadian goods, according to reporting from CNBC and the Washington Post.

What Happened

CNBC reported the collapse of talks as part of its ongoing business news coverage on August 22, 2026, noting the story as one of the week’s most significant developments for cross-border trade. The Washington Post’s business desk, in coverage also published August 22-23, quoted Carney characterizing President Trump’s 50% tariffs as “a miscalculation,” and confirmed the September 8 date for Canada’s retaliatory measures.

As of this writing, specific details on which categories of U.S. goods will be subject to Canadian retaliatory tariffs have not been fully reported. This article will be updated with additional specifics as they become available from primary government sources.

Why This Matters for Markets and Consumers

Trade disputes between the U.S. and its largest trading partners tend to have ripple effects across supply chains, consumer prices, and specific industry sectors with cross-border exposure. A Washington Post analysis accompanying the coverage noted that other countries unhappy with existing U.S. trade arrangements are likely watching the U.S.-Canada breakdown closely, suggesting the dispute could have implications beyond the immediate bilateral relationship.

Broader Context: A Volatile Week for Cross-Border and Fiscal News

The trade breakdown arrived during an already turbulent week for U.S. economic news. The same week saw the national debt cross $40 trillion for the first time, a sharp rise in Treasury bond market volatility, and the Treasury Department doubling the size of its debt buyback program. Whether the trade dispute has any direct connection to these fiscal and monetary developments has not been established in current reporting, but the concentration of major economic stories in the same week has drawn attention from market commentators tracking overall macroeconomic risk.

How This Fits the Broader Trade Policy Pattern

The U.S.-Canada breakdown is not occurring in isolation. Trade policy has been an active area of U.S. economic policymaking throughout 2026, with tariff actions and negotiations affecting multiple trading partners over the course of the year. Canada has historically been among the United States’ largest trading partners by total trade volume, meaning a prolonged dispute carries more direct economic exposure for both economies than a similar breakdown with a smaller trading partner would.

Industries with integrated North American supply chains — including automotive manufacturing, agriculture, and energy — have historically been among the most exposed to U.S.-Canada trade friction, given the degree to which components and raw materials cross the border multiple times during production. Businesses in these sectors should treat the September 8 deadline as a planning point regardless of whether it ultimately takes effect as announced.

What We Don’t Yet Know

Several material details remain unconfirmed or unreported as of this writing:

– The specific list of U.S. product categories subject to Canadian retaliatory tariffs
– Whether any further negotiations are scheduled between the September 8 deadline and the present
– Potential exemptions for critical supply chains, such as energy or auto parts, which have historically received special treatment in prior U.S.-Canada trade disputes

What to Watch Next

Businesses with cross-border exposure to Canadian suppliers or customers should monitor official statements from the U.S. Trade Representative’s office and Canada’s Department of Global Affairs for detailed tariff schedules ahead of the September 8 implementation date. Given the fluid nature of trade negotiations, a resumption of talks or a modified agreement before that date remains possible and would supersede current retaliatory tariff plans.

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U.S. National Debt Surpasses $40 Trillion for the First Time: What It Means for the Economy

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US Debt is now 40 trillions

The U.S. gross national debt crossed $40 trillion for the first time this week, according to Treasury Department data reported by NPR on August 20, 2026. The milestone caps a period of rapid fiscal expansion: the debt has doubled since 2017, and the federal government now spends more than $1 trillion a year just servicing interest on what it owes.

Why the Debt Load Is Accelerating

The debt has not grown at a steady pace. Instead, a combination of pandemic-era spending, tax policy changes, and elevated interest rates has compounded the federal government’s borrowing costs. As older Treasury bonds issued at lower rates mature, they are being refinanced at today’s higher prevailing rates, which pushes up the government’s annual interest bill even without any new borrowing.

That interest bill is no longer a minor line item. At more than $1 trillion annually, debt servicing now competes directly with discretionary spending on defense, infrastructure, and social programs. Economists watching the trend note that this dynamic can become self-reinforcing: higher interest costs widen the deficit, which requires more borrowing, which in turn raises future interest costs.

Bond Market Reaction

The debt milestone arrived during a volatile week for Treasury bonds. Bond prices fell even as equity markets touched record highs, a divergence that market analysts describe as bond investors signaling concern about the sustainability of federal borrowing, even as stock investors remain focused on corporate earnings and AI-driven growth.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent responded to the bond market pressure by expanding the Treasury’s debt buyback program, telling CNBC the size of buyback operations had been doubled to at least $4 billion per operation, with room to increase further. Buybacks are intended to support demand for existing Treasury securities and help stabilize yields during periods of market stress.

What Rising Debt Means for Ordinary Households

For everyday consumers, the national debt level itself is abstract, but its downstream effects are not. Elevated Treasury yields tend to push up borrowing costs across the economy, including mortgage rates, auto loans, and business credit. The same week the $40 trillion milestone was confirmed, average 30-year mortgage rates moved sharply, illustrating how bond market volatility connects directly to household borrowing costs.

Rising federal interest costs also narrow the government’s fiscal flexibility. As a larger share of the federal budget goes toward servicing debt rather than funding programs, policymakers face growing pressure to either cut spending, raise revenue, or both — choices that carry direct economic consequences for households and businesses alike.

What to Watch Next

The debt trajectory is expected to remain a central topic at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, scheduled for August 27–29, 2026 — the first such gathering under new Fed Chair Kevin Warsh, who was confirmed by the Senate in a 54-45 vote in May 2026. While the symposium’s stated theme is financial innovation and payments policy, fiscal sustainability and its interaction with monetary policy are likely to feature in sideline discussions given the scale of the debt milestone.

Investors and households should watch upcoming Treasury auction results and any further changes to the buyback program as early indicators of how markets are digesting the government’s borrowing needs. A weak auction — one that requires higher yields to attract sufficient buyers — would be a signal that investor appetite for U.S. debt is softening further.

The $40 trillion figure is a threshold, not a crisis in itself. But combined with a bond market already showing signs of strain, it adds urgency to a fiscal conversation that has largely been deferred by successive Congresses and administrations.

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Economic Profile of the United States of America (2026–2030 Horizon)

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Economic Profile of the United States of America (2026–2030 Horizon)

Executive Summary & Core Macro Outlook

The United States enters the 2026–2030 macroeconomic window as the unquestioned heavyweight of nominal economic output, retaining its status as the primary engine of global financial liquidity, private enterprise innovation, and high-margin technological deployment. According to multi-year projections from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook and complementary datasets from the World Bank, the US nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to reach $32.38 trillion by 2026, accounting for approximately 25% of global nominal output and roughly 14.5% of world GDP measured at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

Unlike many of its advanced-economy peers across Western Europe and East Asia—which are grappling with acute demographic contraction and structural energy shocks—the United States demonstrates remarkable macroeconomic resilience. The IMF projects a real GDP Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 2.1% to 2.3% through 2030. This expansion is sustained by three structural anchors: unmatched capital depth driving massive private-sector investment in Artificial Intelligence (AI) infrastructure, complete energy independence as a net exporter of hydrocarbons and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and high labor productivity gains that cushion the economy against rising debt-servicing costs.

Macroeconomic Data Matrix (2026–2030 Projections)

Economic MetricIMF / World Bank Baseline (2026–2030)Global Benchmark & Context
Nominal GDP (2026 Projection)~$32.38 TrillionRank #1 Globally
GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)~$32.40 TrillionRank #2 Globally (Behind China’s ~$38.5T PPP)
Projected Real GDP CAGR (2026–2030)2.1% – 2.3%Top decile among G7 advanced economies
Gross Public Debt (% of GDP)~122.5% – 128.0%Structural fiscal deficit trajectory
Core Inflation Rate (PCE Target)Stabilizing at 2.0% – 2.2%Federal Reserve inflation target alignment
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)-2.8% to -3.2%Persistent capital import & reserve currency demand

Deep Structural Growth Drivers

1. The AI Infrastructure Hyper-Cycle & TFP Expansion

The defining growth catalyst for the US economy over the 2026–2030 horizon is the unprecedented scale of private capital expenditure (Capex) poured into artificial intelligence infrastructure, enterprise software integration, and advanced computing hardware.

Major technology mega-caps and private equity funds are directing hundreds of billions of dollars annually into hyper-scale data centers, domestic semiconductor fabrication, high-voltage electrical grid upgrades, and AI-driven workflow platforms. According to World Bank economic research, technological adoption across American service and manufacturing sectors is driving a notable uptick in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This productivity surge allows US companies to expand profit margins and output even in an environment characterized by higher structural real interest rates and tight skilled-labor markets.

2. Deep Capital Markets and Private Sector Liquidity

The structural backbone of US economic outperformance remains its financial system. US capital markets represent over 40% of global equity market capitalization and a vast majority of global venture capital and private credit assets.

This liquidity creates an efficient mechanism for capital allocation: high-potential emerging industries (such as quantum computing, synthetic biology, and advanced defense technology) receive early-stage funding at a scale that no other national market can match. When global monetary conditions tighten, global capital flees toward safety and yield, reinforcing US capital depth and lowering the relative cost of equity capital for American corporations.

3. Net Energy Independence & Industrial Cost Advantages

Unlike industrial hubs in Germany, Japan, or South Korea—which remain highly vulnerable to volatile sea-lane logistics and imported fuel price spikes—the United States operates as a major net exporter of petroleum, natural gas, and refined chemical products.

Access to abundant, cheap domestic natural gas provides US heavy industry, advanced manufacturing, and electricity-hungry data centers with a persistent structural cost advantage. Furthermore, federal policy frameworks (including the CHIPS and Science Act and clean energy tax provisions) continue to catalyze domestic private manufacturing investment, re-shoring high-value supply chains from East Asia back to the American Sunbelt and Midwest.

Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities & Downside Risks

1. Structural Sovereign Debt Trajectory

The most significant medium-term threat to US macroeconomic stability is the path of federal public debt. With gross national debt exceeding 120% of GDP and annual federal deficits running between 5% and 7% of GDP, the US fiscal baseline faces increasing structural pressure.

As older legacy low-yield Treasury bonds mature, they are refinanced at higher prevailing interest rates. According to IMF fiscal monitor assessments, federal net interest payments are absorbing an expanding share of total fiscal revenue, crowding out discretionary spending and narrowing the government’s capacity to deploy counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus during future downturns.

2. Commercial Real Estate (CRE) & Banking Sector Realignment

The structural transformation toward hybrid work models has permanently altered office space utilization across major US metropolitan areas. Regional and community banks, which hold a disproportionate share of commercial real estate debt, face ongoing balance-sheet pressure as legacy office loans mature and require refinancing at lower property valuations and higher interest rates. While systemic money-center banks remain well-capitalized, localized credit tightening from regional lenders presents a headwind for small-and-medium enterprise (SME) borrowing.

High-Outperformance Sector Matrix (2026–2030)

                     
  1. Enterprise AI, Cloud Compute, & Cybersecurity: Companies building enterprise-grade software, AI agents, cloud architectures, and specialized hardware protection layers.
  2. Next-Generation Energy & Grid Modernization: Power generation utilities, high-voltage electrical equipment makers, small modular nuclear reactor (SMR) developers, and energy storage systems catering to exponential data center energy demands.
  3. Advanced Defense Technology & Aerospace: Autonomous systems, satellite networks, hypersonic defense, and advanced materials supplying both domestic security needs and global allied demand.

Strategic Summary for Global Investors & Executives

The United States through 2030 remains the ultimate high-volume, high-yield destination for institutional capital. While fiscal debt risks require long-term monitoring, the immediate 5-year outlook is defined by strong technology-driven productivity, resilient private consumption, and unmatched market liquidity. For global corporations and institutional allocators, exposure to the US economy remains an indispensable pillar of long-term growth strategy.

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