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One day more than 30 years ago, during the administration of President George H.W. Bush, the secretary of state, James Baker, flung a newspaper article at an aide, Daniel Kurtzer, and declared he was going to eject the Israeli ambassador. He was furious about a quotation he had just read from the deputy foreign minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu.
Mr Kurtzer pleaded for 24 hours to check that the quotation was accurate. He learned that Mr Netanyahu’s wording was slightly different from what had been reported, but still shocking: America, Mr Netanyahu had said, “is building its policy on a foundation of distortions and lies”. The ambassador got a reprieve, but Mr Baker declared Mr Netanyahu persona non grata and banned him from the State Department.
A few years later, in 1996, Mr Netanyahu became prime minister, and it was President Bill Clinton’s turn to be insulted. “Who the fuck does he think he is?” Mr Clinton vented to aides, after receiving a lecture on how to deal with Arabs during his first meeting with Mr Netanyahu. “Who’s the fucking superpower here?”
Even Donald Trump, who as president delivered item after item on Mr Netanyahu’s wish-list, found himself blindsided by a classic Netanyahu manoeuvre to box America in. When the two men appeared in the East Room of the White House to announce a peace plan they had arrived at without Palestinian participation—the plan went nowhere—Mr Netanyahu declared it meant Israel could now annex parts of the occupied West Bank. “This was not what we had negotiated,” a flabbergasted Jared Kushner, Mr Trump’s son-in-law and lead negotiator, would later write in his memoir, “Breaking History”. “I grabbed my chair so intensely that my knuckles turned white, as if my grip could make Bibi stop.”
Far more than the unpractised Mr Kushner, President Joe Biden had reason to hope that his grip would be enough to restrain the prime minister, whom he had alternately jousted and joked with for decades, since back before Mr Baker imposed his ban. But since Hamas’s rampage into Israel on October 7th, Mr Netanyahu has repeatedly rejected Mr Biden’s counsel about the war and scorned his vision for its aftermath. That is what provoked Chuck Schumer, the Senate majority leader, to give an extraordinary, anguished speech on March 14th naming Mr Netanyahu along with Hamas as an obstacle to peace and calling for an Israeli election to oust him. Mr Netanyahu, he said, “has lost his way”.
Mr Netanyahu and other Israelis would be making a mistake to interpret the speech as just another bump in the often rocky road the allies have travelled since the founding of Israel. “This is very different,” says Mr Kurtzer, who went on to serve as the American ambassador in Cairo and then Tel Aviv. “The Israelis will need to understand that this is a wake-up call, if nothing else has persuaded them that they’re running into a problem with us.”
Mr Schumer, the highest-ranking elected Jewish official in American history, is no fair-weather friend of Israel. Back when Mr Netanyahu outraged Barack Obama’s White House by attacking Mr Obama’s proposed nuclear deal with Iran in a speech to a joint session of Congress, Mr Schumer was one of only four Senate Democrats to vote against the deal. Mr Schumer is also no progressive. Now aged 73, he was at pains in his speech to point out that “unlike some younger Americans” he was of a generation “within living memory of the Holocaust”. He described pressing a transistor radio to his ear at high school as he fearfully tracked news of the Six Day War.
Mr Schumer is a political animal, as alert to danger in his surroundings as they come, but it is doubtful that he was worrying about Mr Biden’s chances of winning Michigan. Mr Netanyahu should worry instead that, given Mr Schumer’s political sophistication, he was correct in saying he spoke for “a silent majority” of Jewish Americans, people, he said, “who love Israel to our bones” yet take a nuanced view of the war in Gaza. Mr Schumer repeatedly condemned Hamas and a double standard in the news media that put all the blame for Palestinian suffering on Israel. But, he said, both Israel and the United States had a “moral obligation” to do more to protect Palestinian civilians: “We must be better than our enemies, lest we become them.”
Mr Netanyahu responded on March 17th by saying that calling for elections in Israel now would be like having called for elections in America in the wake of the attacks of September 11th 2001. “You don’t do that to a sister democracy, to an ally,” he told cNN. But Mr Biden has made clear that he approved of Mr Schumer’s message. “He made a good speech,” he told reporters.
Moving America
Mr Netanyahu was partly brought up and educated in America, and he prides himself on understanding how to manage its politics. “I know what America is,” he remarked once, apparently unaware he was being recorded. “America is a thing you can move very easily.” Maybe not this time. Given the polarisation of foreign policy, he can count on Republican backing, but bipartisan support of Israel has always been a bulwark of its security and, having lost Mr Schumer, Mr Netanyahu has all but lost the Democrats.
Even before Mr Schumer spoke, Mr Biden had boxed himself in, saying if Israeli forces conducted a major operation in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip they would be crossing “a red line”. He has required “credible and reliable” assurances from Israel that it is using military aid in compliance with international humanitarian law. The Americans will soon decide whether they are satisfied with those assurances. Mr Schumer has dramatically strengthened Mr Biden’s hand, should he choose to find Israel is misusing American weapons. The anger of America’s leaders is directed at Mr Netanyahu, but Israel may wind up paying the price. ■
On July 20, Andy Burnham has been chosen to be the next Prime Minister in UK. The appointment of a new Prime Minister in the United Kingdom often raises questions from people outside the country, especially when no nationwide election has taken place. Many wonder how a new national leader can assume office without voters casting ballots. The answer lies in the UK’s parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is not directly elected by the public but is instead chosen based on who commands the confidence of the House of Commons.
How the UK Selects Its Prime Minister
Unlike presidential systems where citizens vote directly for the head of government, the United Kingdom elects Members of Parliament (MPs) during a general election. The political party that secures a majority of seats in the House of Commons usually forms the government, and that party selects its own leader to serve as Prime Minister.
If the leader resigns, becomes unable to continue, or is replaced by their party, the governing party can choose a new leader without triggering a general election. As long as the new leader is able to maintain the confidence of Parliament, they can immediately become Prime Minister after being formally appointed by the monarch.
Why No Election Was Required
A general election is not automatically required every time the office of Prime Minister changes hands. The governing party retains its parliamentary majority because voters elected MPs rather than an individual Prime Minister. If the ruling party chooses a new leader through its internal leadership process, the government continues to operate without interruption.
This constitutional arrangement provides stability and allows the government to continue functioning during periods of political transition. It also avoids the expense and disruption of holding a nationwide election every time party leadership changes.
The King’s Constitutional Role
After a governing party elects a new leader, the monarch invites that individual to form a government. This constitutional step is largely ceremonial and follows long-established conventions. The King appoints the person most likely to command a majority in the House of Commons, ensuring continuity of government.
Although the monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister, political power rests with Parliament and the elected representatives of the British people.
Could an Election Still Happen?
Yes. A newly appointed Prime Minister has the authority to request a general election if they believe it is politically advantageous or if they seek a stronger public mandate. Parliament can also reach a point where a government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, potentially leading to an election or the formation of a new government.
In many cases, however, a new Prime Minister continues governing until the next scheduled general election.
What This Means for the UK
The UK’s parliamentary democracy is designed to ensure government continuity while respecting the results of the most recent general election. Leadership changes within the governing party do not automatically alter the composition of Parliament, which is why a new Prime Minister can take office without another nationwide vote.
Understanding this process helps explain why political transitions in the United Kingdom can appear different from those in countries with presidential systems. While the Prime Minister may change, the democratic mandate of Parliament remains in place until voters elect a new House of Commons at the next general election.
On July 21, 2026, global economic analysis shifts focus toward a defining structural macroeconomic trend: the massive expansion of public and private capital deployment into high-capacity electrical grid infrastructure. As industrial electrification, automated data center hubs, and renewable energy integration accelerate worldwide, sovereign governments and institutional investors are facing a monumental economic challenge. Updating legacy power grids to meet skyrocketing demand has emerged as a primary driver of long-term capital expenditures and industrial productivity across both developed and emerging market economies.
According to international economic policy updates released this week, grid infrastructure investments are projected to exceed multi-trillion-dollar thresholds over the coming decade. Economic planners caution that without modernized, high-voltage transmission networks, regional manufacturing sectors face severe energy bottlenecks, localized power price volatility, and operational constraints. Consequently, infrastructure spending is rapidly transitioning from passive utility maintenance into a vital component of national economic competitiveness and industrial policy.
The macroeconomic ripple effects of this capital deployment are being felt across global commodity markets and labor networks. High demand for structural industrial inputs—such as copper, aluminum, specialized electrical steel, and high-capacity transformers—has created sustained pricing support for critical material producers. Simultaneously, the specialized technical labor required to manufacture and deploy modern grid hardware is driving wage growth in industrial sectors, adding a complex new layer to central bank disinflation trajectories.
For global policymakers and strategic investors, the economics of energy grid modernization represent a double-edged sword. While massive infrastructure investment boosts short-term gross domestic product (GDP) and strengthens domestic industrial foundations, it requires disciplined fiscal allocation to prevent inflationary crowding-out of private capital. Countries that efficiently streamline grid infrastructure permitting and mobilize private investment will secure lower long-term energy costs, attracting high-tech manufacturing and reinforcing sustainable economic growth.
The international trade architecture entering the second half of 2026 is undergoing a profound structural pivot. As major sovereign economic blocs adjust to the long-term impact of unilateral tariffs and escalating regional subsidies, traditional globalized supply chains are being rapidly replaced by bilateral trade corridors and regional alliance networks. Data released in late July 2026 highlights a significant divergence: while cross-continental freight volumes between non-aligned partners have cooled, intra-regional trade throughout North America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe has surged to record levels. This shift reflects a broader macroeconomic strategy wherein multinational corporations prioritize geopolitical resilience over pure cost minimization.
The primary economic catalyst behind this regionalization is the proliferation of sector-specific tariffs targeting critical industries, notably battery components, clean energy technology, and advanced semiconductor hardware. In response, global manufacturers have adopted multi-tier sourcing models that distribute production across intermediate partner nations before final assembly. While this strategy successfully bypasses primary import duties, it adds structural layers of logistical complexity and administrative oversight. Economists note that while total output remains robust, aggregate production costs have drifted upward, contributing to persistent baseline inflation across major consumer markets.
Simultaneously, currency settlement patterns within these regional blocs are experiencing a notable transformation. Sovereign central banks and commercial institutions are increasingly utilizing localized currency swap lines and digital clearing mechanisms to settle cross-border trade transactions. This transition reduces direct exposure to foreign exchange volatility and mitigates third-party liquidity constraints, further solidifying regional economic cohesion. However, for developing economies situated outside these primary trading alliances, the tightening of international trade networks presents severe challenges, restricting access to key export markets and foreign direct investment.
For corporate strategists and policy analysts navigating late 2026, success requires a thorough understanding of these emerging trade corridors. Organizations must conduct regular risk assessments of their multi-tier supplier networks, model tariff sensitivities under shifting geopolitical scenarios, and invest in real-time supply chain telemetry. As regional economic blocs strengthen their regulatory borders, supply chain agility and compliance fortitude will distinguish market leaders from vulnerable enterprises in the evolving global economy.
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