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AMERICANS WILL elect 471 federal officials in November: 435 members of the House of Representatives, 34 senators, a vice-president and a president. These contests are overshadowed by the impending rematch between President Joe Biden and Donald Trump, his predecessor, which will be pitched as a struggle between democracy and autocracy (and amplified by a projected $3bn in campaign spending). Seven months of this promises to be wearing.
Cast your eye down the ballot, however, and something exotic is in the offing. At the moment, Washington is divided by the thinnest of margins. Democrats control the Senate by just two seats out of 100. Republicans control the House of Representatives by five out of 435 (a margin that will shrink to four once Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin retires next month).
After the election, control of both chambers could flip. In the Senate, the seats contested this year are in extremely favourable states for Republicans. In the House, by contrast, Democrats campaigning against the chaos of Republican leadership may wrest back control. A double flip would be quite a feat of political gymnastics: it has never happened before.
Senate terms last six years, and only one-third are contested every two years. The mix this year is unkind to Democrats. Joe Manchin, the West Virginia senator who managed to remain the Democratic representative of his Trump-loving state, is retiring. His seat will almost certainly be filled by a Republican, leaving the starting-point for the race at, in essence, 50-50.
Of the seven competitive Senate races this cycle, all are now held by Democrats. Five are in presidential battleground states (Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin). They are winnable by Democrats, but none comfortably (see chart). In Montana and Ohio Mr Biden is likely to lose, but the incumbent Democratic senators, Jon Tester and Sherrod Brown, must prevail if the party is to retain control of the chamber. They are the last remaining Democrats holding statewide office in their respective states. Adding to the Democrats’ headaches, Larry Hogan, a popular Republican ex-governor of ordinarily deep-Democratic Maryland, plans to run for its Senate seat.
Chart: The Economist
Republican incumbents, meanwhile, look comfortable. The two that Democrats have the slightest chance of upsetting are Ted Cruz of Texas and Rick Scott of Florida—neither of whom represents states that Mr Biden will be seriously contesting. Overall, then, the maths look troubling for Democrats. They will need to play perfect defence to get to a 50-50 Senate (and hope that Kamala Harris remains vice-president to break ties in their favour).
True, the Democrats managed this feat in the midterms of 2022 (actually gaining one seat, in Pennsylvania). They expect to retain their fundraising advantages. And the candidate-quality issues that hurt Republicans in previous elections may recur. In Arizona, for example, Kari Lake, an election-denying demagogue who in 2022 lost her bid for governor against a weak Democratic challenger, will probably be the party’s Senate candidate. In Pennsylvania Dave McCormick, the presumptive Republican nominee who lost an expensive Senate primary in 2022 to a celebrity doctor, Mehmet Oz, is dogged by allegations of carpet-bagging over his private-jet travel to his mansion in Connecticut.
The House elections are not so tilted against the Republicans as the Senate elections are against the Democrats. But Democrats have a more credible case for taking the chamber than the Republicans do for keeping it, for a number of reasons.
First, Republican stewardship of the House has been chaotic, even by the low standards of Congress. Last year, for the first time in American history, Republican hardliners deposed their speaker. Last week one of their ranks, Marjorie Taylor Greene, introduced a motion to depose the current speaker. More ordinary forces also militate against Republicans. Democrats are expected to outspend them. And there are over a dozen Republicans in districts that voted for Mr Biden; there are only five Democrats in Trump-friendly districts.
Chart: The Economist
The possible flip-flopping of the chambers may seem odd when American politics are so nationalised and polarised. Split-ticket voting—in which people vote for presidential candidates of one party and congressional candidates of another—has gone from common to exceptional. In roughly one-third of the Senate races held in the presidential-election years of 1992, 1996 and 2000, voters opted for a presidential candidate of one party and a senator of the other. In 2016 there were no such cases. And in the 33 elections held in 2020 the sole exception was in Maine.
Split congressional districts have also declined precipitously. Before 2000 well over 100 districts typically had representatives belonging to a different party from the voters’ presidential preference. By 2020 this had declined to a record low of 16.
But as American politics have calcified into two mutually loathing teams of nearly equal size, legislative majorities that were once enduring have become narrow and unstable. Between 1932 and 1994, Democrats controlled the House for all but four years. Since then the chamber has flipped party control five times. Minor fluctuations—small shifts in turnout, the entry of a third-party candidate—can be decisive.
A double flip would matter for more than just novelty. Republican control of the Senate would mean that Mr Trump, if he regains the White House, would have a far easier time confirming his most outlandish potential nominees. Mr Biden, if re-elected, could find that his nominees to fill judicial vacancies were refused.
Republican senators are, for the moment, more internationalist than their House colleagues, so aid for Ukraine could pass through a differently divided government. But on the whole, divided government tends to be inimical to serious legislating—as experienced in the tug-of-war between President Barack Obama and the Republican-controlled Senate after 2015.
The competition for Capitol Hill has not yet attracted a great deal of public interest. Perhaps it should. For all the attention that Americans pay to the question of their next president, they devote surprisingly little to whether or not he will be able to do much from his perch. ■
U.S. President Donald Trump and U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell.
Win McNamee | Annabelle Gordon | Reuters
President Donald Trump on Friday lobbed his latest criticism at Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, as the White House’s discontent for the economic policy leader hits a fever pitch.
During a Friday afternoon question-and-answer session with reporters, Trump pointed to examples of prices going down.
“If we had a Fed Chairman that understood what he was doing, interest rates would be coming down, too,” Trump said. “He should bring them down.”
Trump has long argued that the Fed, which sets monetary policy in the U.S., should cut down interest rates. His latest comments come as the White House has ratcheted up its attacks on Powell in recent days.
White House economic adviser Kevin Hassett said Friday that Trump and his team are assessing whether they can remove the Fed chair. Powell has said previously that he cannot be fired under law and intends to serve through the end of his term as chair in May 2026.
“The president and his team will continue to study that matter,” Hassett said at the White House after a reporter questioned if firing Powell “is an option in a way that it wasn’t before,” according to Reuters.
Trump posted on Truth Social on Thursday that “Powell’s termination cannot come fast enough.” His post included the nickname of “Too Late” for Powell, a continuation of Trump’s habit of giving satirical titles to political rivals.
His use of the word “termination” raised questions around if Trump was referring to Powell’s potential removal from his post ahead of schedule. Hassett said on Friday the administration will look at if there’s “new legal analysis” that would allow for Powell’s firing.
Powell appeared to irk Trump after saying Wednesday that the president’s contentious tariff plan could drive up inflation in the near-term and create challenges for the central bank in managing goals of high employment rates and price stability. Powell said Trump’s levies — many of which are currently on pause — are “likely to move us further away from our goals.”
“We may find ourselves in the challenging scenario in which our dual-mandate goals are in tension,” Powell said in prepared remarks before the Economic Club of Chicago. “If that were to occur, we would consider how far the economy is from each goal, and the potentially different time horizons over which those respective gaps would be anticipated to close.”
Powell also said that the Fed was “well positioned to wait for greater clarity before considering any adjustments to our policy stance.”
The Federal Open Market Committee has its borrowing rate currently targeted in a range between 4.25% and 4.5%, where it has sat since December. Fed funds futures are pricing in a more than 90% likelihood that the central bank holds rates steady again at its policy meeting next month, according to CME’s FedWatch tool.
As Trump’s team has scaled up criticisms, some Democrats have gone on defense. Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., warned on Thursday that a president firing the Fed chief would be dire for U.S. financial markets.
“Understand this: If Chairman Powell can be fired by the president of the United States, it will crash markets in the United States,” Warren said on CNBC.
China last week announced it was done retaliating against U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs, saying any further increases by the U.S. would be a “joke,” and Beijing would “ignore” them.
Instead of continuing to focus on tariffing goods, however, China has chosen to resort to other measures, including steps targeting the American services sector.
While the Trump administration has largely focused on pressing ahead on his tariff plans, Beijing has rolled out a series of non-tariff restrictive measures including widening export controls of rare-earth minerals and opening antitrust probes into American companies, such as pharmaceutical giant DuPont and IT major Google.
Before the latest escalation, in February Beijing had put dozens of U.S. businesses on a so-called “unreliable entity” list, which would restrict or ban firms from trading with or investing in China. American firms such as PVH, the parent company of Tommy Hilfiger, and Illumina, a gene-sequencing equipment provider, were among those added to the list.
Its tightening of exports of critical mineral elements will require Chinese companies to secure special licenses for exporting these resources, effectively restricting U.S. access to the key minerals needed for semiconductors, missile-defense systems and solar cells.
In its latest move on Tuesday, Beijing went after Boeing — America’s largest exporter — by ordering Chinese airlines not to take any further deliveries for its jets and requested carriers to halt any purchases of aircraft-related equipment and parts from U.S. companies, according to Bloomberg.
Having deliveries to China cut off will add to the cash-strapped plane maker’s troubles, as it struggles with a lingering quality-control crisis.
In another sign of growing hostilities, Chinese police issued notices for apprehending three people they claimed to have engaged in cyberattacks against China on behalf of the U.S. National Security Agency.
Chinese state media, which published the notice, urged domestic users and companies to avoid using American technology and replace them with domestic alternatives.
“Beijing is clearly signaling to Washington that two can play in this retaliation game and that it has many levers to pull, all creating different levels of pain for U.S. companies,” said Wendy Cutler, vice president at Asia Society Policy Institute.
“With high tariffs and other restrictions in place, the decoupling of the two economies is at full steam,” Cutler said.
Targeting trade in services
China is seen by some as seeking to broaden the trade war to encompass services trade — which covers travel, legal, consulting and financial services — where the U.S. has been running a significant surplus with China for years.
Earlier this month, a social media account affiliated with Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency, suggested Beijing could impose curbs on U.S. legal consultancy firms and consider a probe into U.S. companies’ China operations for the huge “monopoly benefits” they have gained from intellectual-property rights.
China’s imports of U.S. services surged more than 10-fold to $55 billion in 2024 over the past two decades, according to Nomura estimates, driving U.S. services trade surplus with China to $32 billion last year.
Last week, China said it would reduce imports of U.S. films and warned its citizens against traveling or studying in the U.S., in a sign of Beijing’s intent to put pressure on the U.S. entertainment, tourism and education sectors.
“These measures target high-visibility sectors — aviation, media, and education — that resonate politically in the U.S.,” said Jing Qian, managing director at Center for China Analysis.
While they might be low on actual dollar impact given the smaller scale of these sectors, “reputational effects — such as fewer Chinese students or more cautious Chinese employees — could ripple through academia and the tech talent ecosystem,” he added.
Nomura estimates $24 billion could be at stake if Beijing significantly step up restrictions on travel to the U.S.
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Travel dominated U.S. services exports to China, reflecting expenditure by millions of Chinese tourists in the U.S., according to Nomura. Within travel, education-related spending leads at 71%, it estimates, mostly coming from tuition and living expenses for the more than 270,000 Chinese students studying in the U.S.
Entertainment exports, encompassing films, music and television programs, accounted for just 6% of U.S. exports within this sector, the investment firm said, noting that Beijing’s latest move on film imports “carries more symbolic heft than economic bite.”
“We could see deeper decoupling — not only in supply chains, but in people-to-people ties, knowledge exchange, and regulatory frameworks. This may signal a shift from transactional tension to systemic divergence,” said Qian.
Can Beijing get more aggressive?
Analysts largely expect Beijing to continue deploying its arsenal of non-tariff policy tools in an effort to raise its leverage ahead of any potential negotiation with the Trump administration.
“From the Chinese government’s perspective, the U.S. companies’ operations in China are the biggest remaining target for inflicting pain on the U.S .side,” said Gabriel Wildau, managing director at risk advisory firm Teneo.
Apple, Tesla, pharmaceutical and medical device companies are among the businesses that could be targeted as Beijing presses ahead with non-tariff measures, including sanction, regulatory harassment and export controls, Wildau added.
Shoppers and staff are seen inside the Apple Store, with its sleek modern interior design and prominent Apple logo, in Chongqing, China, on Sept. 10, 2024.
Cheng Xin | Getty Images
While a deal may allow both sides to unwind some of the retaliatory measures, hopes for near-term talks between the two leaders are fading fast.
Chinese officials have repeatedly condemned the “unilateral tariffs” imposed by Trump as “bullying” and vowed to “fight to the end.” Still, Beijing has left the door open for negotiations but they must be on “an equal footing.”
On Tuesday, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Trump is open to making a deal with China but Beijing needs to make the first move.
“In the end, only when a country experiences sufficient self-inflicted harm might it consider softening its stance and truly returning to the negotiation table,” said Jianwei Xu, economist at Natixis.
EVEN WHEN Donald Trump does something well, he exaggerates. He won the popular vote last November for the first time in three tries, by a 1.5 point margin. “The mandate was massive,” he told Time. In fact it was the slimmest margin since 2000, but it was an improvement on Mr Trump’s two previous popular-vote losses, by 2.1 points in 2016 and 4.5 points in 2020. (He was elected in 2016 through the vagaries of the Electoral College.)