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Joe Biden’s weakness among Latinos threatens his re-election

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In Arizona, a growing Hispanic electorate should help Democrats. Yet Donald Trump is gaining ground

Image: Caitlin O’Hara

Ruben Gallego, a Democrat, first won elected office in Arizona in 2010, a time of fierce battles over immigration. That year, Republicans passed SB1070, known as the “show me your papers” law, which required state police to ask individuals they suspected of being undocumented to provide proof of their status. Joe Arpaio, the publicity-minded sheriff in Arizona’s most populous county, recruited right-leaning Hollywood actors to a “posse” he formed to track down illegal migrants. Although the Supreme Court struck down most of SB1070’s provisions and voters ousted Mr Arpaio in 2016, “those scars aren’t going away,” says Mr Gallego, now a congressman running for an open Senate seat. He says the legacy of Latino activism from the Arpaio era may explain why, in 2020, Arizona Latinos voted for Joe Biden in higher numbers than Latinos nationally did, helping to deliver Mr Biden a narrow 10,000-vote victory in the state.

Yet Donald Trump is once again testing Democrats’ assumptions. He gained some 90,000 Latino voters in Arizona between 2016 and 2020 despite having pardoned Mr Arpaio for a criminal-contempt conviction, calling him an “American patriot” who “kept Arizona safe”. And if current polling is anything to go by, Mr Trump looks set to cut further into Mr Biden’s margins with Latino voters come November.

The Latino electorate is growing unusually fast and a majority still prefers Democrats. Of the six swing states likely to decide the presidential election in November (the other five being Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin), Arizona has the largest share of Latino voters. Mr Trump is clearly gaining popularity among Hispanics. However, current polling suggests that Latino voters still prefer Democrats overall, just by a smaller margin than in the past—meaning that it is Mr Biden who will benefit from the growth in Latino voters. The outcome in Arizona will depend largely on the race between these two trends.

Hispanic population in Arizona, % of total

Sources: Pew Research Centre; US Census

The Arizona contest reflects fluidity in the national Latino vote. The group has never constituted a political monolith. It includes both Florida’s right-leaning refugees from Cuba’s socialist dictatorship and California’s proud leftist heirs to Chicano activism. Yet because, on average, Latino voters came to America more recently than non-Hispanic white and black Americans, they are less likely to have inherited a strong party affiliation from their parents or grandparents. They also “are more likely to hold what political scientists call cross-cutting identities”, or traits more commonly found among people outside one’s political tribe, says Samara Klar, a political scientist at the University of Arizona in Tucson. An evangelical Democrat might sound like an oxymoron but half of evangelical Latinos say the Democratic Party represents their interests. Because of cross-cutting identities, “Latino voters know a lot more people from the other party and they’re less hostile” towards them, notes Dr Klar.

Latinos also tend to have less extreme views. Compared with white Americans, they are less likely to identify as very conservative or very liberal. In a recent YouGov/The Economist poll one in seven said they do not know where they fall on the political spectrum, three times the number of white Americans who said the same.

Given these attributes, it should be little surprise that although Latinos as a whole lean Democratic, millions have voted for Republican candidates. Exit polls suggest that as far back as 1984 Ronald Reagan won some 37% of the Latino vote. By 2004 George W. Bush’s approximate 40% share was a high-water mark that even Mr Trump has yet to achieve.

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast by Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Arizona, Hispanics as % of population

By census tract, 2021

Share of total votes cast

by Hispanic voters, 2020, %

Democrats have assumed at their peril that Latinos are a natural constituency and share many of the party’s (increasingly) progressive preferences. “Latinos are not the black vote and Democrats just don’t understand that,” says Mike Madrid, a veteran Republican strategist. Yet Republicans have at times fallen into the same trap, assuming that Latinos leaned so Democratic that courting them was futile. “There were no Latino organisers in the Republican Party for 30 years,” adds Mr Madrid.

That has changed. In 2020 Republicans made gains with Latinos across the board. Voter profiles from Catalist, a political-data firm that helps Democrats, show that although Democrats won Latinos outright, Republicans increased their vote share among all subgroups of Latino voters. Their strides were especially large with non-college-educated Latinos. They swung 11 percentage points to the right between 2016 and 2020. Republicans also gained six points among college-educated Latinos. And while Mr Trump did not generally make notable gains among young voters between 2016 and 2020, young Latinos lurched to the right. Mr Trump’s share of votes from 18- to 29-year-old Latinos increased from 21% to 31%.

Some of this Republican momentum might be a reversion to the mean. Latino support for Barack Obama, the first minority nominee, and Hillary Clinton, the first female one, may have been unusually strong. Without Mrs Clinton to inspire them, Latinas swung towards Mr Trump by 12 percentage points in 2020. But why else did Republican gains materialise in such a pronounced way in 2020?

Top: A Phoenix food vendor who declined to be named said he intends to vote for Donald Trump in 2024.
Bottom: Arizona State University student Jazlyn Gonzalez, 19, said that while the US presidential vote in November “is really important”, she is as yet undecided about her choice. Image: Caitlin O’Hara

Covid may have been a factor. The disease disproportionately killed Latinos and strained their incomes. Some 24% of Latinos were employed as low-income front-line workers, more than any other race or ethnicity. About one in four new businesses are Hispanic-owned. So although Democrats’ focus on lockdowns and containing the disease may have saved many Latinos’ lives, it was perceived as threatening their livelihoods. Meanwhile, Mr Trump and Republican governors across the country advocated for fewer restrictions and a swift return to normal. According to a report by Equis Research, an outfit that studies Latino political behaviour, “Latino voters saw the 2020 election as a referendum on the economy…in a way they hadn’t in 2016.”

About 85% of Arizona’s Latino voters trace their origins to Mexico, a cohort whose views typically track Latino national averages. Yet whereas Democrats’ lead over Republicans among Latinos shrank by 16 points nationally in 2020, in Arizona their lead narrowed by only 9.6 points. Had Mr Trump performed among Arizona Latinos as he did nationally he would have won the state. His prospects have improved since then. Even after accounting for Democrats’ strength in Arizona, current polling suggests Mr Biden’s chances of winning the state in November are on a knife’s edge.

Holding constant the advantage Democrats had among Latinos in Arizona in 2020, Mr Biden is currently up by 17 percentage points among Latinos in the state, an 8.4-point shift to the right. An equivalent erosion in support would have cost Mr Biden 50,000 votes in 2020, enough for him to lose the state. Yet Republicans appear poorly positioned to seize upon their gains as the 2024 general-election campaign gets under way. Four years ago the Republican National Committee (RNC) invested early and heavily to win over Latino voters. This year the RNC is starved for cash. It has just $8m on hand compared with $77m at this point in 2020. And the Arizona Republican Party has been hobbled by dysfunction and factional disputes. All this bodes ill because campaign pros say the formula for winning an election that requires a surge in turnout is simple: spend money and reach out to voters early and often.

Mr Biden could still win the White House while losing Arizona. Assuming that the forecasts of a tight race prove accurate, and that Mr Biden holds on to Pennsylvania and Michigan, which are his strongest prospects among the half-dozen swing states, he would need to win at least one more of them. But Mr Biden’s loosening grip on the Latino vote— which is a significant factor in other closely contested states, particularly Nevada—is hardly encouraging.

Democrats are betting that the electoral maths will continue to favour them in Arizona because the Latino electorate will continue to grow. (They also expect Mr Biden’s standing with voters to improve by November.) The number of Latinos voting in Arizona has in fact increased steadily over the past two decades. This year alone there will be 150,000 newly eligible Latino voters in the state. And Arizona Latinos seem particularly motivated. In 2020 a striking 67% of eligible Latino voters in Arizona went to the polls, compared with 54% nationally (which was the lowest of all major racial and ethnic groups). If Latino turnout again reaches 67% in November, that would mean that Democrats could lose nearly four points from their Arizona margins over Republicans in 2020 and still net just as many votes.

“Who do you think would do a better job

handling the following issues as president?”

Source: YouGov/The Economist

“Who do you think would do a better job handling the

following issues as president?”, United States, %

“Who do you think would do a better job handling the

following issues as president?”, United States, %

Yet it is not a sure bet that Latinos will comprise a larger share of the electorate in 2024. Mr Biden and Mr Trump are both deeply unpopular candidates. Latinos are especially lukewarm on both. In national-level polling from YouGov/The Economist Hispanic respondents are roughly twice as likely as white ones to say that neither candidate would do a good job handling the issues they prioritise: the economy, inflation, health care and immigration. Among those who select a candidate, Mr Biden is viewed as stronger on health care while Mr Trump is seen as stronger on immigration.
Latino attitudes about immigration do not align neatly with the policies of either major party. Polling from Unidos, a lobbying group, found that roughly 83% of the Latinos they surveyed in Arizona in November 2023 supported a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, long a Democratic goal. Yet in that same survey 63% favoured securing the border, the signature cause of Republicans. “Republicans only want border security. They don’t want a pathway to citizenship…they just want moats and crocodiles and hot oil on the border,” argues Mr Madrid. And Democrats are often seen as having prioritised everything but a secure border. Between July and October of 2023 Arizona had more migrant encounters on its southern border than any other state and the crisis has persisted this year. Republicans will be hoping that Democrats bear the brunt of the political fallout.

Top: Samual Lopez, 31, who said he is voting for Donald Trump in November, added that he is frustrated at the US sending aid to Ukraine when there is a large population of homeless people in Phoenix.
Bottom: Ayling Dominguez, 26, who works as an advocate for immigrant rights, said Latino voters should “evolve the way we see our power and choices in electoral politics.” Image: Caitlin O’Hara

Economic issues may also hurt Mr Biden. Until 2019 housing in the Phoenix metropolitan area, where two-thirds of the state’s population lives, was cheaper than the nationwide average. Residents there now shell out 12% more than average. Inflation also spiked higher in Phoenix during 2022 than in any other city, although it has since fallen below the national average. In November 2023 some 59% of Latinos in the state said inflation was one of their most pressing concerns. That cannot be helping Mr Biden’s standing.

These perceptions may yet change as inflation softens. But views on access to abortion tend to be more fixed, and here Democrats retain an advantage. Some 65% of Arizona Latinos think that, no matter their personal views, it is wrong to make abortion illegal. In the aftermath of the Dobbs decision in 2022, which overturned the constitutional right to abortion, a surge of women registered to vote in Arizona. In November Arizonans may vote on a referendum that would protect a woman’s right to an abortion through viability, or about 24 weeks of pregnancy. That could increase Democrat-leaning turnout.

Political campaigns come and go, but Democrats’ outreach to Latinos is maintained during off-cycle years with a vast network of grassroots Latino organisations that hew progressive. “This does not exist on the Republican side of the equation,” laments Helder Toste, a former field director at the Republican National Senatorial Committee.

These dynamics will affect more than just the presidential ticket. They may well help decide which party controls the House and the Senate. Mr Gallego, who currently represents parts of Phoenix in the House of Representatives, will probably do battle with Kari Lake, a Trump acolyte and election-denier, for Kyrsten Sinema’s open Senate seat. The state also has two competitive House races. One features an incumbent and rising star, Juan Ciscomani, a Mexican-born Republican who gave the party’s Spanish-language response to Joe Biden’s state-of-the-union speech in 2023.

The election is still more than seven months away and many Latino voters have not tuned in yet. According to polling from YouGov/The Economist, 38% of Hispanic respondents, compared with 23% of white respondents, say they are paying little or no attention to the 2024 presidential campaigns. In the autumn, when more Latino voters take note, they are likely to be bombarded with messages that the fate of the nation lies in their hands. In Arizona at least, the adverts will not be all exaggeration.

Sources: YouGov; Catalist; Redistricting Data Hub; US Census Bureau; OpenStreetMap; Pew Research Centre; Federal Election Commission; All About Redistricting; ArcGIS; The Economist

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How did the U.S. arrive at its tariff figures?

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U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a “Make America Wealthy Again” trade announcement event in the Rose Garden at the White House on April 2, 2025 in Washington, DC.

Chip Somodevilla | Getty Images

Markets have turned their sights on how U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration arrived at the figures behind the sweeping tariffs on U.S. imports declared Wednesday, which sent global financial markets tumbling and sparked concerns worldwide.

Trump and the White House shared a series of charts on social media detailing the tariff rates they say other countries impose on the U.S. Those purported rates include the countries’ “Currency Manipulation and Trade Barriers.”

An adjacent column shows the new U.S. tariff rates on each country, as well as the European Union.

Chart of reciprocal tariffs.

Courtesy: Donald Trump via Truth Social

Those rates are, in most cases, roughly half of what the Trump administration claims each country has “charged” the U.S. CNBC could not independently verify the U.S. administration’s data on these duties.

It didn’t take long for market observers to try and reverse engineer the formula — to confusing results. Many, including journalist and author James Surowiecki, said the U.S. appeared to have divided the trade deficit by imports from a given country to arrive at tariff rates for individual countries.

Such methodology doesn’t necessarily align with the conventional approach to calculate tariffs and would imply the U.S. would have only looked at the trade deficit in goods and ignored trade in services.

For instance, the U.S. claims that China charges a tariff of 67%. The U.S. ran a deficit of $295.4 billion with China in 2024, while imported goods were worth $438.9 billion, according to official data. When you divide $295.4 billion by $438.9 billion, the result is 67%! The same math checks out for Vietnam.

“The formula is about trade imbalances with the U.S. rather than reciprocal tariffs in the sense of tariff level or non-tariff level distortions. This makes it very difficult for Asian, particularly the poorer Asian countries, to meet US demand to reduce tariffs in the short-term as the benchmark is buying more American goods than they export to the U.S., ” according to Trinh Nguyen, senior economist of emerging Asia at Natixis.

“Given that U.S. goods are much more expensive, and the purchasing power is lower for countries targeted with the highest levels of tariffs, such option is not optimal. Vietnam, for example, stands out in having the 4th largest trade surplus with the U.S., and has already lowered tariffs versus the U.S. ahead of tariff announcement without any reprieve,” Nguyen said.

The U.S. also appeared to have applied a 10% levy for regions where it is running a trade surplus.

"Absolutely nothing good coming out" of Trump tariff announcement, veteran economist Rosenberg says

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative laid out its approach on its website, which appeared somewhat similar to what cyber sleuths had already figured out, barring a few differences.

The U.S.T.R. also included estimates for the elasticity of imports to import prices—in other words, how sensitive demand for foreign goods is to prices—and the passthrough of higher tariffs into higher prices of imported goods.

“While individually computing the trade deficit effects of tens of thousands of tariff, regulatory, tax and other policies in each country is complex, if not impossible, their combined effects can be proxied by computing the tariff level consistent with driving bilateral trade deficits to zero. If trade deficits are persistent because of tariff and non-tariff policies and fundamentals, then the tariff rate consistent with offsetting these policies and fundamentals is reciprocal and fair,” the website reads.

This screenshot of the U.S.T.R. webpage shows the methodology and formula that was used in greater detail:

A screenshot from the website of the Office of the United States Trade Representative.

Some analysts acknowledged that the U.S. government’s methodology could give it more wiggle room to reach an agreement.

“All I can say is that the opaqueness surrounding the tariff numbers may add some flexibility in making deals, but it could come at a cost to US credibility,” according to Rob Subbaraman, head of global macro research at Nomura.

 — CNBC’s Kevin Breuninger contributed to this piece.

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Analysts react to latest U.S. levies

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Charts that show the “reciprocal tariffs” the U.S. is charging other countries are on display at the James Brady Press Briefing Room of the White House on April 2, 2025 in Washington, DC. 

Alex Wong | Getty Images

U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday laid out the “reciprocal tariff” rates that more than 180 countries and territories will face under his sweeping new trade policy.

The announcement sent stocks tumbling and prompted investors to seek refuge in assets perceived to be safe.

Analysts generally had a pessimistic take on the announcement, with some even predicting an increased risk of a recession for the U.S.

Here is a compilation of reactions from experts and analysts:

Tai Hui, APAC Chief Market Strategist, J.P. Morgan Asset Management

“Today’s announcement could potentially raise U.S. average tariff rates to levels not seen since the early 20th century. If these tariffs persist, they could materially impact inflation, as U.S. manufacturing struggles to ramp up capacity and supply chains pass on costs to consumers. For instance, advanced semiconductor manufacturers in Taiwan may not absorb tariff costs without viable substitutes.

“The scale of these tariffs raises concerns about growth risks. U.S. consumers may cut back on spending due to pricier imports, and businesses might delay capital expenditures amid uncertainty about the tariffs’ full impact and potential retaliation from trade partners.”

David Rosenberg, President and founder of Rosenberg Research

“There are no winners in a global trade war. And when people have to realize, when you hear this clap trap about how consumers in United States are not going to bear any brunt. It’s all going to be the foreign producer. I roll my eyes whenever I hear that, because it shows a zero understanding of how trade works, because it is the importing business that pays the tariff, not the exporting country.

And a lot of that will get transmitted into the consumer, so we’re in for several months of a very significant price shock for the American household sector.”

Anthony Raza, Head of Multi-Asset Strategy, UOB Asset Management

“They’ve come up with the most extreme numbers that we can’t even comprehend. How they’re coming up with these? And then in terms of timing, I think we were hopeful that maybe this would be something that was rolled out over the course of a year, that would allow like time for negotiations or whatever. But it does seem like the timing is much more immediate and is, again, worse than our worst-case type scenario in terms of flexibility.”

David Roche, Strategist, Quantum Strategy

“These tariffs are not transitional. They are core to President Trump’s beliefs. They mark the shift from globalisation to isolationist, nationalist policies – and not just for economics. The process will last several years and be felt for decades. There will be spillovers into multiple policy domains such as geopolitics.

Right now, expect retaliation, not negotiation by the EU (targeting U.S. services) and China (focusing on U.S. strategic and business interests). The Rose Garden tariffs will cement the bear market. They will cause global stagflation as well as U.S. and EU recession.”

Shane Oliver, Head of Investment Strategy and Chief Economist, AMP

“Our rough calculation is that the 2nd April announcement will take the US average tariff rate to above levels seen in the 1930s after the Smoot/Hawley tariffs which will in turn add to the risk of a US recession – via a further blow to confidence and supply chain disruptions – and a bigger hit to global growth.

“The risk of a US recession is probably now around 40% and global growth could be pushed towards 2% (from around 3% currently) depending on how significant retaliation is and how countries like China respond with policy stimulus.”

Tom Kenny, Senior International Economist, ANZ

“Today’s announced US reciprocal tariffs are worse than expected. The effective tariff rate on U.S. merchandise imports is likely to climb to the 20-25% range, the highest since the early 1900s.

Yields on inflation-indexed bonds were higher and equities sold off after the announcement, suggesting the market thinks these tariffs will hurt growth and add to inflation. Market pricing of the federal funds rate points to cuts from the Federal Reserve coming sooner.”

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EC President von der Leyen

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The European Union is preparing further countermeasures against U.S. tariffs if negotiations fail, according to European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen.

U.S. President Donald Trump had imposed 20% tariffs on the bloc on Wednesday.

Von der Leyen’s comments come after retaliatory duties were announced by the bloc after the U.S. imposed tariffs on  last month in a bid to protect European workers and consumers. The EU at the time said it would introduce counter-tariffs on 26 billion euros ($28 billion) worth of U.S. goods.

Previously suspended duties — which were at least partially in place during Trump’s first term as president — are set to be re-introduced alongside a slew of additional duties on further goods.

Industrial-grade steel and aluminum, other steel and aluminum semi-finished and finished products, along with their derivative commercial products, such as machinery parts and knitting needles were set to be included. A range of other products such as bourbon, agricultural products, leather goods, home appliances and more were also on the EU’s list.

Following a postponement, these tariffs are expected to come into effect around the middle of April.

This is a developing story, please check back for updates.

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